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Microcredit has rapidly become an important tool in fighting poverty and promoting small business 
development. As such, agencies involved in microcredit loans, especially donors, policymakers, 
and practitioners, are keen to assess the impacts of microcredit, in order to ensure that the 
supportive funds were spent efficiently. However, the evidence of what microcredit programs have 
achieved remains incomplete and inconclusive. Several existing studies find that microcredits have 
both economic and social impacts, while others find no evidence of socio-economic development 
from microcredits. Examining the impacts of microcredit, therefore, remains an open question for 
policymakers, development practitioners, donors, and researchers. 
This thesis explores the effects of microcredit on rural households in Vietnam, focusing on three 
aspects, namely, the economic, social, and human capital aspects. To this end, this thesis aims to 
investigate three research questions, as follows: 
1. Does microcredit increase a rural household’s food consumption? 
2. Does microcredit help rural households to enhance social network? 
3. Does microcredit improve children’s education in rural Vietnam? 
To answer these questions, I first develop a theoretical framework, in which a representative 
household, after accessing microcredit to invest in its small family business, is involved in a multi-
stage decision-making process to maximise its lifetime utility. Accounting for the probability of 
achieving success in the microcredit-funded family business, which increases the family income, 
the household first makes decisions on its children’s education, then on social network and finally 
on food consumption. Solving the utility maximisation problem backwards, I derive the optimal 
consumption, social network, and children education as functions of microcredit and a set of 
control variables. 
Then guided by the theoretical framework, I estimate these impacts using the household survey 
data from rural Vietnam. Regarding the impact on food consumption, microcredit appears to be an 
effective tool for smoothing food consumption. However, it is also found that previous borrowings 
become a burden for current-period consumption. That is, the borrowers need to squeeze their 
current consumption to repay the borrowing in previous periods. Hence, in this sense, despite that 
ix 
 
rural Vietnamese households can benefit from borrowing microcredit, they are also faced with a 
risk of falling into “credit trap”. It is important to improve the microcredit policy to facilitate 
positive impacts and mitigate adverse effects.  
Regarding the impact on social network, microcredit enhances borrowers’ social network in terms 
of both size and quality of the network. The social network can have a long-term impact on 
borrowers, especially the poor. A broader and better social network enables borrowers to access 
to external supports when facing adverse income shocks. It also helps them acquire new skills 
from peers within its social network to build a route out of poverty. 
For the impact on children’s education, I find that microcredit borrowing significantly and 
negatively affects children’s education in rural Vietnam, which suggests a child labour effect. 
When a household receives external resources, such as microcredit, to expand its family business, 
its demand for labour increases, and using its children in the business is, not surprisingly, a cheap 
way to solve the problem. Moreover, this adverse effect is more profound for boys. Such negative 
impact requires attention from policymakers and practitioners, in that despite being an anti-poverty 
tool, the microcredit can also harm children’s education, which, in turn, exacerbates their poverty, 
particularly in the long run. 
This research makes three contributions to existing literature. First, it provides a comprehensive 
analysis of the impacts of microcredit on rural households from three dimensions, namely food 
consumption, social network, and children’s education. Second, the theoretical framework 
developed in this thesis can be utilised in other similar impact assessment studies. Third, the policy 
implications from this study are likely to help improve the microcredit policy and reduce poverty, 
not only in Vietnam but also in other developing countries.  
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Microcredit refers to small loans provided to the poor with an aim to lift them out of poverty. 
It is based on the idea that credits are given as financial assistance to low-income households, 
who otherwise have difficulty in accessing the traditional banking and monetary system due to 
lack of collateral. With the help of microcredit, the borrowers can shift to new livelihood 
strategies, which in turn allow them to pursue self-employment projects that generate additional 
earnings and promote their well-being. Eventually, it will help the poor borrowers to be out of 
poverty.  
This argument is logically consistent. However, it is not clear whether microcredit achieves its 
intended outcomes. To this end, this thesis aims to investigate the effects of microcredit on 
rural households in Vietnam, focusing on three aspects, namely the economic, social, and 
human capital aspects. Based on the standard utility maximisation, this thesis develops a 
theoretical framework which allows us to empirically analyse the impacts of microcredit on 
rural households. This comprehensive study, hence, sheds light on the understanding of 
whether microcredit is an effective tool for poverty alleviation in developing countries. 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 1.1 provides a background of the 
research. Section 1.2 and Section 1.3 highlight objectives and research questions. Then, 
motivations and contributions are presented in Section 1.4. Section 1.5 presents the structure 
of this thesis. 
 Background 
Even though the concept of combating poverty through microcredit is widely adopted and 
practised in both global and Vietnamese contexts, evidence of anti-poverty impacts is mixed 
and inconclusive. For instance,  Pitt and Khandker (1998) investigated the effects of 
microcredit on borrowers’ income and consumption in Bangladesh. They conclude that 
microcredit borrowings significantly enhance these outcomes of interest. However, even using 
the same dataset, Roodman and Morduch (2009) later found no evidence of the impacts in 
Bangladesh. Similarly, in the context of Vietnam, Duong and Thanh (2014) empirically 
analysed the Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey (VHLSS) and found that 
microcredit indeed helps borrowers to earn more income and consume more. In contrast, 
Nghiem et al. (2012), using a quasi-experimental approach, did not discover any significant 
effect of microcredit on household consumption in Vietnam. The contradictory findings of 
previous studies raise a need for a high-quality research on the impacts of microcredit, with 




Given the needs for studies on the impacts of microcredit, three aspects are important, namely 
the economic, social, and human capital aspects. Knowledge of all these three aspects can 
provide comprehensive and essential information to any interested agencies, particularly the 
donors, policymakers, or practitioners, to ensure that funding is spent efficiently. For example, 
the positive impacts of microcredit on borrowers’ economic aspect, such as food consumption, 
reflects the success of microcredit in fighting poverty in terms of economic improvement, 
which however is likely to be short-lived. Although this indicator directly affects the 
households’ utility, it is insufficient to draw a completed picture of microcredit impacts. In 
addition, the microcredit providers also need to understand how their services change their 
clients’ social capital, such as social network, and human capital, such as children’s education. 
Compared with the economic effects, these impacts tend to be more long-lasting, and also 
significantly help lift poor rural households out of poverty. A better social network allows poor 
households to access non-financial supports from relative, neighbour, and friends in time of 
need to deal with any negative income shock. In addition, educated children are more likely to 
get decent jobs and significantly support their parents, as well as other siblings, to end their 
poverty circles. Nevertheless, the effects of microcredit programs on the three aspects of 
household welfare have not been thoroughly explored in the existing literature, as will be 
highlighted in the chapter of literature review, and there remain questions to be answered. 
It is necessary to have a comprehensive study of rural microcredit assessment in order to draw 
appropriate and effective policies for rural development. Rural microcredit is given to the poor 
to improve their welfare and eventually pull them out of poverty. However, the microcredit-
related policies might not work properly due to insufficient facilities and limited resources in 
the under-developed areas. Therefore, if there is no appropriate policy for rural microcredit 
services, it might result in problems rather than solutions for poverty alleviation. For instance, 
the poor borrowers might get deep into debt traps if they cannot pay back the loans; they can 
become even poorer. 
Vietnam appears to be a good case for a rural microcredit assessment study. As a developing 
country in South East Asia, its population is about 96 million (World Bank, 2019). More than 
70 per cent of those are living in rural areas, and most of them are low-income households. 
These attributes make Vietnam an ideal representative for analysing the impacts of microcredit 
on the poor. Furthermore, in Vietnam, poverty is widespread, and the government has made 
significant efforts to alleviate it. These efforts include implementation of a number of 




non-governmental organisations. As a result, Vietnam’s achievement in fighting against 
poverty is substantial. For instance, the incidence of poverty, measured in terms of the 
international poverty line, has declined from 60 per cent in the early 1990s to 20.7 per cent in 
2010, then 9.8 per cent in 2016 (World Bank, 2019). Thus, the contribution to poverty 
alleviation of microcredit and lessons from Vietnam policy implementation would be of 
importance to researchers and policymakers not only in Vietnam but also globally. 
To overcome the shortcomings of previous studies outlined above, this thesis develops a 
theoretical framework to investigate the contribution of microcredit to rural development in 
terms of economic, social, and human capital aspects.  Using a unique panel dataset, namely 
the Vietnam Access to Resources Household Survey (VARHS), the findings are expected to 
propose potential solutions to improve the effectiveness of rural microcredit, not only for 
Vietnam but also for other developing countries. 
 Motivations for this research 
Microcredit has been recognised as a potentially effective tool to fight against poverty. The 
spread of microcredit appears to coincide with a sharp decrease in the poverty rate across 
countries. Vietnam is not an exception. For example, the poverty rate dropped sharply from 
40.07 per cent in 2002 to 9.8 per cent in 2016 (World Bank, 2019), while the number of 
registered microcredit institutions increased from two to thirty-six in the same period. 
However, the role of microcredit in fighting poverty in rural Vietnam is still unclear. Most 
previous studies of microcredit in Vietnam utilised cross-section data or panel data with a short 
time frame, such as Quach et al. (2005) using data from 1992 to 1998. These studies could not 
account for the dynamic aspect of the household’s welfare. This raises a need for a 
comprehensive study on whether microcredit contributes to poverty reduction in rural Vietnam.  
A comprehensive investigation using a nationally representative dataset is necessary to capture 
a full picture of the impact of microcredit on poverty reduction. Findings of such a study will 
allow policymakers to refine their microcredit-related poverty reduction programs to improve 
the intended outcomes. Government can also use the results to support the growth of 
microcredit institutions by providing necessary financial assistance. Findings of the study will 
also facilitate microcredit institutions to better understand the perceptions of their clients on 
the financial services they are providing. That, in turn, helps the microcredit institutions 




 Research objectives and questions 
The major aim of this work is to construct an empirical analysis to investigate the research 
questions related to the impacts of microcredit on rural households. It is hoped that this study 
will lead to new insights of whether microcredit is an effective tool for poverty alleviation in 
Vietnam, and how to improve the services. To achieve these goals, there are two specific 
objectives as follows: 
1. To investigate the impacts of microcredit on the consumption (economic impact), 
social network (social capital impact), and education (human capital impact) of rural 
household borrowers in Vietnam. 
2. To draw policy implications that allow policymakers, government, microcredit 
institutions, and donors to improve their services and maximise the desired outcomes. 
The overarching research question is how microcredit impacts rural households’ welfare in 
Vietnam. To be more specific, this thesis answers explicitly the following three sub-questions: 
1. Does microcredit increase rural households’ food consumption? 
2. Does microcredit help rural households to enhance their social network? 
3. Does microcredit improve rural household children’s education? 
It is expected that answering these three questions will significantly boost our understanding 
of the impacts of microcredit on rural households in Vietnam. 
 Contributions of the research 
This thesis contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, it is expected to shed 
light on the impacts of microcredit on rural households in Vietnam by using a unique and 
nationally representative panel dataset of rural households. The previous studies used cross-
sectional data or panel data that contain only two years. Thus, the research questions such as 
long-term impacts on consumption, education, and social network of rural households could 
not be answered. This thesis attempts to provide a reliable, comprehensive assessment of 
microcredit impacts in rural Vietnam. 
Second, this thesis assesses the influence of microcredit on rural households from three aspects: 




microcredit institutions to understand their contributions to the fight against poverty more 
comprehensively. In particular, assessing household food consumption allows policymakers 
and microcredit providers to understand how their service impacts clients on the economic 
aspect. However, the increase in food consumption is only one dimension to assess how 
microcredit can improve its clients’ wellbeing. In addition to that, human capital and social 
capital impacts also play a vital role in lifting poor rural households out of poverty. Therefore, 
to assess the impacts of financial interventions on rural households, researchers should 
investigate multi aspects. 
Third, this study aims to contribute to the existing literature with a theoretical framework, 
which is based on the standard utility optimisation framework and can be replicated elsewhere 
to tackle similar problems. The theoretical framework provides a full picture of microcredit 
impacts on a household in economic, social, and human capital dimensions. In the framework, 
a representative household makes optimal decisions in a multi-stage manner. Solving for the 
set of optimal decision problems, I derive the optimal consumption, social network, and 
education as functions of microcredit and other control variables. Subsequently, by fitting these 
functions to data, the framework allows me to investigate the impacts of microcredit on rural 
household welfares. 
Last but not least, the findings of this research are highly relevant to policymakers involved in 
microcredit not only in Vietnam but also in other developing countries. Once the roles of 
microcredit in poverty alleviation are better identified, it helps authorities draw appropriate 





 Structure of this thesis 
This thesis consists of eight chapters. Three of those are empirical studies. The thesis 
structure and contents are briefly summarised as follows. 
 
Figure 1.1 Thesis structure 
Chapter 1: This chapter discusses the background in which microcredit is seen as an important 
tool for poverty alleviation. This chapter addresses the motivations and contributions of this 
thesis, then states the research questions to be answered and objectives to be achieved in the 
rest of the thesis.  
Chapter 2: An overview of microcredit is provided in this chapter. The first section introduces 
the basic definition and purpose of microcredit. The second section discusses microcredit in 
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Vietnamese microcredit market: providers, clients and issues in the Vietnamese microcredit 
market.   
Chapter 3: Existing literature on the impacts of microcredit is reviewed in this chapter. It 
consists of four sections. The first section overviews the approaches of microcredit impact 
assessment in the literature. The second section reviews the impact of microcredit on 
consumption. Empirical studies on the impact of microcredit on the household’s social network 
are evaluated in Section 3. Finally, the fourth section reviews previous research on the impact 
of microcredit on children’s education.  
Chapter 4: The theoretical framework for this study, modelling issues, and data used are 
addressed in this chapter. The first section identifies the three impacts of microcredit on rural 
households: economic, social, and human capital. A household utility optimising framework, 
in which a household try to maximise its lifetime utility, is proposed. Based on the framework, 
models for empirical analysis are developed. The final section of the chapter provides details 
on data issues.  
Chapters 5, 6, and 7: These three chapters detail the three empirical studies on food 
consumption, social network, and children’s education, respectively. Each chapter contains 
five sections. The first section introduces the research problem and discusses the need to 
conduct the research. The second section discusses estimation strategies to overcome a number 
of estimation issues, such as selection bias and endogeneity. The third section shows data 
transformation, variable definition and summary statistics for the study. Estimation results are 
discussed in the fourth section. Finally, the last section draws a conclusion for the chapter. 
Chapter 8: This final chapter summarises findings, implications, and future research 
directions. The first section is a summary of all the research findings dawn from the research. 
Based on the findings, the second section highlights the significance and contributions of this 
thesis. The third section suggests important policy implications for improving microcredit 
effectiveness in order to more effectively alleviate poverty in Vietnam. The last section points 
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This chapter provides an overview of microcredit. In Section 2.1, some basics of microcredit 
are introduced. Section 2.2 discusses microcredit in practice that makes microcredit standing 
out from the conventional credit in the financial market. In Section 2.3, the Vietnamese 
microcredit market is presented.   
 Basics of microcredit  
In the literature, the terms of microcredit and microfinance are often used interchangeably. 
They are, however, different. Microcredit refers to small loans, while microfinance includes 
microcredit and other financial services such as insurance, money transfers, payments, 
remittances, among others. Thus, microcredit is only a component of microfinance (Oikocredit, 
2005). In this thesis, the focus is on microcredit. 
Microcredit is a provision of lending services to poor households. Due to their lack of physical 
collateral, these low-income poor families often fail to get approval for loans in the formal 
financial sector. In order to obtain money to fund their essential production and consumption, 
the poor households seek credit from informal sources but often with higher interest rates. This 
informal credit has been seen as a burden on poor families as it erodes their income and, 
consequently, leads the poor borrowers into “credit trap”, a cycle of debt and poverty. To fight 
poverty, governments in developing countries have introduced microcredit programs. These 
programs aim to assist the poor’s access to a small amount of preferential interest rate loans 
through the formal financial system.  
Microcredit services provide additional financial resources for poor households. With this 
assistant, the receivers can shift to new livelihood strategy owing to improved resources. 
Microfinance institutions also provide new knowledge, skills, and experiences to the receivers 
through social group meetings. Microcredit services target impoverished people living in both 
rural and urban areas. The main objective is to help them increase their labour productivity and 
then lead to an increase in household incomes.  
Comparing to the conventional credit, microcredit has the following distinguishing 
characteristics.  
(1) Small loans. This is the most significant feature of the microcredit. The small loans can 
be issued to individuals or groups of people. The loan volume varies from time to time, 




(2) Serving the poor. Microcredit programs chiefly serve the poor in developing countries, 
especially poor women. They focus on poverty alleviation.   
(3) Flexible with collateral requirements. Collateral requirements are the major obstacle 
for the poor who typically do not own valuable assets to secure their loans. Microcredit 
loans are usually collateral-free. Instead, microfinance institutions (MFIs) require their 
clients to have regular meetings to share their loan use experiences and to participate in 
training for new skills. It is through such innovative regular gatherings that MFIs help 
their clients to better use their loans for improved repayments.   
(4) Lower interest rates. The interest rates for microcredit loans vary across providers but 
are generally lower than the commercial interest rates. While this improves the poor’s 
affordability to secure loans, it also helps them to avoid “credit traps” – a situation in 
which borrowers might get approved for microcredit loans, but they have to combat 
higher interest rate and less favourable terms to pay back that loan. As a result, they get 
deep in debt and stuck in the debt trap. 
(5) Group lending. This innovative lending strategy issues loans to an individual who is a 
member of a borrowing group. All members of this group have a responsibility for the 
repayment of this individual’s loan. This join liability mechanism creates a new kind of 
collateral, the so-called social collateral. Group lending is gaining popularity. 
In 2018, globally, some 124 billion US dollars were lent to low-income households through 
the microcredit programs (Figure 2-1). Between 2012 and 2018, global microcredit increased 
at an annual rate of over seven per cent. At the regional level, Latin America and the Caribbean 
is most active in providing microcredit. South Asia has expanded its microcredit lending most 
impressively. The volume of microcredit in other regions is relatively low and with limited 






Figure 2-1: Microcredit loan portfolio. 
Source: Microfinance Barometer (Convergences, 2019). 
Generally, the provision of microcredit is in three forms: individual lending, group lending, 
and village banking. In individual lending, microcredit loans are directly offered to individual 
households. Bank officers take sole responsibility for leading decisions, risk assessment, and 
monitoring repayment. The individual lending is associated with several incentives such as 
collateral requirements, strict repayment terms in lending contracts. These requirements aim to 
promote sufficient social pressure on the borrowers to repay (Morduch & Aghion, 2000). 
Individual lending consumes less time for loan procedures, and it also protects borrowers’ 
privacy better than other lending models (Lehner, 2009). This lending model has been recently 
widely practised by microcredit banks in Bangladesh, Bolivia, and Indonesia.  
Group lending was first introduced by the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh. In this lending type, 
MFIs provide loans to groups of five, which usually are women groups. Each member of the 
groups has responsibility for other’s liability. A member has to monitor others’ loan use and 
repayments. If one of the members fails to repay loans in time, others take full responsibility 
to the debt. Otherwise, they are not able to receive the next credit due to this history of default. 
Members are required to attend regular group meetings. This lending mechanism, on the one 
hand, can mitigate the risk of bad debts by using joint liability, borrowers’ reputation, and the 
level of creditworthiness of each member. On the other hand, it places much pressure on other 
members. As such, group leaders are more likely to select creditworthy members to facilitate 
reputation and increase credit ranking for their group. Subsequently, the default rate is low 
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information, sharing experience among members. However, the cost of group lending is 
relatively high (Savita, 2007). In terms of the default rate, it is similar between individual 
lending and group lending, according to Gine and Karlan (2008). 
A village bank is a local informal self-help group which consists of 20-30 members from a 
village. Members are mostly female farmers. The first loan amount is $50-$100 for each 
member; very small compared to traditional loans. Village banks have regular meetings in 
which its members can update and discuss related loan uses and other financial matters. The 
frequency of participation in these meetings is an important indicator of getting a loan. While 
traditional loans require collateral that makes it almost impossible for low-income households 
to borrow, this village banks allows those who are with limited resources to borrow and invest 
in their microenterprises. Instead of collateral, this leading method employs social pressure to 
guarantee the repayment. The primary purpose of this mechanism is to help those extreme poor 
households by providing small financial assistance to allow them to engage in self-enterprises, 
which hopefully will eventually help them to be out of poverty. 
 Microcredit in practice: A global perspective 
2.2.1 Providers of microcredit 
Most of the microcredit loans are provided by formal financial institutions in forms of small 
loans. The providers of microloans can be divided into four groups.  
1. Banks, either state or private banks. They can be specialised banks for rural 
development or agricultural development or other non-banking institutions. Many 
countries have promoted their local microcredit banks. For example, Grameen Bank 
is the biggest and leading bank for the poor in Bangladesh. In Indonesia, the Unit 
Desa of Bank Rakyat is a successful bank for rural development.  
2. Non-profit, non-governmental organisations (NGOs). This group of providers has 
made significant impacts and has been recognised as a successful microcredit 
delivery system for poor people in rural areas (Mollah et al., 2019). The village, 
mobile, and solidarity banking are three innovative systems of this type of 
microloans provider and are common in most developing countries such as 
Bangladesh, India, or Vietnam.  
3. Self-help groups and credit unions. They are local providers who understand credit 




to be fast and low cost. The heads of groups typically are local reputable female 
heads of households. This group of credit providers is highly democratic and self-
managed by poor people. For example, Bangladesh is a pioneer in encouraging this 
type of microcredit providers in rural areas. 
4. Informal microfinancing, i.e., money lenders and saving collectors/brokers. They 
are also local credit providers and manage risk by understanding their customers’ 
financial situations. In turn, the informal credit lenders tend to charge higher interest 
rates to compensate for the cost of collecting customer’s information.  
Figure 2-2 shows the structure of global funding sources by types of providers. Banks are the 
largest source of microcredit, followed by non-bank financial institutions (NBFI). Together 
they provide over 85 per cent of the microcredit. The credit unions/cooperative and NGOs 
contribute about six and eleven per cent, respectively.  
While the loan volume has increased in recent years, the number of microfinance institutions 
has declined. This could be due to MFIs’ efficiency improvement in their loan services to the 
disadvantaged families, or business merging might have taken place. 
At present, the five largest and most influential microcredit providers are the 51Give (China), 
the Bank Raykat Indonesia, the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), the 
Grameen Bank (Bangladesh), and the Kiva Microfunds (the United States). The 51Give was 
 
 
Figure 2-2: Funding sources by providers. 
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established in 2007 in Beijing, China. It offers financial solutions for other MFIs, including e-
commerce platform. The Bank Raykat Indonesia is a 70 per cent state-owned bank and the 
largest microfinance institution in Indonesia. The BRAC is one of the oldest microcredit 
providers and was founded in 1972 in Bangladesh. Its branches stretch mostly in developing 
countries, from Haiti to the Philippines. The Grameen Bank is a pioneer in using microcredit 
as a productive tool for poverty alleviation. The Kiva Microfunds is an American bank and 
serves the poor in over 80 countries worldwide. The bank’s lending method allows their clients 
directly lend to others who lack access to traditional loans. 
2.2.2 Clients of microcredit 
The clients of microcredit are mostly those who are financially very poor such as female heads 
of households, pensioners, owners of small businesses, poor farmers, and unemployed workers 
(Gan et al., 2017). Collateral requirements are the main obstacle for them to obtain financial 
resources. Microcredit provides them with essential and accessible financial assistance. This 
kind of credit charges a lower interest rate and accepts varied forms of collateral (e.g., social 
form, or individual’s reputation).  
In many societies, women are identified as financially insecure and vulnerable. However, often 
they can better manage household finance and can help their families greatly in improving their 
livelihood if they are offered financial support (Garikipati, 2008). Microcredit has played a 
major role in assisting women in realising their capability potentials. It specifically targets this 
group of clients with loans. Figure 2-3 shows the proportion of microcredit clients by genders 
globally (Convergences, 2019). It is clear that female clients are dominant, with some 80 per 




Microcredit programs chiefly target clients in rural areas. Most of the rural clients are small 
poor farmers. Their businesses are related to unstable income and high risks. Therefore, 
microcredit has played a vital role in helping these poor farmers, alleviating poverty in rural 
areas. Figure 2-4 shows the proportion of microcredit rural clients in the world. Globally, 
over 60 per cent of microcredit clients are from rural areas. This proportion is even much 
higher in South Asia and East Asia and Pacific, being round 70 and 80 per cent, respectively. 
Microcredit is also made available to financially constrained urban residents. Typical urban 
microcredit clients include small retail shopkeepers, restaurants, service businesses, street 
vendors, and small-medium enterprises. Majority of microcredit clients in Latin America and 
the Caribbean are urban residents. 
 
 
Figure 2-3:  Microcredit clients by gender. 
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Figure 2-4: Rural microcredit clients. 
Source: Microfinance Barometer (Convergences, 2019). 
2.2.3 Do the microcredit programs help the poor? 
Whether and how microcredit may help the poor has long been explored. Many empirical 
studies suggest that microlending services can positively affect the wellbeing of the poor, 
especially in developing countries. Islam (2016) believes microcredit promotes income growth 
which leads to improvements in household’s consumption, then directly influence the 
household’s utility. In the same vein, Hulme (2000) argues that microcredit plays a vital role 
in increasing clients’ income and in leading to changes in their education and working skill 
levels. As a result, these changes positively impact households’ wellbeing and social capital. 
Morduch and Haley (2001) show that microcredit helps to support the household in a time of 
facing negative shocks such as natural disasters or severe sickness. The availability of 
microcredit enables poor households to have minimal consumption without selling any assets 
in difficult times. As such, microcredit acts as insurance for poor people to better cope with 
crises. More evidence on microcredit’s role in helping the poor is shown in the next chapter of 
literature review.  
The large and increasing number of poor households participating in microcredit programs is 
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Otherwise, they would not have participated in such programs. During 2012-2018, the number 
of microcredit clients has been steadily increasing (Figure 2-5). Globally, the number reached 
140 million. Microcredit client number increased most impressively in South Asia, East Asia 
and Pacific. South Asia, where a large number of the world’s poor live, accounts for the largest 
portion of the world total, is more than 50 per cent.   
 
 
Figure 2-5: Number of microcredit clients 
Source: Microfinance Barometer (Convergences, 2019). 
 Microcredit in Vietnam 
The earliest version of Vietnam’s microcredit started in 1956, namely the Rural Credit 
Cooperatives (RCCs). The RCCs initially aimed to collect small savings then lend to poor 
households, farmers, small and medium enterprises, and agricultural cooperatives (Wolz, 
1997). The RCCs collapsed in the late 1980s because of corruption, poor management, and 
restructure in the macroeconomic system. To keep supplying financial supports to the poor, 
especially for those related to agricultural sector, the Vietnam Bank for Agriculture was 
established in 1988. It is later renamed as Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural 
Development (VBARD). The bank initially used a joint liability lending mechanism to serve 
its customers and reached 74 lending groups by 1995 (Duong, 2015). To meet an increasing 
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The PCFs aims to form groups of donors to increase its capital and then provides savings, credit 
services to the poor. Most of the funds to MFIs come from Vietnamese government and donors. 
Several foreign donors that significantly contribute to the development of microcredit in 
Vietnam are the Work Bank, Asian Development Bank (ADB), International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), and other aid programs from Australia, France, Belgium, and Canada. In what follows 
is a synopsis of the providers, clients and some major issues in the microcredit market in 
Vietnam. 
2.3.1 Providers 
There are three kinds of microcredit providers in rural areas in Vietnam: formal, semi-formal 
and informal. Over the years, the performance of these three forms of microcredit providers 
has been remarkable. They have been one of the major forces to help reduce the poverty 
incidence in rural Vietnam (Pimhidzai, 2018).  
2.3.1.1 Formal providers 
In the official channel, two state-owned banks, the VBARD and the Vietnam Bank for Social 
Policies (VBSP), are the major microcredit providers. In 1996, the VBARD changed its target 
customers to rural households and agricultural sectors. Since then, the bank has rapidly 
increased the number of customers from rural families. For instance, the number of households 
served by the VBARD was 3.5 million in 1996 (Creusot & Thanh, 2003); by 2019, it increased 
to 13.5 million (VBARD, 2019). The successful expansion of the microcredit services is partly 
due to connections with such organisations as the Women’s Association, the Farmer’s 
Association, and the Veteran’s Association. These social groups play a significant role in 
disseminating information, seeking customers, performing transactions, and facilitating the 
loan procedure. With this network infrastructure, the VBARD aims to finance clients who meet 
the requirement of collateral for their loans. However, most of the poor people in rural areas 
fail to get loans from the VBARD because of lacking collateral.  
The Vietnamese government started to provide microcredit to the poor in 1995 via the Fund 
for the Poor, which was later replaced by a Vietnam Bank for the Poor (VBP) under the 
VBARD management. The VBP aims to provide low-interest rate loan to the poor that requires 
less collateral. To be eligible, the clients must be classified as poor by the local commune’s 
People’s Committee and the Ministry of Labour, Invalids, and Social Affairs of Vietnam 
(MOLISA) and the loans are distributed to the poor households through the social groups to 




increased rapidly. For example, the VBP provided microcredit to about 0.6 million poor people 
in 1998 (Conroy & MacGuire, 2000). In 2003, the VBP was restructured to establish the VBSP 
that was entirely independent of the VBARD. The VBSP since then has become a major non-
profit bank. The VBSP takes part in implementing microcredit projects from the government 
or non-government organisations with low-interest rate to the high-risk group of clients. By 
contrast, VBARD is a commercial bank and mainly focuses on farmers who work in the 
agricultural sector. According to ADB (2014), the formal microcredit activities in Vietnam has 
expanded since 2005. In particular, the number of customers increased from 5.81 million in 
2005 to 7.42 million in 2014. Of which, VBSP accounts for 66 per cent of the formal 
microcredit in terms of the loan value in 2014, while VBARD and other formal and semi-
formal microfinance institutions share 14 and 20 per cent, respectively. 
Although the public financial system has tried to offer suitable services to rural people, many 
households are still unable to access formal credit because of three primary reasons.  
(1) There is a long-distance from clients to VBARD/VBSP offices and long waiting time 
in the application process. Many potential customers, especially the poor, live in remote 
areas, while the banks’ offices are usually set up in the centre of communes or 
provinces. Moreover, to be a client, the poor household must meet a set of criteria such 
as being certified as poor by local authorities, or must be nominated by their social 
groups, or must borrow for agricultural projects. All this results in high transaction costs 
to the poor.  
(2) The requirement to provide collateral becomes a significant barrier to the poor in 
accessing microcredit. The banks usually ask for collateral to ensure their borrowers 
pay back the principal and interest in the agreed time. The common collaterals are the 
land ownership certificates, land title, or permanent residence certificate which the 
borrowers, especially the poor households, do not necessarily have.  
(3) Formal credit providers only provide limited options for funding. The banks tend to 
offer loans for income-generating projects and exclude the loans for consumption, 
health, or education needs. As such, the public financial system does not serve the 
whole rural population to meet all their essential needs. The semi-formal and informal 
microcredit providers fill this gap. 
2.3.1.2 Semi-formal providers 
Semi-formal providers are microcredit institutions that are registered as banks with special 




system. They provide loans that are repaid in small, frequent, and manageable instalments. 
Borrowers are encouraged to repay loans through group cooperation, norms, values, and a 
number of incentives. Microcredit institutions (whether formal, informal, or semi formal) have 
three distinguishing features: 1. the small size of products, both loans advanced and/or savings 
collected; 2. the absence of asset-based collateral; and 3. the simplicity of operations. 
The semi-formal institutions are essential players in the microcredit market. These non-bank 
institutions provide savings and lending services to their members but are not allowed to 
mobilise savings from non-members. Mass organisations (MOs) and not-for-profit Non-
government organisations (NGOs) are leading semi-formal microcredit providers in Vietnam.  
The MOs play a role as social mediation to facilitate the lending processes. The five key MOs 
in Vietnam are social unions, the women union, youth union, farmers union, veterans 
association, and elderly association. These social groups have well-established networks from 
the central to village levels. With the system, the MOs assist microcredit programs in scanning 
potential clients’ economic status, and distributing loans to targeted customers. Using social 
peer pressure, MOs appear to be useful in monitoring loan use and repayment. Also, these 
semi-formal groups act as brokers for VBSP in looking for and assessing customers. 
Unlike MOs, NGOs may not purely provide financial services. More often, NGOs introduce 
programs which target poverty alleviation with other non-financial activities such as skill 
training or education. To do that, the aims of providing financial assistance, such as savings 
and loans, is just a component of the anti-poverty programs. NGOs tend to operate in remote 
areas where most disadvantaged people reside. Moreover, these organisations build up their 
capital by funding from international donors such as the World Bank, ADB, and IMF. They 
also mobilise savings among local communities and then lend small short-term loans to the 
poor with regular instalment repayments. 
2.3.1.3  Informal providers 
The informal microcredit providers, which include moneylenders, relatives, friends, and other 
financial groups, play an important role in providing credit to rural families. The interest rate 
charged by this type of providers varies. Loans come from relatives and friends are mostly free 
of charge. While moneylenders offer a wide range of services which even include loan for 
consumption with a simple procedure to meet urgent demand, they do charge high-interest rates 




The high demand for informal credit is mainly due to its simple application procedure, and the 
fact that the loan can be used for consumption purpose. The relationship between the creditors 
and debtors is based on trust. Given the information provided by the poor clients, the lenders 
make decisions on whether and how much to lend to them. To increase the prospect of getting 
the loans, the borrowers might provide the lenders with information on their skills or properties, 
how they utilised their previous credits and the level of their indebtedness. The repayment 
arrangement is flexible, which can be weekly/monthly or may not be specified at all. 
Furthermore, informal lenders provide loans for consumption purposes. The consumption loans 
are much needed in rural areas where households are vulnerable to any shock. Most of these 
households are poor and do not have durable assets, which can be converted to cash when 
facing shocks such as natural disasters, sickness, or before harvest. In such hardship situations, 
the consumption loans protect them from these shocks. 
The coverage of the informal microcredit service used to be very extensive but is now 
declining. The Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey (VHLSS) shows that the informal 
sectors accounted for more than 70 per cent of the rural credit volume in 1992. This proportion 
then dropped to 30 per cent in 1998 due to the expansion of formal financial institutions by the 
Vietnamese government (Barslund & Tarp, 2008). 
2.3.2 Clients 
In Vietnam, the poor, especially the rural poor, are the major clients of microcredit. Since the 
1980s, the number of microcredit clients has increased impressively. By the 2010s, it has been 
over 7 million (see Figure 2-6). According to the data from the MIX market, World Bank, over 
the period from 2008 to 2017, on average, about 7.5 million poor clients received microcredit 
every year. The significant drop in the number of borrowers in 2010 is due to changes in 
financial policies that encourage more formal microcredit lenders to enter the market and to 
protect against risks of a “credit trap”. However, the formal institutions usually require 
collateral such as land title or other valuable assets, which many rural borrowers do not have. 







Figure 2-6: Number of active clients. 
Source: Based on data from the MIX market. 
In terms of clients’ gender, most of the microcredit clients in Vietnam are female. Figure 2-7 
shows that the proportion of female clients is above 60 per cent throughout the period between 
2014 and 2018. In 2018, this proportion reached 73 per cent.   
 
 
Figure 2-7: Clients by borrowers’ gender. 
Source: Based on data from the MIX market. 
In Vietnam, “group-based lending” gains increasing popularity in providing loans to poor rural 
households. A potential client is required to form a group of 5-50 members residing in the same 
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leaders usually take responsibility in providing information of each member to credit providers, 
collecting loan applications and dispersing the loans, and monitoring repayments from the 
group members. In the case of a default, credit officers deal with default borrowers, while the 
group head helps convince the defaulters to repay. 
In terms of clients’ regions, Vietnam witnessed a significant percentage of rural clients over 
the period from 2012 to 2016 (see Figure 2-8). In particular, rural clients increased from 60 per 
cent in 2012 to nearly 80 per cent in 2016. This structure has remained relatively stable in 
recent years. This trend suggests that the Vietnamese authorities have significantly focused on 
rural development where the majority of the poor population reside.  
 
 
Figure 2-8: Clients by areas. 
Source: Based on data from the MIX market. 
2.3.3 Remaining and emerging issues in Vietnam’s microcredit market 
Access to credit remains one of the critical issues in Vietnam’s effort to use microcredit to fight 
rural poverty. The lack of ability to access the microcredit by those remote and extremely poor 
rural households is most concerning. Further, the benefits of microcredit programs need to be 
shared and accepted by the public, especially those who are in the implementation of such 
programs.  
In Vietnam, there are still challenges in defining and identifying real rural poor. Very often, 
the definition of poverty is different between GSO method and local authorities approaches. 

















and non-poor households basically relies on the instinctive judgement of local officials who 
often have a varied understanding of the national poverty line. If a real poor is “defined” by a 
local official as a non-poor – even though the person is really extremely poor, this then makes 
it difficult for the real poor to access the microcredit.  
Selection bias also denies the access of those really in need for microcredit loans. Generally, 
fund providers, such as policymakers, donors, and others, widely accept that their microcredit 
helps and encourage the poor develop new likelihood strategies, generate extra income from 
enterprising activities, and create more job opportunities. In reality, however, to approve a loan 
application, the providers still tend to focus more on one’s ability to repay. They are more likely 
to select households that have strong potential to repay.   
The benefits of microcredit in fighting poverty and in helping Vietnam’s overall economic 
development needs to be better understood. As noted earlier, microcredit has been one of the 
major forces that have helped to bring down poverty from more than 60 per cent in the 1990s 
to less than 10 per cent today. The public needs to be made more aware of the contributions 
that microcredit has helped the country to advance. Especially, those microcredit providers 
who serve the rural applicants need to be well educated.  
To better educate the public, the evidence of microcredit benefits needs to be adequately 
revealed, which calls for more empirical studies of the microcredit programs. In the case of 
Vietnam, many questions, such as the following, require answers:  
• How have the extremely rural poor and those rural poor in remote areas been served by 
the microcredit programs? And how have they benefited from such programs? 
• How have the microcredit programs contributed to Vietnam’s economic and social 
advancements? 
• Are there notable differences in microcredit program benefits between regions and 
why? 
• Why have poor rural households benefited differently from the programs? What are the 
common traits for households in using the loans more or less successfully?  
• Does microcredit improve rural poor’s food consumption which may result in healthier 
bodies for improved labour productivity?  
• Does microcredit help rural households to increase their social networking that 
subsequently may help them to make better use of resources for improved production 




• Does microcredit improve school attendance of children of poor rural households that 
may better equip these children to step out the poverty trap in the future? 
This research attempts to provide answers to some of the above questions. It is expected that 
the findings of this research will provide valuable insights to help microcredit policymakers, 
MFIs, donors, and loan officers to better implement their micro-financial services to the rural 
poor and make a greater contribution to reducing rural poverty in Vietnam, and as well in other 
developing countries.  
Before diving into the inquiries, in the next chapter, existing literature that examines 
microcredit programs is first reviewed. Then, in Chapter 4, the research methodology to be 
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This chapter reviews what has been explored in the literature on microcredit impact assessment. 
It goes from an overview of earlier impact assessment to the three specific areas that this thesis 
is investigating. Section 3.1 first surveys the literature on microcredit impact assessment and 
the general approaches used. After setting a general picture of the impact assessment in Section 
3.1, the remaining of the chapter, Sections 3.2 to 3.4 focus specifically on studies that address 
the impacts of microcredit on consumption, social network, and education, respectively.  
 Microcredit impact assessment 
Earlier studies till about 2000, that deal with the assessment of the impacts of microcredit on 
individuals, households, enterprises, and communities are first reviewed in this section. The 
next part of this section discusses studies that argue that more aspects of microcredit impacts 
should be explored at various levels. Finally, a Household Economic Portfolio (HEP) model is 
evaluated; this model helps demonstrate how microcredit interventions contribute to a 
household’s welfares, such as consumption, assets, savings, health, social network, education. 
3.1.1  Earlier models of microcredit impact assessment 
The earliest conceptual model was proposed by Sebstad et al. (1995). The primitive analytical 
model classifies the impacts of microcredit into three domains, namely individuals, households, 
and enterprises. At the individual level, the impacts of microcredit on interactions of 
intrahousehold relationships can be assessed by observing personal resources, households’ 
decision-making process, and household members’ community participation. At the household 
level, the impacts could logically be observed by household income, expenditure, and assets. 
At the enterprise level, the impact domains include production processes, resource bases, 
management, market and financial performance. These impacts depend on household 
allocations of labour, capital, and other resources. In short, Sebstad et al. (1995) map the 
significant components of the household economy by suggesting groups of expected impact 
domains at the household, enterprise, and individual levels. According to the authors’ 
suggestion, any study on the impacts of microcredit should take into account the interaction of 
household resources and its activities. 
Based on earlier works, Barnes (1996) develops a household-based microenterprise finance 
program assessment method. Barnes (1996) notices that assets are a crucial proxy for 
household’s welfare due to reflecting household living condition and defining entrepreneurship 




negative shock, to maintain well-being. Therefore, households tend to maximise the present 
value of assets in their livelihood strategies. Barnes (1996) classifies assets into three groups: 
physical, financial, and human capital at the individual, household, and enterprise level. Assets 
can be used by both enterprises and households, or passed among families, individuals, and 
enterprises over time.  
The asset-based analysis suggests several ways that a loan can contribute to household welfare 
by directly purchasing assets or investing in income-generating assets which, in turn, increase 
household earnings afterwards. However, assets may have been accumulated over time. Thus, 
if assets are not treated appropriately, it may lead to a bias in measuring the impact of 
microfinance interventions (Nghiem, 2005).  
Later, Dunn et al. (1996) and Sebstad and Cohen (2001) develop theoretical models for 
assessing the role of microcredit in household risk management. Dunn et al. (1996) argue that 
the desirable provisions of microcredit services are helping its clients reduce risk and loss of 
negative income shock by providing insurance for them. The authors suggest households 
should select low-risk activities, diversify income sources, and use insurance services offered 
by microfinance institutions. In the same vein, Sebstad and Cohen (2001) argue that most of 
the microcredit clients are poor, and they are vulnerable to risk because they see themselves 
have limited resources to cope with income shocks. The clients are risk-averse and tend to 
invest in low return projects which result in low productivity and low income. Therefore, the 
poor might not quickly escape from the poverty circle, but they might be safer if they do not 
invest in high-risk projects. Both studies suggest that access to financial services can help 
clients reduce vulnerable levels by facilitating assets accumulation, diversifying income 
sources, and providing a large number of financial products. 
To contribute to the strand of the literature, Chen (1997) is concerned with the impacts at the 
individual level and argues that household members may receive different impacts from 
microcredit interventions. In this argument, any impact assessment at the individual level 
should be conducted with those at the household and enterprise levels as well. The author 
suggests four outcomes that researchers can trace changes at the household member level. They 
are perceptual (self-esteem, self-confidence), relational (role in the decision-making process, 
participation in household and community activities), cognitive (knowledge, skills, and 
awareness), and material (income, asset) impacts. However, this framework does not account 
for time effects. In particular, several economic impacts, such as income, are likely to occur 




In summary, analytical approaches in earlier studies focused only on the limited number of 
outcomes of interest, such as income, assets, and risk. Microcredit may have various other 
impacts on the livelihood of borrowing families. There is a strong need for models that can 
provide clear insights into such impacts as well. Before presenting discussions on such models, 
highlighted below are possible other major impacts of microcredit in addition to those that have 
been deal within existing studies. 
3.1.2 Potential impacts of microcredit 
Possible impacts of microcredit are shown in Figure 3-1, which is based on previous studies. 
Figure 3-1 includes the levels, types of impacts, and common measures of the impacts. The 
impact levels can be divided into narrow and wide levels (McGregor et al., 2000). The narrow 
level includes the impacts at the individual, household, and micro-enterprise levels. The effects 
at the national, regional and community levels are in the wide level group. 
Types of impacts can be classified into four domains, namely economic, social, cultural, and 
political domains (Zohir & Matin, 2004). It is more likely that the effects on economic domains 
occur sooner while others need longer time to take place. The economic effects and social 
effects are expected to be analysed in the narrow level, while cultural and political impacts tend 
to be assessed at the wide level. 
At the narrow level, the specification of what impacts on individuals are different from those 
on households, and microenterprises. In particular, the effects on individuals might include 
material, cognitive, perceptual, and relational effects. The material effect, such as personal 
income or expenditure, can be achieved more quickly than others. The cognitive effects can be 
proxied by accumulated knowledge or experience. The perceptual effects might include the 
level of participation in community activities. The relational effects can be embedded by the 







Figure 3-1: Potential impacts of microcredit.  
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However, these impacts need to be investigated in the interactions among household members. 
For example, farm works are likely to be shared among household members, while housework 
is mainly done by women. Household heads tend to play a crucial role in deciding resource 
mobilisation, such as investment or marriage of their children. Therefore, the intra-household 
effects of microcredit should be conducted by applying qualitative techniques. Nonetheless, in 
utilising quantitative methods, it needs to be assumed that all household’s members are equal 
in all activities and consumption. 
The effects on the household and microenterprise levels can be clustered into economic and 
social effect groups. The economic effect group includes variations in income, consumption, 
accumulation of physical assets, savings, and investment. The social effects are expected to 
bring more benefit to poor borrowers than that of the economic effects. This impact group 
includes education, health, confidence, level of participation of each individual in household 
activities, and how income or consumption is distributed among the members. 
At the wide level, the microcredit impacts on society and community mainly include cultural 
and political impacts (Zohir & Matin, 2004). The cultural effects of microcredit can be captured 
by observing the changes in borrowers' attitudes or habits. For example, microcredit clients 
might shift their saving habit from traditional moneybox, or jewellery to safe savings in formal 
financial providers. The political effects are measured by changes in the level of participation 
of microcredit clients in policy-making processes. 
In short, the variables of interest can be identified from the assessment level. For example, the 
economic indicators, such as income, expenditure, and accumulated assets, are commonly used 
in microcredit impact assessment studies. The social proxies, such as children’s education, 
health care, nutritional consumption, have become popular. However, the choice of dependent 
variables for microcredit impact assessment studies depends on points of view the research 
stands for. This thesis stands on the viewpoints of microcredit-related donors, investors, and 
policymakers who are keen to understand the impacts of financial services at the household 
level.   
3.1.3 The household economic portfolio model 
When addressing household economic assessments, it is necessary to take into consideration 
of different expectations of microcredit stakeholders, such as donors, policymakers, 
researchers, practitioners, investors, or clients. Each major stakeholder in microcredit 




(Schreiner, 1997). In particular, donors are more likely to maximise the number of poor clients’ 
access to microcredit, while society tries to maximise benefit from the financial interventions 
to all groups. Other stakeholders such as investors, the poor clients, and workers try to 
maximise their profit from using the services. 
The goals of different stakeholders may contradict each other in the short run. For example, 
investors tend to prefer high-interest rates and fees in order to maximise their profit, while poor 
clients prefer to have low-interest rates and cost. In the long run, a trade-off among the goals 
of all groups could be achieved. For instance, a market equilibrium can be achieved when poor 
clients agree to an acceptable interest rate from investors. 
Objectives, scale, scope, and methods of microcredit impact assessment studies are different 
depending on the kinds of stakeholders. For example, donors and academia require to 
understand where microcredit is allocated and whether the services are effective. To answer 
these questions, quantitative methods with large-scale datasets may be needed. On the other 
hand, practitioners need useful information on loan management tasks to avoid failure in 
repayments and provide better services to clients. This requirement may need to focus on 
detailed small-scale qualitative assessments. Hulme (2000) divides the objectives into two 
groups of performance assessments. Firstly, "proving" objective sets a goal of measuring as 
accurately as possible to all microcredit impacts. This goal tends to be pursued by academics, 
researchers, policymakers, evaluation departments, and program managers. Secondly, 
"improving" objective focuses on understanding the processes of interventions and its impacts 
to improve those processes. This objective is likely to be set by program managers, donor field 
staffs, NGO personnel, and intended beneficiaries.  
This current thesis focuses on the impacts of microcredit at the household level. The underlying 
rationale for using households as units for analysis is that households are major targets of 
microcredit services. They play a crucial role in their production and investment strategies. 
Thus, any intervention examination which aims to provide impacts at the micro levels must 
look into household resource allocation and business activities (Team, 2001). The popular 
household economic portfolio (HEP) model is a household economy analysis framework with 
a focus on three components, namely resources, activities, and interaction between these two 
(see Figure 3-2). Households use their internal and external resources for three main groups of 
activities: consumption, production, and investment. In turn, these activities generate outcomes 
and contribute back to the household resource pool. These processes’ outcomes depend on their 
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Figure 3-2: The household economic portfolio model. 





The household resource pool combines internal and external resources. Internal resources can 
be classified into three groups, namely human, economic, and social capital. Human capital 
includes the labour-power (from strong/weak health), and knowledge, skills (from education) 
of family members. Economic capital includes income, savings, land, equipment, machinery, 
and inventory. Social capital is stored in less tangible or even intangible forms such as social 
networks. The microcredit goes into the resource pool as an external resource. For example, 
one can borrow loans from available financial institutions to add to its resource pool. 
The household activity component includes all activities of consumption, production, and 
investment. Consumption includes activities for food preparation, household cleaning, 
education, health care, and relaxing, which in turn contribute to human capital. The production 
activities can either generate income by producing marketable commodities such as agriculture 
cultivation, running small businesses, wage labour, or generate non-income products which are 
just used for family consumption. The households may invest in tangible items including real 
property, such as land and housing; physical stores of wealth, such as livestock or jewellery; 
financial stock, such as cash saving account; and productive assets, such as machinery. The 
households may also invest in intangible items to improve human capital through education. 
The connections between household resources and activities include livelihood strategies and 
possible outcomes. The livelihood strategies are all factors which significantly influence 
household decision-making processes in allocating their endowments to various activities. The 
possible results are economic and social outcomes from those activities that contribute back to 
the family resource pool. The outcomes come from the activities are added up to the unused 
endowment for future use. The outcomes also reflect the effectiveness of household resource 
allocation strategies. Therefore, by examining the outcomes, one can observe the contribution 
of external resources to the household economy.   
In summary, the HEP model shows how microcredit interventions go from the household 
endowments to their diverse activities and contribute back to the family endowments. The HEP 
model covers most of the household activities, including consumption, production, and 
investment. Therefore, the model can address where microcredit is used and avoids the 
fungibility problem.   
 Microcredit and household consumption  
In the literature examining microcredit impacts on consumption, the problem of self-selection 




access of microcredit due to the unobservable characteristics such as entrepreneurial ability, 
and where financial institutions choose to locate. These features significantly influence the 
household decision on whether to borrow, while econometricians could not observe and control 
them in estimations. The self-selection results in an endogeneity problem in estimation that is 
not easy to be resolved. Although a large volume of the literature focuses on the wider 
contributions of microcredit services to customers, there is no consensus on the way to control 
for self-selection bias. 
This section reviews earlier studies of the impact of microcredit on household food 
consumption,1 with a focus on methods used to control for estimation problems such as 
selection bias. These studies are classified into two broad categories according to whether the 
findings are a significantly positive effect of microcredit on the consumption or a 
negative/insignificant effect. 
3.2.1 A positive effect on consumption 
A number of previous studies have found that microcredit generates a positive impact on 
household food consumption. Attanasio et al. (2015) examined the impacts of joint liability 
lending in rural Mongolia where group and individual lending programs were randomly 
implemented across rural areas. By utilising a randomised control survey, the study found a 
positive connection between borrowing and food consumption. Pitt and Khandker (1998) 
utilised instrumental variables to estimate the impact on household consumption from lending 
by three major microcredit institutions in Bangladesh. The study defined the eligible 
households for microcredit are those who own less than a half-acre of land as an instrument 
variable. With these criteria, control and treated groups are formed to estimate the average 
treatment effects on the consumption. By using a limited-information maximum likelihood 
estimation, they find a positive impact in the range between 0.018 and 0.043 from six research 
equations. Schroeder (2010) also suggest that microcredit has a positive impact on per-capita 
family consumption with an elasticity ranging from 0.177 to 0.212. To overcome the 
endogeneity problem, the authors impose an assumption that the conditional correlation of the 
errors is constant. This assumption allows using observational data to simulate instrument 
variables. 
 
1 Some studies investigate the impacts of microcredit on other types of consumption. However, due to data 
availability, this thesis only explores the household food consumption. Therefore, this section only reviews 




Khandker (2005) uses panel data and finds loans to women lead to an expansion in household 
consumption in Bangladesh. Quach et al. (2005) employed the Heckman two-step method to 
analysis the impact of borrowing on consumption per capita in Vietnam by using the VHLSS 
1993 and 1998. They find a modest impact. Particularly, the elasticity of increasing 
consumption is just 0.07 and 0.06 in 1993 and 1998, respectively. Imai and Azam (2012) 
and  Khandker and Samad (2014) utilise a panel data with fixed effects estimators to overcome 
the problem of self-selection bias. They find positive and significant benefits from borrowing 
to household consumption and income in Bangladesh. Similar impacts are also found by using 
repeated cross-sectional data in the study of Duong and Nghiem (2014). Moreover, Imai and 
Azam (2012) employed the difference-in-differences technique with propensity score 
matching  (DID-PSM) and household fixed effects models in their study. This method provides 
a reliable and effective ways to control for the endogeneity bias in microfinance research. 
Nghiem et al. (2012) utilise the quasi-experimental survey with village fixed effect to analyse 
the positive impacts of microfinance on income and consumption in Vietnam and control for 
heteroscedasticity. By this method, the control and treated groups are designed to have similar 
characteristics and offer three main advantages (Bhuiya et al., 2015). First, the endogeneity 
problem is controlled for, which is less time- and resources-consuming than the 
randomised control trials. Second, one can use the fixed effects and structural models to deal 
with endogeneity and clearly explain the effect of microcredit on livelihoods of customers. 
Third, the method can capture the spillover effects. Similarly, Boonperm et al. 
(2013)  demonstrate the positive link between support from the Village and Urban Community 
Fund and spending level of durable goods. Doan et al. (2014) used the quasi-
experimental approach with the propensity score matching and multiple treatment effects to 
evaluate the impacts of credit on health care and education spending of the poor in urban areas 
of Ho Chi Minh City of Vietnam. They suggest that although the formal credit increases 
expenditure in education and health care, the impacts of informal credit is insignificant. This is 
likely due to that the impacts on education and health care can only be observed in a longer 
time frame than that utilised in the study.  
Islam (2015) used village fixed effects to address the non-random nature of program placement 
and instrumental variables to deal with self-selection and found that the effects of microcredit 
on food consumption in Bangladesh were heterogeneous among households. The author 
concluded that the poorest participants achieved the biggest impact in terms of food 




(2012) found that microcredit in Bangladesh played a role as insurance for rural households 
against health shocks. The authors pointed out that microcredit can help rural borrowers to 
maintain their consumption, and avoid selling their livestock, in response to health shocks. 
Duong and Thanh (2014) evaluated the impacts of microcredit on the income and food 
consumption of rural households in Vietnam by using VHLSS data for 2006 and 2008. To deal 
with the selection bias, they applied propensity score matching (PSM) and difference-in-
differences (DID) methods. Their results showed a significant improvement in rural household 
food consumption and income due to microcredit. However, they found no evidence to support 
an increase in income among the rural poor. The authors suggested that local authorities should 
provide training in skills or business management to mitigate the misuse of loans. Phan et al. 
(2014) also employed a PSM approach to analyse cross-sectional data for rural Vietnam in 
2010. They found that VBSP loans affected food consumption, and further the effects were 
stronger among the “truly poor” as certified by local authorities. Using a DID approach, Li et 
al. (2011) analysed household data for rural China and found that microcredit to rural borrowers 
raised both consumption and income. However, they also found that the main beneficiaries 
were non-poor households. 
3.2.2 A negative or insignificant effect on consumption 
Some studies found adverse effects or no connection between microcredit and household 
consumption. Coleman (1999) uses the quasi-experimental survey for Thailand. The author 
finds an insignificant link in changing expenditure in consumption as well in physical assets 
and labour time for a borrower. This result, however, can be cautiously explained that Thailand 
is relatively wealthy. Hence, small loans may not make much change in household welfare. 
Crépon et al. (2015)  assess the microcredit impacts on self-employment activities and 
consumption by using a quasi-experiment in remote areas in Morocco. The study applies the 
instrument variables estimation to overcome the self-selection problem. One of the key findings 
is that there is no evidence of a significant impact on consumption, although a significant 
impact on self-employment was found. The authors suggest it is due to that the increasing 
income from self-employment activities does not cover a decline of wage due to self-
employment.  
Utilising a credit scoring technique to randomly select a treatment group, Karlan and Zinman 
(2010) also found that microcredit did not affect food consumption in Manila. Banerjee et al. 




They randomly assigned groups of slums into control and treatment groups, where treatments 
groups benefited from access to new microcredit offices. They then analysed the impact of 
microcredit 15 to 18 months after opening the new offices and found no evidence of a change 
in average per capita food consumption.  They did, however, find an increase in consumption 
of durable goods by those households who ran existing businesses. Augsburg et al. (2015) used 
a similar randomised controlled trial to analyse the impact of microcredit in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. They found a negative effect of microcredit on food consumption and savings 
despite a positive impact on self-employment and labour supply. 
Roodman and Morduch (2009) performed a regression discontinuity estimation, using data 
from the work of Pitt and Khandker (1998) for Bangladesh, and found that the consumption 
was not driven by microcredit borrowing, in contradiction to the original findings of Pitt and 
Khandker. They argued that the eligibility criterion of owning land at some threshold level was 
not enforced and therefore using it as an instrumental variable was not valid. 
3.2.3 Summary 
Previous studies of the effect of microcredit on food consumption have yielded inconclusive 
results. A complicating issue in the empirical estimation is that households self-select into 
microcredit borrowing, resulting in a selection bias that needs to be corrected. Researchers have 
generally relied on two approaches for this. One is to rely on quasi-experimental approaches 
or randomised control trials to determine access to microcredit and thus avoid household-based 
choice in borrowing. The other is to employ instrumental variables when observational data 
are used. Regardless of either approach, however, the findings in the existing literature are 
conflicting as to the effect of microcredit on consumption. Quasi-experimental and randomised 
control trial approaches are time-consuming and costly to implement. In contrast, with the 
availability of high-quality observational data with long time series, it is feasible and less costly 
to adopt an instrumental variable approach, which will be adopted in this research.  
 Microcredit and social network 
A growing body of literature has investigated the success of microcredit interventions on 
poverty reduction. So far, the vast body of literature has focused on the economic gains of 
individuals and groups. Most of these studies support the link between the provision of 
microcredit and economic benefits. However, studies that examine the link between the 




to address the links between microcredit and social network, which is a very important 
component of social capital. These studies are generally qualitative. There is a lack of studies 
that employ quantitative approaches to estimate the relationships between the provision of 
microcredit and social network. This section reviews existing studies related to microcredit and 
social network.  
Social network is an important part of social capital. Although definitions of social capital vary, 
social network has always been directly or indirectly indicated in such definitions. For example, 
Coleman (1988) defines social capital as “a variety of different entities, with two elements in 
common: they all consist of some aspect of social structure, and they facilitate certain actions 
of actors whether personal or corporate actors within the structure” (Coleman, 1988, p. 598). 
Later, Putnam (1995) suggests that social capital is features of social structure such as trust, 
norms, and networks that facilitate coordinated action to improve the efficiency of society. 
Dasgupta and Serageldin (1999) define social capital as "the norms and social relations 
embedded in the social structures of societies that enable people to coordinate actions to 
achieve desired goals". Various other versions of social capital can be found, for example, in 
Woolcock and Narayan (2000) and Krishna and Uphoff (2002).   
Social capital plays an important role in community development and ultimately a whole 
nation’s development (see Ahmed et al., 2014; Claridge, 2004). Given that social network is 
an important part of social capital, logically the presence of strong and productive social 
networks promotes a country’s development. This is a major motivation for this current study 
to look into whether microcredit fosters social network in communities where microcredit is 
made available in Chapter 6. What follows in this section are some existing studies that have 
attempted to establish how social network is influenced by the provision of microcredit.    
3.3.1 Microcredit generates social network 
A limited number of studies have shown that the provision of microcredit does promote the 
growth of social network. For microcredit research, social network is classified into horizontal 
network and vertical network (Dasgupta, 1999). The horizontal social network is typically 
viewed as the relationships among borrowers who are assigned into groups or known to each 
other (such as relatives, from the same village or region), while the vertical network is the 
relationships between borrowers and those who are involved in making the loans available to 
them. It is believed that the horizontal flows of information are more reliable than vertical 




opportunities. Financial institutions try to employ local workers who grown up and married 
locally. Subsequently, they often have insider knowledge about clients' circumstances to build 
up their vertical social network.  
Todd (1996) shows the evidence that the provision of microcredit by the Grameen Bank in 
Bangladesh helps its clients to grow their networks. The author reports a case where a female 
borrower was able to not only better maintain existing networks of her and husband's kin, but 
also grow new social networks and building reputation. The female borrower combined her 
kinship group and capital from the Grameen Bank to lease and purchase lands. She ran a money 
lending business and developed clients by giving free-interest loans. This kind of business 
assists the Grameen Bank staff when they were busy. In turn, she could develop her network 
by providing small loans to help others buy livestock and lease land. 
Larance (2001) finds that being a member of the Grameen Bank can expand social network. 
The study concludes that the regular meetings enhance the network among its members, 
especially in family and kinship groups.  Most of the respondents in the research reported that 
they could use social networks to facilitate economic and non-economic activities. For 
instance, with a new network, many respondents enrolled and learned in the public mass 
education program that allows them to learn how to read. A member could learn experience 
from others and use it in his/her projects invested by loans from the bank. The author also 
reports that the members could expand social exchange. As a member, s/he could borrow 
jewellery and clothes to wear in social events and meet local social obligations. Moreover, by 
joining in the microcredit program, women could build their social network and ease mobility 
restrictions which seclude them within neighbourhoods and seek for assistance by using the 
local network. 
Dowla (2006) concludes that the services provided by the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh create 
a social network among society by promoting social trust, building new norms, and forming 
vertical and horizontal networks. In rural areas, the poor are more likely to trust only family 
and close friends because such trust is enforceable in cases of conflicts. Being a member of the 
Grameen Bank allowed people, who are not in the "radius of trust", to cooperate to reach 
common group goals. The author also suggests that participation in microcredit programs 
enhances self-confidence and expands social networks. In turn, indigent clients, particularly 
women, find it easier to nominate themselves to a political position. Claridge (2004) explains 
that the economic empowerment of women is changed by accessing financial services. When 




families. The return further allows them to renegotiate and significantly change gender 
relations within families and the community. These changes result in social and political 
empowerment. 
Microcredit provided through group-based lending can improve women's collective social 
behaviour (Sanyal, 2009). The author proposes three mechanisms through which microcredit 
creates the social network in India. First, continuous economic ties can generate trust that 
enhances cooperation among group members to identify social problems. Second, working 
together in a group with membership criteria, such as monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms, 
gradually forms the external group activities. Third, the features of interaction among group 
members, such as the cognitive focus of attention (money), talking, interaction with leaders, 
peer pressure, and mutual identification, may foster social network. 
In comparison with other development programs, microcredit is seen to be the most productive 
tool to create a social network. Basargekar (2010) makes it clear that the social network is 
generated through peer group pressure and monitoring. Social network improves 
creditworthiness of the poor clients, especially women. The social interactions also bring more 
benefits to the community such as greater trust, sharing of information, better decision making, 
and sharing power within households and in the community, and the generation of support 
system. Feigenberg et al. (2017) conducted an empirical experiment on the economic return to 
the social network. They randomly assign first-time borrower groups to meet either weekly or 
monthly. The study concludes that financial intervention increases the interaction among 
clients that, in turn, help to improve risk-sharing and reduce defaults. Further experimental 
evidence shows that high frequency of interaction fosters economic cooperation among clients. 
Individuals' social contact creation is significantly associated with the meeting frequency of 
the group. Around 90 per cent of clients are more likely to visit other group members after five 
months in the experiment. After their loans cycle ended, 40 per cent of them are more likely to 
participate in social events together for more than one year.  
Microcredit also plays an essential role in building a social network in micro-
entrepreneurship.  Morris et al. (2006) compare the performance between individual lending 
and group lending to self-employed entrepreneurs in Bulgaria and the Philippines. They 
suggest that cooperative lending groups have better performance than individual self-employed 
entrepreneurs. The reason is that the networks help entrepreneurs access flexible interest 





3.3.2 Social network is not an automatic outcome of accessing microcredit 
Research findings so far tend to suggest that the generation of social network by accessing 
microcredit is not an automatic outcome. This outcome depends on the political capability of 
borrowers, program structure, and social interaction. Moore and Putzel (1999) highlight that 
the political capability of the poor determines the level of empowerment. The most important 
role of external agencies is to create an environment in which the financial institutions facilitate 
the political participation of their poor customers. Seibel et al. (2000) examine the relationship 
in the Philippines. They assess the effectiveness of applying the Grameen Bank's experience, 
such as regular meetings, prompt repayment, on the Philippine financial system. The authors 
suggest that training, peer selection processes, and microcredit regulations play an important 
role in creating social network which then contributes to the success of the microcredit 
programs.  
Basargekar (2010) examines the effectiveness of social network in urban microcredit 
programmes in India by using a random sampling method to survey 217 women in the Self-
Help Group. The research points out that the urban financial programmes have positive 
correlations with awareness, capacity building, active and collective attendance in social and 
political events. However, the paper does not agree that the creation of the social network is an 
automatic achievement. The financial organisations should implement specific policies such as 
developing decision-making ability, capacity building programmes.  
Other studies have examined how social networks may influence the performance of 
microcredit. Van (1999) studies how social network help decreases transaction costs of 
microcredit programs. Ronchi (2004) finds that social network and microcredit support each 
other. Microcredit interventions use the existing social network to reduce transaction costs and 
improve repayments. 
3.3.3 Summary 
Overall, most existing studies on microcredit and social network have been qualitative and 
emphasised the success of microcredit provision in enhancing and creating the social network. 
A possible reason for the lack of quantitative research is that it is difficult to measure the social 
network due to the nature of multi-dimension of the social networks, such as the level and 
density of the social network. Moreover, some studies also suggest that the positive impacts on 
the social network are not an automatic outcome of microcredit. Other studies explore bi-




approaches with large-scale datasets to address the relationships between microcredit and 
social networks will be a valuable addition to the literature.   
 Microcredit and children’s education 
3.4.1 The mechanism through which microcredit affects education 
It is reasonable to expect that microcredit positively increases children's education because the 
lack of credit is considered as a major determinant for inadequate education for children in 
underdeveloped countries (Edmonds, 2006). Particularly, there are two reasons in rural areas 
of developing countries that human capital formation, especially education, is not a major focus 
in the household decision-making process. First, the lack of resources and infrastructure, such 
as schools, teachers, and academic materials, leads to the limitation in education provision. 
Second, budget constraints and parents’ preferences could lead to less demand for schooling 
achievements. These obstacles can be overcome by accessing microcredit. 
A growing body of literature has pointed out the determinants of children's schooling. These 
factors can be grouped into supply-side factors and demand-side factors. The supply-side 
factors are related to infrastructure, a supply of teachers, schooling resources, which can be 
facilitated by social and political impacts of microcredit programs on the community. Demand 
factors, however, can be affected by credit interventions mostly at the household level.  
Demand-side factors are individual's demand for education. This demand is a result of cost-
benefit analysis within the household. The cost includes financial costs and opportunity costs. 
The benefits are future return to the family from current education expenditure (Hill & King, 
1993). The outcome of the analysis depends on the perception of individual parents who may 
have different preferences for their children's human capital. There is evidence in the literature 
that shows mothers tend to allocate a higher proportion of household income to children's 
education as compared to fathers (Kennedy & Peters, 1992; Mencher, 1988; Philips & Burton, 
1998; Thomas, 1997). This information is valuable from policymakers’ point of view as it 
points out to whom in a household the loans should be given, in order to achieve the desirable 
outcomes. 
There are other important questions for policymakers as well in their efforts to promoting 
children's schooling. First, does it matter if loans are taken out by the mother or father? What 
channels could maximise the program benefits? What is the optimal credit size? What is the 




What are the roles of financial and social intermediary in the improvement of demand for 
education? Are boys and girls affected by microcredit to the same extent? The answers to these 
questions might differ due to the channels in which households achieve education through 
access to microcredit. Microcredit can generate positive or negative impacts on schooling 
demand. Sign of the effects depends on which channels the service influences education. 
Microcredit may improve demand for education through income, risk management, gender, 
and information effects. The negative effect, however, occurs when households invest in land 
that demands child labour for farming or housework. 
3.4.2 Channels through which microcredit impacts education 
There are five channels through which microcredit influences clients’ children’s schooling. 
The first channel is the income effect. When households access loans and invest in their 
projects, it may generate extra income. Subsequently, it should result in higher education 
expenditure (Behrman & Knowles, 1999). If the return from using their loans is larger than the 
borrowing cost, the borrowers' income increases and subsequently improves their children’s 
education under the assumption of parental altruism (Basu & Van, 1998). The increasing 
income may allow parents to overcome the financial threshold to send their next generation to 
school. However, this mechanism may not work in case of a decrease in income due to failure 
of risky projects or a burden of loan repayments. In addition, researchers argue that the parents' 
preferences are different and they may behave strategically and not spend on children’s 
schooling (Basu & Ray, 2002; Moehling, 2006). Islam (2008) finds that microcredit supports 
households to smooth their consumption; thereby, they do not need to pull their children out of 
school. However, this channel works only in the formal credit sector in which women are more 
likely to gain power within the family owing to the support of policies. 
The second channel is a risk-management effect. Maldonado and González-Vega (2008) 
suggest that faced with negative exogenous shocks, poor rural households tend to pull their 
children out of school. Households facing negative income shocks are likely to reduce the 
spending on education, and their children are demanded to work on farms to earn extra money. 
In these cases, accessing microcredit helps households to smooth consumption without selling 
assets, using financial savings, and taking children out of school. That, in turn, increases the 
household's ability to cope with unexpected shocks and increase demand for children's 
schooling. Islam and Choe (2013) find that in time of negative shocks, the vulnerable 




deal with the shocks and smooth consumption, thereby minimising the likelihood of 
withdrawing children from school. 
The third channel is the gender effect. It is believed that women’s preference for nutrients and 
education of children is stronger than that of men (Behrman & Rosenzweig, 2002; Thomas, 
1990), and microcredit institutions prefer giving loans to women. Thereby, microcredit can 
promote women empowerment by changing their power in the family's decision-making 
process. Subsequently, the demand for education might be positively affected. 
The fourth channel is the information effect. Given the uncertainty about the future, the poor 
may be short-sighted in terms of evaluating the return on education investment. Accessing 
microcredit allows the poor to acquire new knowledge from additional microcredit services, 
such as training and regular meetings. That might modify intertemporal perceptions about 
education return and influence schooling choices (Maldonado & González-Vega, 2008). In the 
same vein, Islam and Choe (2013) also report that financial institutions may provide additional 
training courses to their clients to help the poor understand the benefit of knowledge in the 
efficient utilisation of loans, and encourage them to send children to school for their future. 
The fifth channel is the child-labour demand effect. There is a possibility that the self-employed 
household might increase demand for child labour if it is funded by microcredit. Using loans 
for household enterprise often requires extra labour to work. For instance, borrowers might use 
the loans to purchase livestock, such as cows or chickens. Subsequently, children might be 
asked to take care of the animals, which affects negatively children's schooling time. If access 
to microcredit leads to an increase in productive activities, the opportunity cost to send children 
to school may increase, and the parents need to work more due to the extra activities. In both 
cases, microcredit access fosters the demand for child labour, and thereby limits children’s 
schooling (Trigueros, 2002). 
3.4.3 A positive effect on children education 
Pitt and Khandker (1998) find that financial services enhance children's schooling in 
Bangladesh, and in addition, girls receive more education if their families are Grameen Bank’s 
clients. Karlan and Zinman (2008) suggest that only male micro-entrepreneurial clients pay 
more attention to sending their children to school.  
Holvoet (2004) highlights how microcredit impacts children's schooling by using a household 




compared with non-borrowers, the education of borrowers’ children exhibits no significant 
difference when they borrow directly from local banks. However, a significant difference 
emerges when loans are taken up through social intermediations, such as women's groups. 
Moreover, mothers who borrow microcredit through the social groups are more likely to bring 
more educational benefits to girls than boys.  
Doan et al. (2014) contribute to the debate on whether microcredit brings benefit to education 
and health in developing countries. They employ the propensity score matching technique to 
match non-borrowers with borrowers and find that only loans from formal credit sources 
statistically impact education and healthcare spending in Vietnam, while there is no evidence 
for impacts of informal credit.  
You and Annim (2014) analyse the impact of formal credit in China, using a dataset of two 
surveys in 2000 and 2004. After controlling for the selection bias by using static and dynamic 
regression-discontinuity designs, they find that the formal microcredit helps borrower's 
children gain longer schooling years and achieve a higher average grade. However, it is noted 
that their study mainly focuses on the short-term impacts, given that their data only cover two 
years.  
Only a few researchers focus on the medium- or long-term effects of microcredit financial 
services. Islam (2011) argues that time length is a significant factor for return from microcredit 
to realise. Households need time to build up their reputation to access larger loans, which 
enable them to fund more productive projects and achieve higher profit. In addition, long-term 
clients are more likely to receive more supports from financial institutions than non-clients or 
short-term clients. Owing to such supports, households may not need to pull their children out 
of school for business expansion. Osborne (2006) uses a dynamic model to assess the impacts 
of microcredit on rural households in developing countries. He concludes that credit borrowing 
only has short-run benefits for productivity, consumption, and lifetime utility. In the long run, 
in contrast, the benefits are not sustained and even become negative. 
3.4.4 A negative or insignificant effect on children education 
Not all studies have discovered that microcredit borrowing benefits education. Some studies 
find that access to credit leads to an increase in income-generation activities, which tends to 
result in an increase in demand for child labour. Consequently, children may be taken out of 




In rural India, Jacoby and Skoufias (1997), one of the early studies, reported an increase in 
child labour, and thereby a decrease of school attendance, due to accessing microcredit. They 
conclude that poor financial infrastructure incurs risk to rural households, who usually are 
vulnerable to idiosyncratic shocks. As a result, the rural households use their children’s school 
attendance as self-insurance against such risk. When an unexpected adverse shock occurs, they 
will pull their children out of school to cope with it.  
Recently, a randomised evaluation of a group-lending program in India, conducted by Banerjee 
et al. (2015), finds no evidence for any difference in health, education, or women's 
empowerment between the borrowers and non-borrowers. Notably, there is no change in 
enrollment of children or teenagers, despite a decrease in teenage girls' labour supply. 
Furthermore, there is no difference in expenditure for schooling between private and public 
enrolment for boys and girls aged from five to fifteen. 
In Guatemala, Wydick (1999) points out that the linkage between microcredit and child 
schooling is not unequivocally positive. Microcredit borrowers tend to invest in labour-
intensive equipment/assets, and if the potential for moral hazard exists within family 
businesses, the households may still prefer to use their children rather than hiring workers. 
Furthermore, the demand for child labour even steps up if the success of the household 
enterprises boosts the return to child labour and thus increases the opportunity cost of 
schooling. As a consequence, microcredit, which is frequently assumed to ease credit 
constraints, does not guarantee an increase in children education.  
Hazarika and Sarangi (2008) also find a similar result in rural Malawi. Their study reveals that 
children in borrowing households are more likely to work in the season of peak labour demand. 
Adults in the borrowing households are frequently busy with the increased workload due to 
improved access to microcredit, particularly in the peak season, and subsequently, their 
children have to take up more domestic work. Moreover, data from Malawi show a 
significantly lower rate of primary school enrolment among children in the borrowing 
households, compared with those in the non-borrowing households. In addition, a stronger 
adverse effect is observed among young boys.  
Despite findings of significant impacts on business activity and self-employment in Bosnia, 
Augsburg et al. (2012) show that microcredit dramatically decreases school participation and 
fosters labour supply of children aged from 16 to 19. However, there is no significant effect on 




overcome the liquidity constraint. As such, the households might muster resources from 
elsewhere and reduce costs as much as possible. Internal labour, especially child labour, is a 
cheaper and more flexible input for household businesses, in comparison with those in the 
market. These advantages promote demand for child labour and reduce school enrollment of 
children. Moreover, the adverse effect is magnified if parents care more about their benefit than 
their children's future utility. In such cases, access to microcredit leads to transferring resources 
to parents and worsening children’s schooling.  
Using a large dataset from rural Bangladesh, Islam and Choe (2013) find that microcredit 
participation adversely affects children's education and increases child labour abuse rate. 
Notably, the authors point out that girls and younger children of borrowers are less likely to 
enrol in school and more likely to be forced to work than boys and older siblings. Moreover, 
mothers tend to bring more benefits to girls in terms of education than fathers. They also 
suggest that self-employment activities are a significant determinant for a reduction in 
children's education. 
3.4.5 Summary 
This section reviewed studies on the mechanism that microcredit may influence the decision 
of borrowers on their children’s education, the channels in which microcredit influences 
education, and those that have discovered varying impacts of microcredit on education. 
Findings of the literature on the linkage between microcredit and children’s schooling are 
inconclusive. This is due to different perspectives, methodologies used, and aims of the impact 
assessment.  
Further, in estimating the impact of microcredit on children’s education, previous studies do 
not distinguish between microcredit loans for production purpose and those for consumption 
purpose. Conceptually, microcredit borrowing for the purpose of consumption, which includes 
expenditure on children’s education, can promote children’s school attendance in the current 
period, which however becomes a burden in later periods when it needs to be repaid. In 
contrast, the productive microcredit borrowing tends to expand the borrowing household’s 
family business and increase its demand for workers, which is most likely to be satisfied by 
employing its children, at the expense of their education. Therefore, it appears necessary to 





In light of this gap, this thesis focuses on the productive microcredit and analyses its impact on 
rural children's education in Vietnam by using the Vietnam Access to Resources Household 
Survey (VARHS), a nationally representative panel dataset. This large-scale dataset allows the 
tracking of stated and actual uses of microcredit loans in rural Vietnam. Hence, it is possible 
for this study to separate different types of microcredit loans and focus on those that are actually 
used for the production purpose. In the next chapter, the methodologies to be used to examine 
the impacts of productive microcredit on education, as well as consumption and social network, 
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This chapter presents the methodology to be used in this thesis to assess the impacts of 
microcredit on the three variables of interest, namely the consumption, social network, and 
children’s education. Section 4.1 provides an overview of the research methodology. Theoretic 
considerations are given in Section 4.2 on how the three aspects of interest may be affected by 
the provision of microcredit. Section 4.3 discusses the theoretical model, in which a 
representative household maximises its lifetime utility and makes optimal decisions on 
education, social network, and consumption sequentially. The last section, Section 4.4 will 
discuss the VARHS dataset, which I utilise in this thesis. 
 An overview of the research methodology 
This thesis investigates the effects of microcredit on rural households in Vietnam, focusing on 
three aspects, namely the economic, social, and human capital aspects. The investigation is 
based on a conceptual framework, in which a representative household, after accessing 
microcredit and investing in its small business, is involved in a multi-stage decision-making 
process to maximise its lifetime utility. Based on the probability of being successful in doing 
businesses funded by microcredit, the household makes optimal decisions on its children’s 
education, social network, and food consumption sequentially. This multi-stage decision 
process is to be solved backwards, to obtain the optimal consumption, social network, 
education as functions of a set of explanatory variables which include microcredit. Data from 
the Vietnam Access to Resources Household Survey from 2008 to 2016 are used for empirical 
verifications in this thesis. These surveys were conducted every two years in 12 provinces in 
Vietnam and mainly focus on rural areas. 
 Identifying the impacts of microcredit on rural households  
Figure 4-1 demonstrates the impact flow, in which microcredit affects the household from three 
aspects. A household’s consumption is examined to assess the impact on the economic 
dimension. The social aspect is proxied by a household’s social network. Lastly, the children’s 




Consumption is the best outcome for the economic assessment, in comparison to income and 
assets, which are also frequently used in microcredit impact assessment. One may argue that 
income is the main economic outcome in microcredit intervention. However, income is an 
aggregated variable which comes from multi-sources, such as micro business, remittances, and 
seasonal incomes. Moreover, income exhibit seasonality, for example, rural households may 
have more income in crop harvesting seasons and less earning at other times. As a result, it is 
harder to identify the income effects of the interventions. Assets also appear not to be the best 
indicator for impact assessment because the asset level does not change quickly as other 
economic indicators in responding to the interventions. Assets need more time to be 
accumulated. For example, a poor household may need a significant amount of time to save 
enough money to buy harvesting equipment.  Therefore, it is hard to attribute the change in 
assets to the financial intervention. Meanwhile, families tend to smooth food consumption, 
subject to their budget constraints. Food consumption represents the household’s living 
standard level and is more responsive to the shock caused by the financial intervention. 
The social impacts can be measured by either the level of participation in community decision 
making processes or social networks. Arguably, the impact on social network is easier to be 
identified than that on the level of involvement in the social decision-making process, for which 
data are usually not available. Several proxies can be used to measure the social network, such 
as the number of social groups to which a household is a member, number of close friends, and 
the level of participation in social events such as weddings and birthday parties. Fortunately, 
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Human capital impacts can be captured by changes in children’s education or health care 
expenditure. Education achievement can be measured by the number of school years that all 
household members obtain. In rural areas, it is not difficult to collect data about the education 
achievement of household members. Although most rural households have low income, they 
highly value the future return of children’s education. As such, the rural households tend to 
spend a significant proportion of their resources to invest in their children’s education as a 
long-term investment, which, in turn, is expected to bring more income in future. 
In contrast, accurate data on health care expenditure are hard to obtain because rural people 
tend to use traditional medicine to treat sicknesses such as flu or cold. They rarely see doctors 
or go to hospitals unless they have serious health problems. Hence, this thesis employs the 
children’s education of rural households as a variable of interest for the assessment of human 
capital impact. 
After identifying the crucial indicators for economic impacts, social capital impacts, and human 
capital impacts, it is important to discuss a sequence that a household makes its optimal 
decisions. This research posits that after taking up microcredit loans, the borrower invests the 
borrowing in its small businesses. With the additional income, if the business achieves success, 
the households decide optimal education, social activities, and consumption levels sequentially 
(see Figure 4-2).  
Education, which increases human capital, is the first concern in the household’s utility 
maximisation problem. Arguably, households tend to allocate a significant proportion of their 
resources to invest in children’s education. They expect that the more education achieved, the 
more return they can receive in the future. Therefore, the optimal decision on the number of 
their children’s school years, or how much they should spend on education, is made before 
making any other decisions on social activities and consumption. Next, the household decides 
its social capital level through involving in social activities. The social activities could be the 
number of close friends they have, how much they spend on weddings, birthday, or other social 
events. Finally, the household makes the optimal decision for their consumption after deciding 
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 The model 
A representative household is engaged in a multi-stage decision-making process. At stage one, 
the household decides on its children’s education. Then, at stage two, it makes an optimal 
decision on its social network, and at stage three, choose its optimal consumption path. The 
model can be solved backwards by deriving the optimal consumption first, then for social 
network and education. 
4.3.1 Household optimising framework  
A representative household chooses a consumption path to maximise the present value of 












where utility in year 𝑡 is given by a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function; 𝐶𝑡 
is consumption in year 𝑡; ρ is a discount factor; and 𝜎 is the elasticity of substitution between 
consumption and saving.  
In each year, the household receives income, inherits wealth from the previous year, consumes 
goods and services, and makes interest and principal payments on microcredit loans. 
Accordingly, the household faces the following budget constraint: 
 𝑊𝑡+1 = (1 + 𝑟)[?̃?𝑡 + 𝑊𝑡 − (1 + 𝑟)𝑀𝑡−1 − 𝐶𝑡] (4.2) 
where W is household wealth; ?̃? is household income; r is the rate of interest. For simplicity, r 
is assumed to be constant for all periods and the loan interest rate is the same as the interest 
rate of savings;2 Mt is the total amount of microcredit loans borrowed at time t, and note the 
household might borrow more than once at time t. 
 




The household receives income (?̃?) from two sources. One is earnings from small businesses 
that are owned by the household (including farming) and financed with microcredit borrowing, 
𝑌𝐵, and the other is all else (e.g., wage labour and remittances), 𝑌:  
 𝑌?̃? = 𝑌𝐵𝑡 + 𝑌𝑡. (4.3) 
Running a small business requires household capability (entrepreneurship), which is only 
partly observable. Let z denote household capability such that 𝑧 = ?̌??̃?, where ?̌? is the observed 
component, which depends on a set of factors to be specified shortly, and ?̃? is the unobserved 
component, which is distributed over the range [0, ?̃?] with an upper bound ?̃? and cumulative 
distribution function (CDF) 1 − 𝐺(?̃?). To achieve business success, a threshold level of 
capability (entrepreneurship) is needed, which is denoted as 𝑧. Given the CDF of  ?̃?, the 
probability of achieving success in business can be written as follows: 
 𝑝 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑧 > 𝑧) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(?̃? > 𝑧?̌?−1) = 𝐺(𝑧?̌?−1) = 𝐺(𝐶, 𝐸, 𝑆, 𝐻). (4.4) 
where the observed component of capability (?̌?) is a function of household consumption, C; 
education, E; social networks, S; and other household characteristics, H. 
4.3.2 Factors affecting household capability 
Conceptually, food consumption, social networks, education all affect household capability. 
For example, the more food one consumes, the better the nutrition one receives and thus the 
higher is one’s productivity and the chance of achieving success in business. Education is a 
measure of human capital where with greater human capital, the probability of success in 
business increases. One’s social network also contributes to the probability of success in 
business by enhancing access to external resources and to opportunities for exchange of 
knowledge and experiences. 
The vector of other household characteristics (𝐻) includes household experience (age of 
household head, whether the household is local), resources (household size, area of land owned, 
number of dependent members, involvement in non-farming business activities, income from 
sources other than the household business), and economic status (whether the household is 
classified as poor, whether it experiences any income shock), and finally a year indicator. These 




business success. For example, an older household head with more experience is better able to 
deal with unforeseen situations. Moreover, local households have better understanding of the 
local business environment than households that migrated from other communes.  
Labour (household size) and land are two important inputs for a household business, a farming 
business. Accordingly, I expect these characteristics to enhance a household’s probability of 
success in business. The number of dependent members of the household reflects a burden as 
it requires the allocation of limited resources toward looking after them with a consequent 
negative effect on the probability of success in business.  
A household’s involvement in non-farming activities can affect its likelihood to succeed in 
business. However, the direction of such effect is not a clear cut. On the one hand, the 
involvement is likely to equip the household with relevant experience, for example, to help 
perform better in risk management, which will increase the probability of success. On the other 
hand, as farming is the major livelihood strategy in rural areas, a household might pursue non-
farming activities only because of the lack of agricultural inputs, such as land and/or labour. 
For example, a household may be forced to engage in fertiliser trading or handicraft production 
because it does not have farmland. In such cases, resorting to non-farming activities suggests 
a lower probability of success in business. 
Household status variables, such as whether a household is classified as poor and whether it 
experiences an income shock, are also determinants of capability. 3 If a household is classified 
as poor, it will be targeted in economic development programs and may receive public support, 
which can help it achieve success in business. On the other hand, being classified as poor might 
be due to low capacity, which in the absence of outside support may reduce the probability of 
achieving success. 
4.3.3 Optimal consumption 
Taking into account the array of factors that influence the probability of achieving success in 
business, the expected income from the business can be written as: 
 
3 Local authorities classify a household as poor if its income is below the official poverty line (for example, 
$1.25/person/day for rural Vietnam in 2016). Once a household is classified as poor, the local authorities issue a 




 𝑌𝐵𝑡 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑧𝑡 > 𝑧) × 𝐴𝐾𝑡
𝛼 = 𝐺(𝐶𝑡, 𝐸𝑡 , 𝑆𝑡 , 𝐻𝑡) × 𝐴𝐾𝑡
𝛼
 (4.5) 
where 𝐴 denotes the productivity of business capital stock in year 𝑡, 𝐾𝑡; and  is the elasticity 
of business income with respect to capital; 𝐾𝑡 is derived as the depreciated capital stock of the 
previous year plus investment from microcredit borrowing in the current year, 𝑀𝑡, such that 
𝐾𝑡 = (1 − δ)𝐾𝑡−1 + 𝑀𝑡 where δ is the depreciation rate. 
Utilizing the dynamic programming technique (Bellman & Dreyfus, 2015), the Bellman 
equation corresponding to Equation (4.1) can be written as: 
 𝑉(𝑊𝑡) ≡ max
{𝐶𝑡}
{𝑢(𝐶𝑡) + ρ𝑉(𝑊𝑡+1)}. (4.6) 
where 𝑉(. ) denotes the optimal value of the household utility which can be obtained by 
maximising the objective function, subjects to the budget constraint. 















Taking the derivative of the budget constraint (4.2) with respect to 𝐶𝑡 and 𝐶𝑡−1, Equation (4.7) 




𝜕𝐺(𝐶𝑡−1, 𝐸𝑡−1, 𝑆𝑡−1, 𝐻𝑡−1)
𝜕𝐶𝑡−1
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 𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝛽7ln 𝐾𝑡
+ 𝛽8𝑙n 𝐾𝑡−1 +  𝛽9𝑙n 𝐻𝑡−1 +  𝛽10𝑙n 𝐻𝑡 +  𝜖𝑡  
(4.9) 
where the  coefficients are to be estimated from the data, and 𝜖𝑡 is an error term. 
4.3.4 Optimal social network 
After solving for the optimal consumption, the optimal social network is solved. The expression 
for the optimal social network can be derived by substituting consumption (C) back into the 
utility Equation (4.1) and the budget constraint Equation (4.2). Moreover, to examine the long-
run causality between social network and microcredit, I focus on the steady state, where all 
variables are stable over time, t. The consumption Equation (4.9), can be rewritten at the steady 
state as follows:4  
 𝑙𝑛𝐶 = 𝑓(𝐸, 𝑆, 𝑀, 𝐻) = 𝛽c1 + 𝛽c2 ln 𝐸 + 𝛽c3 ln 𝑆 + 𝛽c4 ln 𝑀 + βc5 ln 𝐻 (4.10) 
where 𝛽𝑐𝑖, i = 1...5, are parameters. At the steady state, the household utility maximisation 










Equation (4.11) admits the same solution as max
{𝑆}
ln 𝐶 = max
{𝑆}
 𝑓(𝐸, 𝑆, 𝑀, 𝐻), subjects to the 





[𝐺(𝑒𝑓(𝐸,𝑆,𝑀,𝐻), 𝐸, 𝑆, 𝐻)𝐴(𝜎𝑀)𝛼 + 𝑌 − (1 + 𝑟)𝑀
− 𝑒𝑓(𝐸,𝑆,𝑀,𝐻)] 
(4.12) 
The household’s utility maximisation yields an optimal social network as follows: 
 
4 At the steady state, I assume 𝐶𝑡 = 𝐶𝑡−1 = 𝐶, 𝐸𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡−1 = 𝐸, 𝑆𝑡 = 𝑆𝑡−1 = 𝑆, 𝐻𝑡 = 𝐻𝑡−1 = 𝐻, 𝐾𝑡 = 𝐾𝑡−1 = 𝐾 =














𝜆𝜕𝐺(𝑒𝑓(𝐸,𝑆,𝑀,𝐻), 𝐸, 𝑆, 𝐻)
𝜕𝑆
− 𝐺(𝑒𝑓(𝐸,𝑆,𝑀,𝐻), 𝐸, 𝑆, 𝐻)) 𝐴(𝜎𝑀)𝛼 − (𝜆 + 1)𝑒𝑓(𝐸,𝑆,𝑀,𝐻) − 𝑌




where 𝜆 stands for the Lagrange multiplier. 
Equation (4.13) shows that the optimal social network is a function of children’s education, 
microcredit borrowing, income from sources other than household business, and other 











𝐺(𝑒𝑓(𝐸,𝑆,𝑀,𝐻), 𝐸, 𝑆, 𝐻)) 𝐴(𝜎𝑀)𝛼 − (𝜆 + 1)𝑒𝑓(𝐸,𝑆,𝑀,𝐻) − 𝑌 + (1 + 𝑟)𝑀])), I obtain the 
following estimable equation: 
 ln 𝑆 = 𝛽s1 + 𝛽𝑠2ln 𝐸 + 𝛽𝑠3 ln 𝑀 + 𝛽𝑠4 ln 𝑌 + 𝛽𝑠5 ln 𝑊 + 𝛽𝑠6 ln 𝐻 + ℰ (4.14) 
where 𝛽si (i = 1 ... 6) are coefficients to be estimated from the data; the error term, ℰ,  captures 
the measurement error and is assumed to be i.i.d. 
4.3.5 Optimal children’s education 
In stage one, the representative household makes a decision on children’s education, 𝐸. Given 
the optimal consumption and social network, the household’s utility optimisation problem can 
be rewritten as follows:  
 max
{𝐸}
ln 𝐶 = max
{𝐸}
 𝑓(𝐸, 𝑆, 𝑀, 𝐻) = max
{𝐸}













ℎ(𝐸, 𝑀, 𝑌, 𝑊, 𝐻)
= (𝛽c1 + 𝛽c3𝛽s1) + (𝛽c2 + 𝛽c3𝛽s2) ln 𝐸 + (𝛽c4 + 𝛽c3𝛽s3) ln 𝑀 + 𝛽c3𝛽s4 ln 𝑌
+ 𝛽c3𝛽s5 ln 𝑊 + (βc5 + 𝛽c3𝛽𝑠6) ln 𝐻 
The optimisation yields an optimal solution as follows: 
 








𝜆𝜕𝐺(𝑒ℎ(𝐸,𝑀,𝑌,𝑊,𝐻), 𝐸, 𝑒𝑠(𝐸,𝑀,𝑌,𝑊,𝐻), 𝐻)
𝜕𝐸
− 𝐺(𝑒ℎ(𝐸,𝑀,𝑌,𝑊,𝐻), 𝐸, 𝑒𝑠(𝐸,𝑀,𝑌,𝑊,𝐻) , 𝐻)) 𝐴(𝜎𝑀)𝛼 + 𝑒ℎ(𝐸,𝑀,𝑌,𝑊,𝐻) − 𝑌
+ (1 + 𝑟)𝑀]))
−1
 
where 𝜆 stands for the Lagrange multiplier. 
(4.17) 







− 𝐺(𝑒ℎ(𝐸,𝑀,𝑌,𝑊,𝐻) , 𝐸, 𝑒𝑠(𝐸,𝑀,𝑌,𝑊,𝐻), 𝐻)) 𝐴(𝜎𝑀)𝛼 +
𝑒ℎ(𝐸,𝑀,𝑌,𝑊,𝐻) − 𝑌 + (1 + 𝑟)𝑀]), an estimable equation for children’s education can be 
obtained as follows: 
 ln 𝐸 = 𝛽e1 + 𝛽𝑒2 ln 𝑀 + 𝛽𝑒3 ln 𝑌 + 𝛽𝑒4 ln 𝑊 + 𝛽𝑒5 ln 𝐻 + 𝜖 (4.18) 
where 𝛽ei, i = 1 ... 5, are coefficients to be estimated from the data; and the error term, 𝜖, 




In summary, the microcredit borrowing can play an important role as an external source of 
funding, which helps households to finance their small projects. To achieve success, 
households need to have a certain level of capability (entrepreneurship). The probability of 
achieving success depends on such factors as household consumption, children’s education, 
social network, and household characteristics. With the additional income from the small 
business, a representative household makes optimal decisions on how much to consume, how 
much resource allocates for the social network, and their children’s education. The decision 
process can be solved backwards to obtain the optimal consumption, social network, and 
education as a function of a set of explanatory variables. Hence, guided by this framework, I 
can assess the impact of microcredit borrowing on the household economic, social capital, and 
human capital aspects, as will be reported in Chapters 5-7 in this thesis. 
 The data 
4.4.1 Introduction 
This study employs the data from the Vietnam Access to Resources Household Survey 
(VARHS), which has been conducted every two years since 2002 for a selected group of 12 
provinces (see Figure 4-3). The surveys are conducted under a collaboration involving the 
Central Institute for Economic Management of Vietnam, the Institute of Labour Science and 
Social Affairs of Vietnam, the Institute of Policy and Strategy for Agriculture and Rural 
Development of Vietnam, and the University of Copenhagen in Denmark. The 12 provinces 
covered are Ha Tay, Lao Cai, Phu Tho, Lai Chau, Dien Bien, Nghe An, Quang Nam, Khanh 







Red River Delta: Ha Tay 
North East: Lao Cai and Phu 
Tho 
North West: Lai Chau and 
Dien Bien 
North Central Coast: Nghe 
An 
South Central Coast: Quang 
Nam and Khanh Hoa 
Central Highlands: Dak Lak, 
Dak Nong, and Lam Dong 
Mekong River Delta: Long 
An. 
 
Figure 4-3 VARHS provinces 
 
To obtain a nationally representative panel dataset of rural households, a three-level stratified 
sampling design is employed. First, the primary commune units were randomly chosen. 
Second, from each commune, three census enumeration locations were selected randomly. 





The sample size for the five survey rounds from 2008 to 2016 is shown in Table 4-1. Following 
expansion through earlier rounds, the number of households stabilised at around 3,500 and the 
information collected was standardised. To compensate for attrition, new households are added 
in each round. 
A rural household might use microcredit borrowing for different purposes, including 
consumption. Therefore, by following the theoretic considerations presented earlier in this 
chapter, which assume that a typical household borrows microcredit and invests in its small 
business (namely income-generating activities), careful data formation was carried out. 
households who use microcredit only for consumption purposes are excluded from the data.5 
Moreover, I account for such possible errors as missing or outlier data in the data cleaning 
process. The data cleaning process results in a reduction in the sample size from 14,185 to 
12,202 observations.  
To avoid any potential bias caused by commune’s characteristics, I exclude those communes 
that contain only borrowers or only non-borrowing households. This filter decreases the sample 
size to 11,647 observations, which spreads over 2,699 households, 406 communes, 131 
districts, and 12 provinces, for final analysis. 
The information concerning households’ access to microcredit is the primary focus of this 
study. I measure the total amount of microcredit borrowing of a household from loans that the 
household takes up in each survey round. In addition, I only focus on the households who have 
at least one loan for the income-generation purpose, based on self-reported actual use of loans.  
 
5 Base on the information of main use of loan which reported in the surveys, I excluded all households who 
borrowed for consumption purpose. There are 14 main use of loan from the survey: (1) for rice production; (2) 
for  other crop production; (3) for animal husbandry; (4) for forestry; (5) for fishery; (6) for non-farm activity; (7) 
build/buy house ; (8) buy land; (9) buy another asset; (10) pay for wedding/funeral; (11) for education expenses; 
(12) for health expenses; (13) for general consumption; (14) for other consumption. I excluded all households 
who borrowed for wedding/funeral; education expenses; health expenses; general consumption; and other 
consumption. 
Table 4-1: Sample size for the VARHS surveys. 
Year 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 
Households 3,269 3,208 3,704 3,648 3,582 
Individuals 15,844 14,904 16,585 16,206 15,665 
New households 1,184 106 598 136 77 
Attrition households 239 45 103 191 143 




Table 4-2 shows, by year, the number and share of households that took out at least one 
microcredit loan. The number of households that accessed microcredit increased from 1,242 
(43.8 per cent) in 2008 to 1,457 (51.4 per cent) in 2010, and then declined to 834 (29.4 per 
cent) in 2016. This is because since 2010 the government has implemented policies to 
encourage more formal microcredit lenders to enter the market and to protect against risks of a 
“credit trap”. However, the formal institutions usually require collateral such as land title or 
other valuable assets, which many rural borrowers do not have. As a result, it became more 
difficult for rural households to access both formal and informal microcredit. 
It can be observed from Table 4-2 that the proportion of female borrowers is high with over 66 
per cent during the study period. This is not surprising because microcredit loans are mainly 
distributed through the major mass organisations such as Woman Union. Moreover, 
microcredit also aims to support disadvantaged borrowers such as women in rural areas. 
Therefore, the number of female borrowers in rural Vietnam outweighs that of male 
counterparts. Regarding borrowers’ income (whether a borrower is classified as being poor), 
Table 4-2 suggests that the number of poor households accessing microcredit loans are 
relatively small, comparing to the number of non-poor borrowers. Hence, it appears that the 
Vietnamese authorities should pay more attention to the poor households’ access to 
microcredit, in order to help the poor end their poverty cycle. 
Table 4-2: Distribution of loans 
 
Year 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016  
By number of loans 
Total (number of households) 1,242 1,457 1,113 997 834   
One loan 953 972 830 755 692   
Two loans 224 370 220 187 112   
Three loans 65 115 63 55 30  
% of households with loans  43.78   51.36   39.23   35.14   29.40   
By gender (%) 
Female 66.90 66.30 69.54 68.60 70.98  
Male 33.10 33.70 30.46 31.40 29.02  
By income levels (%)       
Poor households 22.78 22.78 26.24 18.05 5.51  
Non-poor households 77.22 77.21 73.76 81.95 94.49  
       




4.4.2 Measurement of food consumption 
Consumption (C) is measured specifically in terms of household food consumption. The food 
consumption value is calculated from the expenditures on food at and away from home yearly. 
For example, a household was asked about the quantity of main food items that they consume 
in last four weeks, such as pork, beef, chicken, any kind of fish, shrimp, fruit, milk, beer, rice, 
wine, coffee, and eating outside the home. Then these quantities are multiplied by its 
contemporaneous price for measuring the monthly food expenditure. Eventually, the yearly 
food consumption is roughly calculated by multiplying by 12 (months).6 The consumption, 
then, is converted to a real term, using the producer price index (PPI) with the base year of 
2008.7 
4.4.3 Measurement of social network 
Measuring social network is a challenge due to its multi-dimensionality and intangible nature. 
In the literature, the social network is measured in different ways by different studies.  Dowla 
(2006) captures social network through trust, norm, vertical and horizontal relationships among 
households. Those dimensions are found to be difficult to quantify.  Recently, Akram and 
Kumar (2013) measure social network by aggregating scores on questionnaire items broadly 
related to trust, membership density, frequency of participation in social groups, and the level 
of democratic decision making in the community.  
In the context of Vietnamese rural households, this study concerns how the households interact 
with its community. The social network of a household can be captured by a range of 
dimensions, such as the number of times that the household attends social events (such as 
weddings, parties, festivals), the frequency of participation in the social groups’ meetings. I 
measure the social network from two dimensions, namely the size and quality. The standard 
principal component analysis (PCA) is employed to construct these two indexes that measure 
both the size and quality of a household’s social network. 
Size and quality dimensions are the two important aspects to measure social network of a 
household. For example, a household with high index in social network size might have many 
 
6 In the survey, the participants were asked how much food items they consumed in the last 4 weeks 
(approximately one month). Therefore, I multiply it by 12 to approximate the annual food consumption. 
7 The theoretical framework in this thesis is based on the production function, in which the representative 




friends, is a member of many social groups such as farmers’ union, women’s union, but it does 
not mean the household interacts actively with its social network. The household might not 
participate in any of the group’s meetings and does not gain any advantages from its social 
network. On the other hand, the quality index reflects the level of interaction of the household 
with its community. For instance, a household might have few friends or being a member of 
few social groups. However, the friendships are close, and s/he frequently attends the social 
meetings which are more likely to enhance the quality of its social network. It is expected that 
accessing microcredit improves both size and quality of social network. 
The social network size index, denoted by SIS, is an indicator of how extensive a household’s 
social network is, also known as the density of the social network. The index is constructed 
from four aspects, including (1) the number of participation in social events such as weddings, 
festivals, or birthday parties (SIS1); (2) the number of social associations that a household 
joined (SIS2); (3) the membership duration (years) of those social associations (SIS3);8 and (4) 
the diversity of those social groups (SIS4).9 If a household communicates with others who are 
different in terms of occupation and family relationship (namely the social groups that a 
household joined are more diverse), they are more likely to exchange information and gain 
experience from different perspectives. Arguably, participating in more social events, being a 
senior member in more social groups, and enjoying more diversity of those social groups, are 
more likely to extend the household’s current social network size, which, in turn, enables the 
household to access more external supports in time of need. 
Unlike the social network size, the quality of social network measures how deep a household 
interacts with its social network. The deeper a household interacts, the more benefits the 
household is expected to receive. If a household needs to ask for help, it is more likely that it 
will first request help from family or close friends, rather than from ordinary friends. In 
response, family members or close friends are more likely to support the household.  
 
8 This is calculated by summing up the number of years that the household is a member of the 
associations. 
 
9 In the survey, households were asked two questions for each participated social group: (1) Are 
members of this group mostly of the same extended family/family network/blood? and (2) Do members 
of this group mostly have the same occupation? The answers are coded as 2 if it is yes, 1 otherwise. 
Then, the household social network diversity score is measured by summing up the score from two 




In order to measure the depth dimension of the social network, denoted by SIQ, I consider five 
aspects. They are (1) the frequency of participation in social group meetings (SIQ1);10 (2) 
democratic level of the decision making process in those social groups (SIQ2);11 (3) 
expenditure for social activities (SIQ3);12 (4) whether there is any household member holding 
official or other positions of public responsibility in their commune (SIQ4); and (5) the number 
of friends who are willing to support the household in case of need (SIQ5).  
Being an active member by frequently participating in social group meetings enables the 
household to not only build up better relationships with their colleagues but also update new 
useful knowledge from these group meetings. If a household joins a social group with a higher 
level of democracy in terms of the decision-making process, the household is more likely to 
have a voice in the group’s decisions. That way makes them more confident and increases the 
quality of their social network. Spending on social activities is another indicator of a 
household’s social network quality. A household tends to spend more of its income on social 
activities which can bring in benefits. As such, a higher level of spending signals effectiveness 
of a household’s social network.13 
The quality of a household’s social network is also determined by the official position of any 
household members in their communes. In rural Vietnam, political connections play an 
important role in building up the reputation of a family among the community (Markussen & 
 
10 The score of how often the household participates in meetings is coded as 1 for rarely/never; 2 for 
sometimes; 3 for almost always. This component is obtained by summing up the score from each social 
group that the household is a member.  
11 For each participated social group, a household was asked: How does this group usually make 
decisions? the answers are coded as 1 for leader decides and informs the other group members; 2 for 
leader asks the group members what they think and then decides; 3 for all group members discuss and 
decide together. This component is obtained by summing up the scores related to all the social 
associations of the household. 
12 Measured by summing up the total value spent on New Year’s Eve, social events, and gifts. 
13 This variable might also be considered as a component of the social network size. Arguably, a 
household could spend more on social activities, if it has a broader social network. However, the 
household appears to be more concerned with the effectiveness of its spending on those activities, as an 







Tarp, 2014). If any household member holds official public responsibilities in their commune, 
they are likely to have more influence on others because these members tend to have valuable 
and trusted information from the government. The number of close friends who are willing to 
support the household in difficult times is the last aspect of constructing the quality index. The 
more close friends who are willing to help in difficult times a household has, the higher quality 
of its social network is. Given the multidimensional nature of the social network, the PCA is 
an appropriate approach to construct the two social network indexes. An advantage of the PCA 
is that it can reduce the dimensionality to calculate the desired overall measures of the social 
network.  
As the first step, PCA calculates the factor or component scores based on the eigenvectors of 
the correlation matrix of the initial variables. Each initial variable is optimally weighted and 
then summed to compute the factor scores. PCA creates uncorrelated factors, where each is a 
linear weighted combination of the initial inputs. These linear combinations account for more 
variations in the data than any other linear combination of variables. The factors are sorted so 
that the first factor is the one that explains the largest variations in the data. The subsequent 
factors are uncorrelated with the previous factors, and explain additional, but to a smaller 
extent, variation. Therefore, each factor represents an additional dimension of the original data. 
The details of PCA can be found in Vyas and Kumaranayake (2006). 
For the second step, this study uses the first two factors, with their shares of explained variation 
as weights, to linearly calculate the indexes. These indexes are subsequently transformed to a 
0-100 scale to avoid the difficulty in interpretation due to the negative values (see Akram & 
Kumar, 2013). 
The results of the PCA are reported in Table 4-3. For the social network size index, the two 
extracted factors together account for 82.82 per cent of the total variations in the original data. 
The first factor can explain 59.12 per cent of the variations of the original data. The number of 
social associations that a household joined (SIS2), membership duration of those social 
associations (SIS3), and the diversity of those social groups (SIS4) showed high positive 
loadings. However, the number of participation in social events such as weddings, festivals, or 
birthday parties (SIS1) shows high positive loading in the second factor, which accounts for 





No. Indexes Components Scoring coefficients 
 Factor 1  Factor 2 
1 
SIS 
SIS1 0.19 0.98 
2 SIS2 0.59 -0.09 
3 SIS3 0.50 -0.12 
4 SIS4 0.59 -0.11 
Per cent of variance (%) 59.12 23.70 
Cumulative (%) 59.12 82.82 
5 
SIQ 
SIQ1 0.64 -0.14 
6 SIQ2 0.63 -0.16 
7 SIQ3 0.18 0.64 
8 SIQ4 0.35 -0.13 
9 SIQ5 0.16 0.72 
Per cent of variance (%) 38.99 20.30 
Cumulative (%) 38.99 59.27 
N=9,260. 
 
For the social network quality index, the overall explanation of variations in the data by the 
first two factors is 59.27 per cent. Respectively, factor 1 and factor 2 account for 38.99 and 
20.30 per cent of the total variations. The frequency of participation in social group meetings 
(SIQ1) and democratic level of the decision-making process in those social groups (SIQ2) 
appear to be highly correlated with the first factor, while the expenditure for social activities 
(SIQ3) and the number of friends who are willing to support the household in case of need 
(SIQ5) showed high positive loading in the second factor. The data of these indexes are graphed 
in Figure 4-4. 
  






Figure 4-4 Average social network indexes by age of household head 
Figure 4-4 plots the average of the two indexes against the ages of the household head. Overall, 
the group of households who take up microcredit loans achieves a higher average level of the 
social network than the group of non-borrowing household in both cases. However, the 
difference is more evident for social network quality. A household in rural Vietnam generally 
enjoys its highest level of the social network at the age of 60 to 90. 
4.4.4 Measurement of children’s education 
In this study, children’s education is proxied by two variables, namely completed grades 
(𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠) and school gap (𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑔𝑎𝑝). The completed grades are measured by grades children 
completed in school. The school gap is the difference between the expected schooling and the 
actual schooling years, according to the child's age (see Islam & Choe, 2013). For example, in 
Vietnam, a child should start school at age six, and continue to finish high school at age 18. A 
child, thus, at the age of seven to eighteen, is expected to complete school years, which equals 
to his/her age minus six. If a child's age is less than six, then the expected schooling year is 
zero, and if the child is older than 18, then the expected schooling is 12. The actual schooling 
is the number of years that the child completed and self-reported at the time of the survey 
conducted. Subsequently, the schooling gap is defined as  
𝐸 = max{0, 𝑒𝑠 − 𝑎𝑠} 
where E represents the school gap; as denotes the actual schooling years; and es denotes the 
expected schooling years and 𝑒𝑠 =  { 0                   𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑔𝑒 ≤ 6,
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Later in Chapters 5 and 6, the variable E is measured as the sum of schooling gaps relative to 
expected schooling for household children (years) as these two chapters focus on the household 
level. In Chapter 7, in contrast, the analysis is at the individual child level, and therefore, the 
measure of children’s education is proxied by school gap and completed grades of each child 
in households. 
Figure 4-5: Average school gap by children’s gender and age 
Figure 4-5  demonstrates the average school gap among boys (left panel) and girls (right panel) 
by age.  Overall, the significant gap between the treatment (borrowers’ children) and control 
(non-borrowers’ children) groups occurs after age 11, when the children start their secondary 
school. It is not surprising because attendance in the primary school is compulsory and 
widespread in Vietnam. Moreover, the demand for children’s education is stronger among the 
treatment group. 
 Summary 
The theoretical framework proposed in this chapter has provided some insights into the causal 
relationships between microcredit interventions and its effects on the household. The outcomes 
from businesses funded by microcredit can be classified into three groups, such as economic 
capital, social capital, and human capital. By observing these outcomes of interest, assessors 
can trace the impacts of microcredit at the household level. 
The underlying assumption of this theoretical framework is that a representative household 
accesses microcredit and invests into its small businesses. These businesses might or might not 
be successful. Whether the household can achieve success depends on a set of household 





first as it is the most important concern for the household. Second, the household chooses its 
social network level to optimise its utility. Lastly, consumption is determined after having 
optimal decisions for education and social network. The household’s utility maximisation 
problem is solved backwards to derive the three models for consumption, social network, and 
education for the empirical analyses. 
The VARHS is a unique panel database of rural living conditions in Vietnam. Each round of 
the VARHS survey is repeated across the same households to form a rich panel dataset. The 
technique of collecting data and rich information contained in the VARHS survey is sufficient 
to conduct comprehensive research on the impacts of microcredit on rural households in 
Vietnam. For my purposes, this thesis utilises a panel dataset of five survey rounds from 2008 




CHAPTER 5  IMPACTS OF 
MICROCREDIT ON RURAL 
HOUSEHOLDS’ FOOD CONSUMPTION 
A revised version of this chapter was published in the Journal of Asian Economics:  
Phan, C. T., Sun, S., Zhou, Z. Y., & Beg, R. (2019). Does microcredit increase household food 
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This chapter presents the first empirical study of this thesis, focusing on the impact of 
microcredit on rural households’ food consumption. The decision on food consumption is made 
in stage three of the multi-stage decision-making process. This chapter consists of five sections 
as follows: The introduction section highlights the importance and contribution of the study to 
the literature. The second section discusses the estimation strategy to overcome the selection 
bias problem. The next section focuses on defining variables and summary statistics. The 
results are discussed in the fourth section, and the last section concludes the chapter. 
 Introduction 
Microcredit is considered a vital tool for economic development and poverty alleviation. The 
additional resources households gain from microcredit, combined with the new knowledge, 
skills, and experiences they glean from microcredit institutions and peer associations, can 
permanently transform livelihoods. More stable household food consumption paths can support 
better nutrition and human capital formation and thus lead to long-term productivity benefits. 
As reviewed in Chapter 3, much research has been done to test the impact of microcredit on 
household welfare, looking at food consumption expenditure in particular. However, the 
findings are mixed. For example, Pitt and Khandker (1998) found that microcredit significantly 
improves annual household consumption expenditure in Bangladesh, whilst Roodman and 
Morduch (2009), using the same dataset, found an insignificant effect. Similarly, Quach et al. 
(2005) confirmed that microcredit in Vietnam benefits borrowers in terms of food and non-
food expenditure, while Nghiem et al. (2012), using a quasi-experimental approach, found no 
significant effect of microcredit on household food consumption. The mixed findings suggest 
that more research, with better quality data and more appropriate methodology, is needed, in 
order to provide solid evidence on the impact of microcredit. Contributing to this strand of 
research, this chapter explores how microcredit affects rural household food consumption in 
Vietnam. 
In Vietnam, poverty is widespread, and the government has made significant efforts to alleviate 
it. These efforts include implementation of a number of microcredit programs that function 
primarily through state-owned banks in coordination with non-governmental organisations. 
However, despite the fact that these microcredit programs date back more than two decades, it 
is unclear whether and to what extent the programs have been effective in improving the 




This chapter sheds light on this issue. Chapter 4 proposes a theoretical model in which 
microcredit supports a representative household by financing its family business. The 
household is assumed to maximise its lifetime utility, which yields an optimal consumption 
path as a function of the household’s microcredit borrowing. With reference to this theoretical 
consumption path, I then estimate the impact of microcredit empirically in this chapter. For 
this purpose, this chapter makes use of a household dataset for the period 2008-2016 from the 
Vietnam Access to Resources Household Survey (VARHS). The results suggest that 
microcredit programs in rural Vietnam appear to have been effective in raising household food 
consumption in both the short and long terms.  
Most previous studies of microcredit in Vietnam utilised cross-section data or panel data with 
only short time frames, such as Quach et al. (2005) using data from 1992 to 1998.  Accordingly, 
these studies did not account for the dynamic aspect of household food consumption. By 
contrast, this study uses a dataset that covers a longer period of time and allows for analysis of 
the dynamics of household food consumption. As such, it is able to more comprehensively 
assess the impact of microcredit on the consumption of rural Vietnamese households. Further, 
some previous studies, such as Nghiem et al. (2012) and Swain et al. (2008), focused on 
household income and assets in examining the impact of microcredit. However, food 
consumption is the more relevant indicator in the sense that it directly affects household 
welfare, whereas the effects of income and assets are indirect. 
 Estimation strategy 
Equation (4.9) links optimal household food consumption to microcredit borrowing (via the 
capital variable) and other explanatory variables. To evaluate the impact of microcredit on food 
consumption, Equation (4.9) is estimated using the survey data from Vietnam. The equation is 
presented as follows: 
𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝛽7ln 𝐾𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑙n 𝐾𝑡−1
+  𝛽9𝑙n 𝐻𝑡−1 +  𝛽10𝑙n 𝐻𝑡 +  𝜖𝑡 
where C is household food consumption; E stands for children’s education; S denotes social 
network; K is accumulated microcredit borrowings; and H is a set of household characteristics;  
𝜖 is the error term; and s are coefficients to be estimated from the data. 
Estimating Equation (4.9) is faced with two challenges, namely the presence of the lagged 




lagged dependent variable (𝐶𝑡−1 ) results in a correlation between household characteristics 
and time-invariant unobserved household heterogeneity. In other words, the assumption that 
𝐸[𝑋𝑡𝜖𝑡] = 0, where X is a vector of all explanatory variables in Equation (4.9), does not hold. 
Therefore, using the ordinary least squares estimator or standard panel estimators, such as fixed 
effects or random effects estimators, will lead to inconsistent estimates of the coefficients 
(Hsiao, 2014). A widely-used approach to dealing with this problem is to adopt the Difference 
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimation (Arellano & Bond, 1991), which involves 
removing the fixed effects by first differencing, and then using lagged levels of the dependent 
variable as instruments for the endogenous and predetermined variables. However, this 
approach has been found to be weak in two situations: (1) when the dependent variable is close 
to a random walk, so that past levels are weak instruments as they convey little information 
about current changes, and (2) when the time series in the panel is short such that cross-
sectional variation overwhelms the time variation (Bond et al., 2001).  
To address these weaknesses, Blundell and Bond (1998) consider additional moment 
conditions to form a System GMM (GMM) estimation technique. The System GMM estimator 
includes a simultaneous system of the level equations and the first-differenced transformed 
equations. In the first-differenced equations, the lagged levels of predetermined and 
endogenous variables are employed as instrumental variables (similar to those in the Difference 
GMM estimator), and in the level equations, the instruments used are differences of these 
variables to make them exogenous to the fixed effects. Given the short panel of only five time 
periods, combined with a cross-section of 2,699 households, the System GMM estimation is 
more appropriate than Difference GMM (see Blundell & Bond, 1998). Nevertheless, I also 
report Difference GMM results for comparison.14 
The second challenge is the selection bias in household borrowing, which also renders 
𝐸[𝑋𝑡𝜖𝑡] = 0 invalid.  The selection bias can occur from both demand and supply sides. On the 
demand side, households may be more likely to borrow when they possess superior knowledge 
or skills (entrepreneurship) that enable them to better exploit business opportunities. Similarly, 
on the supply side, microcredit lenders may regard knowledge and skills as indicators of likely 
success in business and loan repayment.  
 
14 In comparison to matching techniques, the difference GMM and system GMM appear to be appropriate 




To address the problem of selection bias, the microcredit borrowing variable (K) is 
instrumented. Note that although the System GMM estimator employs lags and differences as 
internal instruments, this may not be sufficient to eliminate the selection-bias problem. 
Therefore, this chapter employs the loan interest rate as an excluded instrument for microcredit. 
The interest rate is largely determined on the supply side in the micro-finance market with 
borrowers being in a very weak bargaining position. Therefore, the given interest rate directly 
affects a household’s decision to borrow, but not its food consumption (other than indirectly 
through the effect on borrowing). Education (E) and social network (S), too, may not be strictly 
exogenous but may rather reflect choices made in conjunction with food consumption and 
borrowing decisions. Accordingly, this study also employs excluded instruments, namely the 
average interest rate of loans obtained within a prefecture (%), the highest level of education 
of a member in the household (number of school years), and distance to the nearest all-weather 
road (km), for these variables. 
 Variable definitions and summary statistics 
Table 5-1 reports variable definitions and summary statistics. Household food consumption (C) 
is taken as expenditures on food, both at home and away from home. Table 5-1 reports that on 
average, a rural household in Vietnam expends over 10 million VND (478 USD) annually for 
food. There are few households in the surveys that have food expenditure at the minimum level 
of only around 0.5 million VND (22 USD), while in contrast, another small number of 







Accumulated microcredit borrowing (K), the variable of interest, is measured by depreciated 
capital stock that a household accumulates over the study periods. The accumulated microcredit 
borrowing capital (𝐾𝑡) is measured by 𝐾𝑡 = (1 − 𝛿)𝐾𝑡−1 + 𝑀𝑡, where 𝛿 is economic 
depreciation rate (5% per annum). 𝑀𝑡 is the microcredit borrowing in the current year. The 
capital stock, K, allows for the microcredit borrowing of previous years to play a role in the 
business in the current year, subject, however, to depreciation. The capital stock in the initial 
Table 5-1. Variable definitions and descriptive statistics 
Variables Description Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. 
C Household food consumption 
(million VND) 
0.49 207 10.37 9.03 
K Accumulated microcredit borrowing 
(million VND) 
0 3,238 25.00  104.00 
SIS Social network size index (score) 0 100 10.20 6.30 
E  Education measured as the sum of 
schooling gaps relative to expected 
schooling for household children 
(years) 
0 47 2.00 4.30 
Y Income from sources other than the 
household business (million VND) 
0 1,576 30.73 47.80 
EduH Schooling of household head (years) 0 12 6.00 3.90 
HSize Household members (number) 1 17 4.60 2.00 
AgeH Age of household head (years) 18 100 51.50 13.70 
Plot Land holding (ha) 0 84 1.06 1.75 
Dep Dependent members (number) 0 10 1.80 1.40 
Nfarming Whether a household is involved in 
non-farming business activities (1-
yes; 0-otherwise) 
0 1 0.25 0.43 
Shock Whether a household experienced an 
income shock (1-yes; 0-otherwise) 
0 1 0.51 0.50 
Poor Whether a household is classified as 
poor by authority (1-yes; 0-
otherwise) 
0 1 0.19 0.39 
Local Whether a household is local (1-yes; 
0-otherwise) 
0 1 0.78 0.42 
Irate Average interest rate of loans 
obtained within a prefecture (% 
yearly) 
0 76 3.82 36.30 
HiE Highest level of education of a 
member in the household (number of 
school years) 
0 12 9.27 3.07 
DiR Distance to the nearest all-weather 
road (km) 
0 80 3.50 7.66 




year, 𝐾0, is set as microcredit borrowing in 2008, namely 𝐾0 = 𝑀0. The average accumulated 
capital for sample households is 25.3 million VND (1,150 USD). At the high end, some 
households accumulated capital of more than 3 billion VND (150,000 USD), while others had 
no accumulated capital. 
The interest rate, used as an instrument for 𝐾, is calculated as the average interest rate on loans 
at the prefecture level. The average interest rate for the sample is 3.82 per cent, which is lower 
than interest rates normally observed in Vietnamese credit markets of over 10 per cent. This is 
a sign that the Vietnamese government has supported rural residents by lowering interest rates 
in rural areas. 
The social network index (SIS) is calculated from four elements using principal components 
analysis. The four elements are: number of social events attended (weddings, festivals, or 
birthday parties); the number of memberships in social associations; total duration of 
memberships in these social associations; and diversity of these social associations.15 The index 
is subsequently transformed to a 0-100 scale to avoid the difficulty in interpretation due to the 
negative values of the indices (see Akram & Kumar, 2013). The mean value of the social 
network index is 10.2. 
To instrument the social network variable (S), I use distance to the nearest all-weather road 
since households who live closer to all-weather roads are likely to have better opportunities to 
make contacts and access information than those who live in more remote areas. Moreover, it 
is unlikely that this distance will affect household food consumption directly. The average 
distance from sample homes to an all-weather road is 3.5 km while the longest distance 
recorded is 80 km. 
Education (E) is measured as the sum of school gaps of all children in a household. The school 
gap is the difference between actual years of schooling and expected years of schooling given 
the child’s age (see Islam & Choe, 2013). Children are expected to be in school from age six 
to age 18 such that 18-year-olds should have received 12 years of schooling. The average 
school gap per household is found to be two years, indicating that rural households in Vietnam 
face difficulties in sending their children to school. Many poor households find they must 
 
15 Households were asked two questions regarding diversity of social associations: (1) Are members of 
this association mostly of the same extended family/family network/blood? (2) Do members of this 
group mostly have the same occupation? Answers are coded 2 for yes, 1 otherwise. The score is taken 




forego education for their children so that they can work to make a contribution to the 
household.  
To instrument education, I make use of the highest level of education of a household member 
(number of school years). The most educated household member can serve as a role model to 
inspire others to pursue education. Conceptually, the highest level of education in the 
household should not directly affect the household’s food consumption. 
Income, Y, from sources other than the household business, include (1) net income from 
wages/salaries; (2) net income from common property resources such as earnings from 
collecting forest products or hunting in forest areas not owned or rented by the household; (3) 
net income from private transfers, such as remittances from relatives; (4) net income from 
public transfers, such as remittances from government support programs; and (5) income from 
other sources not related to the household business financed by microcredit. On average, a 
sample household earned almost 31 million VND (1,428 USD) from these five sources of 
income. 
The average age of the household head is almost 52 years. Households own an average of 1.06 
ha of land. Around 19 per cent of households are classified as poor. Local residents (non-
migrants) comprise 78 per cent of the population. More than half of households (51 per cent) 
experienced at least one income shock in the past two years. 
In the empirical estimation, some variables are log-transformed, which requires non-zero 
values. Therefore, a value of one is added to variables that contain zero before the logarithm 
transformation. Such a strategy is also used by Mark and Shahidur (1998) and Roodman and 
Morduch (2014). All nominal monetary variables are converted to real terms using the producer 
price index with the base year 2008 (General Statistics Office of Vietnam, 2017). 
 Results 
5.4.1 Baseline results 
Each endogenous variable, namely accumulated microcredit (K), school gap (E), and social 
network size (SIS), is estimated on all exogenous variables, and then test whether the three 
external instruments are jointly significant. The associated F statistics are 5.29, 49.91, and 




Table 5-2 reports the System GMM estimation results.16 Column 1 presents the results without 
external instruments, and Column 2 results with external instruments. While there exist 
variations in the magnitude of point estimates, the signs remain consistent. The parameter of 
focus is the coefficient of accumulated microcredit borrowing (K), which measures the 
elasticity of food consumption with respect to K. The results show that a one per cent increase 
in the contemporaneous value of accumulated microcredit borrowing leads to a 0.177 per cent 
increase in household food consumption with the external instruments, or a 0.461 per cent 
increase without the external instruments, both statistically significant at the one per cent level. 
This finding supports the hypothesis that microcredit borrowing helps rural households 
improve their living standards through financing business activities and confirms the important 
role of microcredit in economic development in rural Vietnam. The finding is consistent with 
those of Islam (2015), Kaboski and Townsend (2012), Li et al. (2011), and Li et al. (2011) who 
report a positive impact of microcredit on food consumption in Bangladesh, Thailand and 
China, respectively. 
 
16 One might wonder whether the inclusion of the external instruments in the System GMM estimation improves 
efficiency since the number of internal instruments is already large. For comparison, I present the results of 
Difference GMM estimation (external instruments omitted) in Appendix Table A1. I note substantial differences 
in the point estimates relative to the System GMM estimates of Table 5-2. However, as discussed in Section 5.3 
in Chapter 5, the Difference GMM estimator is not well suited to the study data given the short time series of five 





The coefficient of one-period lagged accumulated microcredit borrowing is estimated at -0.150, 
which is significant at the one per cent level (or 0.438 without the external instruments, also 
Table 5-2. Impacts of microcredit on household food consumption (System GMM) 
Household food 
consumption 
System GMM System GMM  with external 
IVs 
Coefficients Robust SE Coefficients Robust SE 
log Ct-1 -0.037 0.110 0.119*** 0.045 
log Kt 0.461*** 0.178 0.177*** 0.056 
log Kt-1 -0.438*** 0.154 -0.150*** 0.048 
Et -0.035 0.164 -0.116*** 0.041 
Et-1 0.104 0.100 0.089*** 0.032 
SISt 0.704*** 0.134 0.190*** 0.053 
SISt-1 -0.401*** 0.100 -0.098** 0.039 
log Yt -0.053* 0.029 0.010 0.010 
log Yt-1 0.052** 0.026 0.018** 0.009 
EduHt -0.088** 0.037 -0.0005 0.012 
EduHt-1 0.011 0.032 0.0043 0.010 
HSizet -0.302** 0.132 0.038 0.048 
HSizet-1 0.154 0.096 -0.024 0.034 
AgeHt -0.011 0.013 0.006 0.005 
AgeHt-1 -0.002 0.013 -0.009** 0.005 
log Plott -0.171* 0.104 0.153*** 0.051 
log Plott-1 0.163* 0.087 -0.127*** 0.042 
Dept 0.152 0.111 0.018 0.038 
Dept-1 -0.108 0.169 0.025 0.046 
Nfarmingt -0.796*** 0.231 -0.152** 0.073 
Nfarmingt-1 0.621*** 0.155 0.238*** 0.051 
Shockt -0.367*** 0.116 -0.154*** 0.037 
Shockt-1 0.341** 0.133 0.061 0.045 
Localt 0.120 0.168 0.057 0.055 
Localt-1 0.032 0.177 0.019 0.057 
Poort 0.078 0.185 -0.104 0.065 
Poort-1 -0.069 0.144 -0.139*** 0.048 
     
Year dummies YES YES 
AR(1) -4.58*** -4.59*** 
AR(2) 0.72 1.03 
Hansen test 20.61 18.70 
Number of instruments 42 45 
Observations 9,220 9,220 
Number of households 2,699 2,699 
   
Note: ***, **, and * indicate the statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 % levels, respectively. AR(1) and 





significant at the one per cent level).17 Thus, the previous period’s accumulated microcredit 
borrowing negatively affects a household’s current-period food consumption. An increase in 
the previous period’s accumulated borrowing indicates an increase in the repayment burden, 
which may be the reason for a decrease in current period food consumption, ceteris paribus. 
The long-run elasticity of food consumption with respect to accumulated microcredit 
borrowing can be calculated by imposing the steady-state conditions, namely 𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑡−1 
and 𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑡−1. The result shows that a one per cent increase in steady-state accumulated 
borrowing leads to a 0.031 per cent increase in steady-state consumption (a 0.022 increase 
without the external instruments). Thus in either the short run or the long run, microcredit 
borrowing appears to promote household food consumption in rural Vietnam through the 
financing of business activities. 
The findings of a positive impact of microcredit borrowing on rural household food 
consumption indicate that Vietnam’s approach to microcredit programs has been effective. 
Two features of Vietnam’s microcredit market are likely to contribute to the positive impact of 
microcredit. First, Vietnam’s microcredit providers focus more on group lending, rather than 
individual lending, where group members are familiar with each other, and the leader is a 
reputable person in the community and takes responsibility for the group. Borrowers in the 
same group can easily communicate with each other, and so when one member achieves 
success in utilising microcredit, his/her experience can be quickly shared with other members 
of the group. There also exists peer pressure within the group, such that each member has an 
incentive to perform well in utilising microcredit. Second, in addition to the loan, the 
microcredit providers frequently provide short training workshops to their customers, which 
helps to improve the use of microcredit and increase the probability of business success. 
Despite the significant and positive impact of microcredit on food consumption in both the 
short and long run, the negative coefficient on one-period lagged accumulated microcredit 
borrowing (Kt-1) suggests that microcredit can be a burden to rural Vietnamese. The more a 
household has borrowed in the past, the bigger the repayment burden, which in turn negatively 
affects consumption, ceteris paribus. On average, a household has accumulated capital from 
microcredit borrowing of approximately 1,150 USD, which amounts to around 40 per cent of 
household income. The repayment burden is thus substantial. Besides, the relatively small size 
of microcredit borrowing limits the scope of investment options for households. On this scale 
 




of borrowing, households can only afford to invest in small projects which may not be 
profitable enough to service their loans and support higher standards of living unless borrowing 
continues. 
In considering the impact of other explanatory variables on household food consumption, this 
chapter focuses on the model with external IVs. The gap in children’s education (E) shows a 
contemporaneous negative effect on food consumption. A gap of one year in children’s 
education is associated with a 0.12 per cent decrease in current food consumption with 
statistical significance at one per cent. This may be due to a household with lower academic 
achievement being less likely to succeed in business and thus suffering a lower living standard. 
However, a one-period lag in the education gap is positively associated with food consumption, 
which may be a reflection of the economic contribution made by children when not attending 
school. 
One unit increase in the contemporaneous social network index (SIS) is associated with a 0.19 
per cent increase in current food consumption. This suggests that an expansion in a household’s 
social network can provide an immediate boost to its food consumption. However, the effect 
becomes negative after a one-period lag, perhaps due to the demands of maintaining an existing 
social network as households must allocate limited resources to social activities to the detriment 
of generating income for food consumption. 
As expected, income from sources other than the family business (Y) positively affects 
household food consumption, although this effect registers as statistically significant only with 
a lag. 
Household land holdings (Plot) affect consumption positively contemporaneously but 
negatively with a lag. Land is an essential input of household farming businesses. A household, 
with more land, is thus more likely to achieve success in such business, and as a result, increase 
its consumption. However, land requires capital investment to be productive. Faced with a 
credit constraint, household investment in the previous period may constrain consumption in 
the current period. 
Non-farming activities have a negative effect on consumption contemporaneously but a 
positive effect with a lag. In theory, the direction of the effect is ambiguous depending on 
whether non-farming activities are complementary to business success or whether it reflects a 
lack of farming resources. As expected, negative income shocks (Shock) and poverty (Poor) 




Several tests are conducted to check the model specification. The Arellano and Bond (AB) test 
for autocorrelation obtains a significant test statistic for AR(1) and an insignificant test statistic 
for AR(2), suggesting that the estimation with one-period lag is appropriate. The Wald test 
rejects the null hypothesis that the coefficients are insignificant overall. Finally, the Hansen 
test of overidentifying restrictions fails to reject the null hypothesis that the instrumental 
variables are valid. 
5.4.2 Robustness check 
The baseline estimations suggest that microcredit borrowing has a positive impact on rural 
household food consumption in Vietnam. To check for the robustness of the findings, I employ 
the System GMM (with instrumental variables) to re-estimate Equation (4.9) on different 
subsamples by household size, household head gender, and poverty status. Table 5-3 reports 
the estimation results. 
Overall, Table 5-3 further confirms the positive impact of microcredit borrowing on household 
food consumption in most of the subsample estimations. Particularly, microcredit appears to 
have greater impact on households who have more than 4 members. This is possible because 
the more member a household has, the more labour the household can supply for its business, 
and hence increases the possibility of success in doing its business. As a result, food 
consumption increases. For the estimation on those households whose heads are female, I do 
not find any evidence of significant impact of microcredit on these households. It is not 
surprising because the sample of female household heads is small, compared to male 
counterparts. In the sample, households with female heads only account for 17 per cent of total 
Table 5-3 Robustness check 
Subsamples 
System GMM  with external IVs 
log Kt log Kt-1 
Coefficients Robust SE Coefficients Robust SE 
By household size     
Less than average (4.6) 0.0392* 0.056 -0.0376* 0.052 
Greater than average (4.6) 0.0882* 0.054 -0.0871** 0.046 
By household head gender      
Female household head -0.0319 0.090 0.0137 0.076 
Male household head 0.0663** 0.033 -0.0567* 0.039 
By poverty status      
Non-poor households 0.0944* 0.047 -0.0706*** 0.042 
Poor households 0.0277* 0.041 -0.0190* 0.035 
 




households. In contrast, the estimation with subsample of male household heads is similar to 
that of the baseline case. Moreover, Table 5-3 suggests that microcredit use is more effective 
among non-poor households than poor households. Non-poor households usually have more 
resources that can be used in their business projects than poor households. This advantage helps 
non-poor household invest microcredit more effectively. 
 Concluding remarks 
This chapter assesses the impact of microcredit borrowing on rural households’ food 
consumption in Vietnam. Specifically, this analysis starts with a theoretical model as developed 
in Chapter 4, where microcredit helps a representative household through financing its family 
business. The household maximises its lifetime utility, which yields a dynamic optimal 
consumption path. The theoretical framework shows that optimal consumption is a function of 
microcredit borrowing, and then use the optimal consumption function to guide the empirical 
estimation. To estimate the impact of microcredit on household food consumption, this study 
implements the System Generalised Method of Moments estimation using a panel dataset from 
the Vietnam Access to Resources Household Survey for the period 2008–2016. The estimations 
use excluded instrumental variables to address the endogeneity problem of explanatory 
variables and the sample selection bias due to households’ non-random access to microcredit 
borrowing. 
The estimation results in this chapter indicate that the microcredit programs in rural Vietnam 
are effective in improving household food consumption in both the short and long terms. The 
chapter thus contributes to the debate over whether microcredit borrowing is a tool for poverty 
alleviation in Vietnam, and developing countries more generally, by confirming that it 
positively affects household welfare. However, it is worth noting that accumulated microcredit 
borrowing of the previous period can negatively affect a household’s current-period food 
consumption, suggesting that repayment may be a burden to the household. Although rural 
Vietnamese households can benefit from microcredit borrowing, they are also facing the risk 
of falling into a “credit trap”. Therefore, this finding also points to the need for careful 
management of microcredit loan policy. 
Despite the positive impact found for food consumption, there exist a number of factors that 
limit the effectiveness of microcredit in Vietnam. First, the loan size is relatively small, which 
limits the scope of investment options for households. Second, despite the provision of training 




decrease the probability of achieving success in small business. Third, the survey data show a 
decrease in the number of households accessing microcredit in later years in both the formal 
and informal credit sectors. This decrease occurred because the government implemented 
policies to improve the formal microcredit sector and mitigate risk from informal microcredit. 
However, formal microcredit providers tend to require collateral which many rural households 
do not have. This constraint prevents microcredit lending from achieving its aim to the full 
extent. 
To further promote the positive impacts of microcredit, microcredit lenders can increase their 
loan size to encourage borrowers to invest in larger and more profitable projects. They can also 
provide additional support services, such as business skill training and information on 
investment options that can help households to more effectively use their borrowings. For their 
part, regulators can revise loan requirements to allow not only physical collateral, but also 
social collateral, such as a household’s social reputation, which will increase access to 
microcredit. Local authorities can encourage residents to participate in more social groups, 
such as the Women’s Association, the Farmer’s Association, and the Veteran’s Association, 
which help them to access microcredit in the formal sector in rural Vietnam. Poor households 
can build their social networks and use these networks as collateral for their loan applications. 
These steps will facilitate greater use of microcredit to more fully achieve the aim of poverty 
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This chapter examines the impact of microcredit on rural households’ social network, which is 
determined in stage two of the multi-stage decision-making process. The chapter consists of 
five sections. After an introduction in Section 6.1, Section 6.2 specifies the empirical model 
and discuss the estimation strategy. Section 6.3 describes the variables and summary statistics. 
Section 6.4 reports the results. Finally, Section 6.5 concludes the chapter. 
 Introduction 
Social network plays an important role in helping the poor escape poverty in low-income 
countries, where formal insurance and crisis supporting systems are generally unavailable. 
Social network generates trust among the poor communities. It fosters exchange of common 
values and knowledge, resolves social conflicts, connects individuals within groups, and 
bridges gaps among different participants. That, in turn, enables the poor to access social 
supports when facing adverse income shocks. In addition, the less fortunate households can 
learn new skills to build a route out of poverty by learning from peers within its social network. 
Given the vital role of social network in poverty alleviation, it is important to have a more 
comprehensive understanding of the impact of any anti-poverty programs, including 
microcredit, on social network. Microcredit is a popular policy tool to combat poverty. Not 
only does microcredit provide additional resources, but it also encourages social interaction 
among its borrowers. By participating in a microcredit program, intuitively, the poor are more 
likely to interact with other borrowers to exchange their experiences, learn new skills, and 
support each other in time of need. However, despite its importance, the evidence of whether 
participating in microcredit programs fosters a borrower’s social network is not well 
documented.  
In particular, there is a lack of quantitative examinations on the impact of microcredit on social 
network. As discussed in Chapter 3, Only a few studies have focused on the social impacts of 
microcredit. They have only used qualitative approaches to demonstrate the linkage between 
social network and microcredit interventions (Basargekar, 2010; Van, 2000).  
Filling this gap, this chapter contributes to the existing literature by a quantitative evaluation 
of the impacts of microcredit on social network of rural households in Vietnam. The analysis 
will shed light on a better understanding of whether microcredit helps rural households in 
Vietnam build up their social network, which is an important external resource to lift them out 




makers in term of improving effectiveness of microcredit services. Particularly, a positive 
impact of microcredit borrowing on social network suggests that their microcredit provision 
can benefit rural borrowers and help them end poverty. In turn, the poor can use their social 
network as social collaterals for their next loans. The microcredit providers can also accept 
social network as a form of collaterals in allocating loans. By doing so, the poor are able to 
access microcredit loans without physical collateral such as land ownership which they do not 
always have. As a result, more poor households can access microcredit and get out of poverty. 
In Chapter 4, I have shown that a household’s optimal level of the social network is a function 
of microcredit borrowing. Briefly, a representative household borrows microcredit in order to 
invest in its small business projects, where it requires the household to have a certain level of 
capability to achieve success. If the business is successful, the household derives an income, 
which, together with the income from other sources, can be used for building the social 
network. By choosing a level of social network, the household maximises its utility subject to 
its budget constraint, which yields an equation that links social network to the microcredit 
borrowing.  
Empirically, in this chapter, the impact of microcredit on social network is quantitatively 
estimated, using the panel dataset from the VARHS (2008-16). As detailed in Chapter 4, due 
to the multi-dimensional nature of the social network, the principal component analysis (PCA) 
is employed to construct two indexes to be used in the regressions, namely the social network 
size and social network quality indexes. The results suggest that microcredit significantly 
improves both rural household’s social network size and quality.  
 Estimation strategy 
The microcredit variable (ln 𝑀) in Equation (4.14) is likely to be endogenous due to the 
potential selection bias in accessing microcredit and possible bi-directional causality between 
microcredit and social network. The selection bias arises primarily from two sources. The first 
is non-random placement of microcredit providers. The microcredit providers tend to locate 
their businesses in more developed areas to utilise their better infrastructure and/or central 
location. Consequently, households, who live in remote areas, are less likely to access 
microcredit services due to higher travel cost. Second, among those who are short of financial 
resources, borrowers are more likely to have better knowledge or entrepreneurship than non-
borrowers. The borrowers might able to see more economic opportunities of having a loan. 




The bi-directional causality between microcredit and social network can also occur. On the one 
hand, participating in microcredit encourages social interaction among borrowers, which 
creates or enhances the social network. On the other hand, the social network plays a role as 
non-physical collateral for microcredit borrowers. The non-physical collateral is widely 
accepted in rural areas, where most of its residents are poor and do not have any physical assets 
to secure loans. Thus, the better social network a household has, the better chance it has to 
receive a microcredit loan. 
In addition, children’s education (𝐸) can also be endogenous. Conceptually, a household also 
makes decisions on education, in addition to the consumption and social network, resulting in 
the optimal level of education being a function of microcredit borrowing and a set of other 
relevant factors. Therefore, E is likely to be correlated with the error term in Equation (4.10). 
To address the endogeneity problem, this study employs the feasible two-step generalised 
method of moments estimator with excluded instrumental variables (IV-GMM). For 
microcredit (M), This study employs the indicator of whether a household borrows previously 
(IV1) to correct for the endogenous selection for receiving microcredit. I employ the 
availability of funds at the village level (IV2) to correct for the endogenous amount of credit 
to be received.  
If a household has previously had a microcredit loan and successfully used it, it will have a 
better understanding of the borrowing process, and it might be identified as a creditworthy 
customer by current credit providers. As such, the household will have more chance to access 
microcredit. Khandker and Faruqee (2003) point out that the availability of funds is a valid 
predictor for how much a borrower could receive. I proxy the availability of funds by the sum 
of all households’ borrowing amount in its village. Conditional on a household borrowing 
microcredit, how its social network is affected does not depend on whether the household has 
borrowed previously and the availability of fund in the village. Therefore, these two 
instruments are both relevant (correlated with the microcredit borrowing) and valid 
(uncorrelated with the error term).  
Besides, I employ the highest number of school years of a member in the household (IV3) as 
an instrument for children’s education. Arguably, the member with the highest level of 
education can serve as a good role model that inspires other members to achieve the same or 




the highest level of education in the household shall not directly affect a household’s social 
network, other than through children’s education.  
Later in the estimations, to check the relevance and validity of the three instruments, the under-
identification, weak identification, and over-identification tests are conducted and reported in 
Section 6.4. The under-identification test checks whether the instruments are correlated with 
the endogenous variables. The weak identification test verifies whether the correlation between 
instruments and endogenous regressors are weak or not. The over-identification test (Sargan-
Hansen test) tests the null hypothesis that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term.  
In estimating Equation (4.14), it is possible that the explanatory variables are collinear with 
each other. To address such potential multicollinearity problem, the correlation among the 
explanatory variables is first checked. It is generally low. For example, the correlation of log 
microcredit and school gap is as low as 0.0337. In addition, the variance inflation factors (VIF) 
of all explanatory variables are reported in Table B1 (see appendix B). The VIFs fall in a range 
from 1.06 to 2.33, suggesting no serious multi-collinearity issues among the explanatory 
variables. Besides, to mitigate any possible bias caused by other unobserved time-invariant 
factors, household fixed effects are utilised in the estimations. 
 Variable definitions and summary statistic 
Guided by the theoretical framework in Chapter 4, This study focuses on the households that 
use microcredit only for non-consumption purposes.18 In addition, communes that contain only 
borrowers or only non-borrowing households are excluded to avoid any potential bias caused 
by communes’ characteristics. Besides, I also delete the outliers in the sample. The final sample 
consists of 9,260 observations, covering over 2,637 households, 395 communes, 132 districts, 
and 12 provinces. 
Table 6-1 reports variable definitions and summary statistics. The social network is measured 
by social network size (SIS) and social network quality (SIQ) indexes, as detailed in Chapter 4. 
 
18 Base on the information of main use of loan which reported in the surveys, I excluded all households 
who borrowed for consumption purpose. For example, there are 14 main use of loan from the survey: 
(1) for rice production; (2) for  other crop production; (3) for animal husbandry; (4) for forestry; (5) for 
fishery; (6) for non-farm activity; (7) build/buy house ; (8) buy land; (9) buy another asset; (10) pay for 
wedding/funeral; (11) for education expenses; (12) for health expenses; (13) for general consumption; 
(14) for other consumption. I excluded all households who borrowed for wedding/funeral; education 




Both indexes are ranged from 0 to 100, with a mean of 10.18 and 14.09, respectively. The 
standard deviation is modest (6.38 and 9.36 for SIS and SIQ, respectively). This occurs because 
people living in rural areas tend to have broad connections with their neighbours and 





Variables Description Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. 
SIS Social network size index (score) 0 100 10.18 6.38 
SIQ Social network quality index (score) 0 100 14.09 9.36 
M Total microcredit borrowing (million VND) 0 37 3.42 7.26 
E  Children’s education (School gaps of 
children (years)) 0 47 2.15 4.43 
Y Income from sources other than the family 
business (million VND) 0 1,576 29.28 44.10 
W Household wealth (million VND) 0 7,295 31.04 105.14 
EduH Number of school years of the household 
head  0 12 5.48 3.03 
HSize The number of household members 1 17 4.66 2.00 
AgeH The age of household head (years) 18 100 51.25 14.02 
Plot Total land holding (ha) 0 84 1.01 1.67 
Dep The number of dependent members 0 10 1.81 1.44 
Nfarming Whether a household is involved in non-
farming business activities (1-yes; 0-
otherwise) 
0 1 0.23 0.42 
Shock Whether a household experienced any 
income shock (1-yes; 0-otherwise) 0 1 0.52 0.50 
Poor Whether a household is classified as poor by 
authority (1-yes; 0-otherwise) 0 1 0.21 0.41 
Local Whether a household is local (1-yes; 0-
otherwise) 0 1 0.79 0.41 
IV1 Whether household previously borrow (1-
yes; 0-otherwise) 0 1 0.55 0.50 
IV2 Availability of funds at the commune 
(million VND) 2 7,885 313.51 556.36 
IV3 Highest level of education of a member in 
the household (number of school years) 0 12 9.08 3.15 
      
N= 9,260, VARHS 2008-2016. 
   




Total microcredit borrowing (M), the variable of interest, is measured by summing up current 
productive loans. Table 6-1 indicates that a typical household takes up an average loan of 3.42 
million VND (150 USD) in each survey round. Two instrumental variables are used to account 
for the endogenous selection for receiving microcredit and endogenous amount of credit to be 
received. The availability of funds in commune level is proxied by a sum of all amount of 
microcredit borrowing in each commune. On average, 313 million VND (13,695 USD) are 
available for each commune. More than half of the households in the sample have borrowing 
experience. 
Children’s education (E) is measured as the sum of school gaps of all children in a household. 
The school gap is the difference between actual years of schooling and expected years of 
schooling given the child’s age (Islam & Choe, 2013). Children are expected to be in school 
from age six to age eighteen, such that an eighteen-year-old should have received 12 years of 
schooling. The average school gap per household is found to be two years, indicating that rural 
households in Vietnam have some difficulties in sending their children to school. Many poor 
households forego their children’s education so that the children can work to help the 
household. To instrument the children’s education, this chapter makes use of the highest level 
of education of a household member (number of school years). The average highest education 
level recorded in the sample is 9.08 years.  
Income, Y, from sources other than the household business includes (1) net income from 
wage/salary; (2) net income from common property resources, such as earnings from collecting 
forest products or go hunting in forest areas not owned or rented by the household; (3) net 
income from private transfers, such as remittances from their relatives; (4) net income from 
public transfers, such as remittances from governmental support programs; (5) other income 
from other sources that are not related to the household business which is financed by 
microcredit. On average, a household in the sample can earn almost 29 million VND (1,318 
USD) per year from these five sources. 
Household wealth, W, is measured by the total value of its assets plus savings. The average 
wealth in the sample is 31 million VND (1,409 USD). The average number of years of 
education for the household head is 5.48 years. The average age of the household head is almost 
51. Households in the sample own 1.01 hectare of land on average. There are more than four 
people in a typical household, while the average number of independent members is 1.81. 




households are classified as poor, and 79 per cent of them are non-migrant residents. More than 
half of the households experienced at least one income shock in the past two years. 
In the empirical estimation, some variables are log-transformed, which requires non-zero 
values. Therefore, a value of one is added to variables that contain zero before the logarithm 
transformation. Such a strategy is also used by Mark and Shahidur (1998) and Roodman and 
Morduch (2014). All nominal monetary variables are converted to real terms using the producer 
price index with the base year 2008 (General Statistics Office of Vietnam (2017). 
 Results 
6.4.1 Baseline results 
Tests are implemented to check the relevance and validity of the instrumental variables. First, 
the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic in the under-identification test is 94.964 with a p-value of 
0.000. The null hypothesis that the three instruments are not correlated with the endogenous 
variables (microcredit borrowing and children’s education) is rejected at the one per cent level. 
Second, whether the excluded instruments are weakly correlated with the endogenous 
regressors is checked. The weak identification test obtains the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 
of 35.208, which is greater than the Stock and Yogo critical value of 11.04 at the five per cent 
level, suggesting that excluded instruments are not weak. Finally, the over-identification tests 
in both estimations obtain Hansen J statistics of 2.673 and 1.396 respectively, both of which 
have a p-value greater than 0.1, failing to reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are 
valid at the 10 per cent level. 
Estimated coefficients of Equation (4.14) are reported in Table 6-2, where the first column 
presents results of the social network size estimation, and the second column reports those of 
the social network quality estimation. Overall, most of variables are statistically significant and 
consistent in the sign of the impacts across both estimations. The consistency across both 
estimations is not surprising in that both indexes measure the two dimensions of the same social 
network. It is also noted that the impact of microcredit is statistically significant in both size 






Table 6-2 Impacts of microcredit on household social network 
VARIABLES 
Social network size index 
(SIS) 






     
log Microcredit (M) 0.237*** 0.044 0.413*** 0.069 
School gap (E) -0.414*** 0.114 -0.650*** 0.168 
log non-business income (Y) 0.003 0.034 0.121** 0.057 
log Wealth (W) 0.148*** 0.027 0.346*** 0.044 
Education of head (EduH) 0.587*** 0.137 0.937*** 0.208 
Household size (HSize) 0.727*** 0.087 1.061*** 0.136 
Age of head (AgeH) 0.094*** 0.016 0.108*** 0.021 
log Land size (Plot) 0.229** 0.101 0.379** 0.154 
Dependent members (Dep) -0.279*** 0.102 -0.486*** 0.156 
Non-farming (Nfarming) 0.675*** 0.208 1.046*** 0.307 
Income shock (Shock) 0.294** 0.136 -0.017 0.213 
Poor status (Poor) -0.497*** 0.177 -0.409 0.268 
Local resident (Local) 0.237*** 0.044 0.413*** 0.069 
   
Household Fixed effects YES YES 
Under-identification test 1  94.964*** 94.964*** 
Weak identification test 2  35.208** 35.208** 
Over-identification test 3 2.673 1.396 
Excluded instruments 4 3 3 
Number of observations 9,260 9,260 
   
Note: ***, **, and * indicate the statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 % levels, respectively; 1 Reports the 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic; 2 Reports the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic, the Stock-Yogo weak ID test 
critical values at 5% is 11.04; 3 Reports the Hansen J statistic; 4 The three instrument variables include 
indicator of previous credit borrowing, availability of funds, and highest number of school years of household’s 
members. 
 
The results suggest that microcredit borrowing significantly enhances the size and quality 
dimensions of rural households’ social network in Vietnam. Notably, a one per cent increase 
in microcredit borrowing (M) leads to an expected increase of 0.237 and 0.413 points in the 
social network size (SIS) and quality index (SIQ), ceteris paribus, respectively. This finding 
confirms that borrowing microcredit does enable rural households to enhance their social 
network. With additional resources provided by microcredit borrowing, a household is able to 
be more active in the regular meetings with their counterparts, enhance their roles in the social 
group’s decision-making process. Subsequently, it improves their reputation in the local 
community and helps them expand their social network, such as making more friends who are 




Given that participating in microcredit facilitates the connection of rural borrowers with their 
communities, it is important that local authorities, microcredit practitioners, and policymakers 
improve the effectiveness of microcredit market in rural areas. In using the microcredit loan, a 
household is more likely to expand its social network size by making friends with other 
borrowers, joining and interacting actively within the social groups to build up knowledge and 
reputation. This, in turn, increases the probability of success in its microcredit-funded business. 
Since microcredit plays a positive role, it is welfare-improving that microcredit providers in 
rural Vietnam increase access to microcredit. To do so, microcredit providers could rely on 
“social collaterals”, instead of “physical collaterals” which poor households do not always 
have. 
As expected, the children’s education, non-business income, wealth, education of household 
head, size of family, age of the head, land size, and non-farm activities positively influence a 
household’s social network. A household that receives non-business income from non-farm 
activities, such as working for governments or commercial companies, is more likely to interact 
and expand its network outside the local community through, for example, friendships with co-
workers from other provinces. A relatively wealthy household is more likely to have a higher 
demand for social activities, such as meeting their business’ partners and regularly participating 
in parties, which in turn help increase their reputation. 
A family with an older head or higher education (less school gap) is likely to have a better 
understanding of the local community and higher expectation on the benefit of social network 
than their younger or less educated counterparts and consequently has a larger and better social 
network. For a household, each of its members is likely to play a role in building up their family 
social network with the local community. Thus, the bigger a household is, the broader social 
network the household can achieve. Those households with larger land size are more likely to 
connect with other farmers to share their experience in land cultivating. Thus, the more land a 
household owns, the higher motivation to interact with the local community it will have. 
Non-farm activities, such as selling fertilisers, are likely to bring higher payoffs with lower risk 
to rural residents. To achieve that, the rural households are required to interact with both 
farmers and non-farmers (for example, suppliers) to increase the likelihood of success of their 
non-farm businesses. Such activities, in turn, enable rural households to expand their social 
network. Income shock appears to have a positive impact on household social network size. It 
is possible that in time of facing difficulty, rural households tend to seek for any help and 




understanding of local communities, a local household tends to have wider and higher quality 
network in comparison with a migrant household. 
The findings indicate that the number of dependent members and the poor status appear to 
negatively affect a household’s social network. Arguably, a household optimally allocates its 
limited resources for different needs. The more resources the household allocates for taking 
care of dependent members, the fewer resources the household invests in social network. The 
budget constraint of being poor is also a factor that limits a household’s social network. 
6.4.2 Robustness check 
The baseline estimations show that microcredit statistically and significantly impacts rural 
households’ social network, in terms of both size and quality. The results are reported in Table 
6-3. 
To check for robustness of the findings, the Kernel-based propensity score matching 
difference-in-differences approach is employed (Juan, 2009). The borrowing households’ 
group (treated group) is matched with non-borrowing households by using the kernel 
propensity score. I check for each two-round period (2008-2010, 2010-2012, 2012-2014, 2014-
2016, and 2008-2016). For instance, in the two-round period 2008-2010, I assign the year 2008 
as period zero (𝑡0) and year 2010 as period one (𝑡1). The treated group includes those 
households who do not borrow in 2008 but borrow in 2010. Based on the observed covariation, 
the Kernel-based propensity score is calculated for all households in 2008. The control groups 
are formed by matching the score with treated households. Two control groups are formed to 
check the robustness. One includes households who do not borrow in both 2008 and 2010 but 
might borrow in other years. Another control group includes households who have never 
Table 6-3 Robustness check 









Social network size index       
Not borrow in both periods 1.416*** 2.061*** 1.040* 1.088**  
Never borrowed in 2008-2016 1.288** 1.963*** 0.735 0.895 1.276** 
      
Social network quality index       
Not borrow in both periods 1.826** 4.078*** 2.588*** 2.122**  
Never borrowed in 2008-2016 1.669* 4.063*** 2.437** 2.069* 1.861* 
 
Note: ***, **, and * indicate the statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 % levels, respectively. The 




borrowed in the sample data. Taking advantage of the panel data, it is possible to estimate the 
average treatment effect on the treated (ATT).  
Table 6-3 suggests that borrowing microcredit improves rural household’s social network size 
and quality in all periods. The strongest impacts are found in the period 2010-2012. This 
chapter also examines the whole period from 2008 to 2016, in which the treated group includes 
households who have borrowed at least once since 2008. The results indicate significant ATTs 
of 1.276 and 1.861 for social network size and quality, respectively. Overall, the positive 
impact of microcredit on social network expansion and quality is confirmed. 
 Concluding remarks 
This chapter assessed the impacts of microcredit on social network of rural households in 
Vietnam from two dimensions: the size and quality. It contributes to the existing literature both 
theoretically and empirically. Theoretically, I developed a comprehensive framework that is 
based on household utility maximisation (as presented in Chapter 4) and can be used in other 
similar studies. Empirically, the impact of microcredit on a household’s social network is 
estimated with a panel dataset of the Vietnam Access to Resources Household Surveys from 
2008 to 2016. The PCA was employed to measure the household’s social network, and GMM 
IV was used in the estimation to address the potential endogeneity of microcredit borrowing. 
The findings suggest that the impact of microcredit is statistically significant on both size and 
quality of social network. Being a client of microcredit lenders, the borrower can improve the 
quality of its social network via regular group meetings and non-financial supports from the 
lenders. Through such activities, the rural household can strengthen its reputation and make 
more close friends. 
The findings have an important implication for fighting rural poverty. Given the significantly 
positive role of microcredit, it is welfare-improving to increase the microcredit access to the 
poor households. To do so, microcredit providers need to overcome the lack of “physical 
collateral”, a problem that the rural poor generally has. Microcredit providers can adopt long-
term lending strategies that are based upon the social network of their clients, namely to accept 
the “social collateral”, in addition to any “physical collateral”. In such ways, poor households 
will have a better chance to access finance. Successful use of microcredit loans helps them 
further improve the size and quality of their social network. Eventually, it will make it more 




Through its influence on the size and quality of social network, microcredit can become a 
crucial tool for poverty alleviation and elimination. Donors, government departments, and 
other supporting agencies should aim to improve the effectiveness of microcredit provision by 
developing policies and strategies that help enhance the quality of the poor households’ social 
network.  
Microcredit providers should also organise regular meetings (e.g., monthly, quarterly) for those 
who apply for microcredit. Their attendance at such meetings should be made as part of the 
requirements of obtaining a microcredit loan. These meetings can be used to provide training 
to help the borrowers to improve their business skills, to ask their clients to update their 
business progress and performance, or just to provide them with any changes in credit-related 
regulatory requirements or any other developments in the community that will affect their 
business operations.  
This chapter only focusses on rural areas in Vietnam, where the residents’ livelihood is mostly 
related to agriculture. Future research can extend to urban areas and compare the difference 
between rural and urban areas regarding the impacts of microcredit. In addition, future research 
can explore the difference between poor and non-poor households regarding the impacts of 
microcredit. Results of such investigations will provide valuable insights into the different roles 




CHAPTER 7  IMPACTS OF 
MICROCREDIT ON CHILDREN’S 
EDUCATION 
A revised version of this chapter will be submitted to World Development:  
Phan, C. T., Sun, S., Zhou, Z. Y., & Beg, R. Does productive microcredit harm rural children’s 
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This chapter analyses the first optimal decision of the representative household on their 
children’s education after accessing microcredit. Section 7.1 is an introduction to the impact 
on children’s education. Section 7.2 specifies the econometric models and the estimation 
procedures. Section 7.3 describes the dataset. Section 7.4 presents the results and Section 7.5 
concludes. 
 Introduction 
As discussed previously, microcredit is fast becoming a key instrument in poverty alleviation. 
It is found to affect recipients not only economically, such as on consumption, income and 
financial assets (see for example Khandker and Samad (2014) and Khandker (1998)), but also 
non-economically, such as on social network (Phan et al., 2020) and children’s education (You 
& Annim, 2014).  
There has been a growing number of studies that explore the determinants of children's 
education from both supply and demand sides (see for example, Islam and Choe (2013), and a 
few more). The supply-side factors include infrastructure, a supply of teachers, and schooling 
resources. Microcredit programs in the community are likely to positively affect these supply-
side factors and subsequently promote children’s education. On the demand side, in deciding 
their children’s education, households compare the financial and opportunity costs of sending 
their children to school with the future return to the family (Hill & King, 1993), subject to their 
budget constraints. On the one hand, the microcredit borrowing can relax a household’s budget 
constraint, and consequently promote its demand for children’s education.  
On the other hand, the microcredit borrowing for the purpose of production (productive 
microcredit), on which this study focuses, can dampen a household’s demand for its children’s 
education. First, the microcredit-funded business may fail, and the loss of income due to 
business failure tightens the household’s budget, which in turns negatively affects the education 
for its children. Second, an increase in the productive microcredit borrowing help expands the 
family business, resulting in an increased demand for workers. In such situations, the household 
is likely to ask the children to help out in the business, reducing their education. Maldonado 
and González-Vega (2008) find that when parents invest in projects that demand child labour 
for farming or housework, their children’s education is sacrificed. In rural areas, children often 
work in labour-intensive sectors, such as agriculture, and have limited access to educational 
facilities. In addition, they are vulnerable to child-labour abuse, particularly when their family 




children’s schooling, which will present implications for policymakers and researchers to 
enhance the rural human capital development in developing countries.  
Rural Vietnam is a valuable case for investigating the impacts of microcredit. First, 70 per cent 
of the population live in rural areas, and 90 per cent of those households are low-income. As 
microcredit programs mainly focus on poor clients, rural Vietnam provides a sufficient sample 
for assessing their impacts. Second, in Vietnam, poverty is prevalent. The government has put 
in significant efforts in poverty alleviation, where microcredit plays an important role, and 
achieve an impressive outcome.19 Therefore, lessons from Vietnam, particularly those on the 
impacts of microcredit, are likely to help policymakers in other developing countries to fine-
tune their poverty-alleviation policies. 
Despite its importance, to the best of my knowledge, no existing studies investigate the impacts 
of productive microcredit on rural children’s education. Previous studies do not distinguish 
between the microcredit loans for income-generating activities and loans for consumption 
purpose (see Islam & Choe, 2013; Maldonado & González-Vega, 2008). The pooling of 
different types of microcredit loans is one of the factors that result in findings of contrasting 
impacts of microcredit in the previous studies. Besides, policymakers are usually more 
interested to understand the role of productive loans, rather than that of consumption loans.  
Filling this gap, this study focuses on the impact of productive microcredit on children’s 
schooling, using a unique dataset of the Vietnam Access to Resources Household Survey 
(VARHS) in the period of 2008-2016. This chapter finds that productive microcredit loans 
exert significant adverse effects on children’s education in rural Vietnam, which is more 
profound for boys. 
 Estimation strategy 
As illustrated in Chapter 4, the household’s optimal decision on its children’s education 
depends on a set of factors, such as microcredit borrowing (M), non-business income (Y), 
household wealth (W), and other household characteristics (H). It shall be noted that the optimal 
education in Equation (4.18) is an aggregate of the education of all individual children in the 
household. For a particular child, his/her education will also depend on his/her characteristics. 
 
19 The poverty rate declined from 60 per cent in the early 1990s to 20.7 per cent in 2010, then 13.5 per cent in 




Therefore, motivated by Equation (4.18), I write the educational achievement for child j in 
household i as follows: 
 ln 𝐸𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽e1 + 𝛽𝑒2 ln 𝑀𝑖 + 𝛽𝑒3 ln 𝑌i + 𝛽𝑒4 ln 𝑊𝑖 + 𝛽𝑒5 ln 𝐻𝑖 + 𝛽𝑒6 ln 𝐼𝑖𝑗 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗 (7.1) 
where 𝐼 denotes a vector of child’s characteristics that are expected to influence the schooling 
years. 𝛽𝑒6 stands for a vector of parameters need to be estimated. 
The vector 𝐼 includes a child’s age, gender, and birth order. A child’s age is expected to exert 
a positive effect. As will be discussed shortly, the child’s education will be measured by both 
a child’s completed grades and schooling gap. Not surprisingly, the older a child is, the more 
schooling grades that he/she will be likely to complete. For the schooling gap, an older child 
tends to have higher schooling gap by construction (see definition in Chapter 4). For example, 
a six-year-old child’s schooling gap is 0, while in contrast, an eighteen-year-old child has a 
schooling gap between 0 and 12. A child’s gender is a dummy variable that has a value of one 
for a girl, and zero otherwise. In rural Vietnam, girls are expected to have less schooling years 
than boys due to son-preference. Hence it is expected to have a negative effect. The birth order 
of a child in the family is expected to exert a negative impact. In rural areas, parents are believed 
to take younger children out of schools to do housework when they are too busy. 
This chapter measures the children’s education from two aspects, namely the child’s completed 
grade and schooling gap. In the literature, a child’s education can be proxied by the status of 
school enrolment (dummy variable); the completed grades (grades); and the schooling gap 
(number of years). The status of school enrolment does not inform the achievement, level, or 
quality of schooling for children who are not in school at the survey time. So, instead, this study 
employs the completed grades and schooling gap for the empirical estimations. The completed 
grade captures children’s schooling grade. However, it does not reflect how well children do 
in school or whether they complete a grade in more than one year. So, this chapter also employs 
the schooling gap, which captures such issues as late entries, dropping out, or failed grades. 
Because the two dependent variables are non-negative integers from zero to twelve, it is 
appropriate to use the Poisson model in the estimation. The Poisson model has been widely 
employed to analyse such count data (Wooldridge, 1997). One might argue that the 
distributions of school gap and completed grade violate a Poisson model’s assumption that the 
variance equals the mean, namely equi-dispersion. If this assumption is violated, it results in 




To address the under-/over-dispersion problem, this chapter also uses the negative binomial 
model (NB), which is a Poisson maximum likelihood estimation with correction of under/over-
dispersion problem. To determine which method is more appropriate, the Likelihood-ratio (LR) 
test is conducted with a null hypothesis that the under/over-dispersion does not occur. A failure 
to reject the null hypothesis suggests that there is no under/over-dispersion issue, and both NB 
and Poisson models can produce consistent results.  
Furthermore, if the value of dependent variables contains a significant proportion of zero, 
namely “excess zeros”, the zero-inflated Poisson or zero-inflated NB models would be more 
appropriate.  In our sample, there is only 0.41 and 0.19 per cent of school gap and completed 
grade is zero, respectively (see Tables C1 and C2 in Appendix C). Thus, it is not necessary to 
consider these zero-inflated models. 
However, estimating Equation (7.1) directly is subject to selection bias due to the non-random 
access to microcredit. The selection bias may arise from both the demand and supply sides. On 
the supply side, the placement of financial institutions is non-random, and as such, it is unlikely 
that financial services are allocated across the villages randomly. The financial institutions 
could be located systematically more in high-income villages as the wealthier villagers can 
afford the loans. On the demand side, there is a tendency for borrowers to possess an attribute 
that non-borrowers lack (such as the "entrepreneurial ability"). The borrowers with 
"entrepreneurial ability" are more likely to get loans and earn higher income from investment 
activities than others. Therefore, the assumption that E[Xijtϵijt] = 0, where X is a vector of all 
explanatory variables in Equation (7.1), is likely not to hold, which if not addressed, will lead 
to inconsistent estimates. 
To address the endogeneity problem, I instrument the microcredit borrowing in the Poisson 
regression model. The endogeneity occurs from two aspects, namely one endogenous selection 
on whether to receive microcredit and the other endogenous amount of credit to be received. I 
employ the average loan’s interest rate at the commune level and the availability of funds at 
the commune level as excluded instrumental variables for microcredit. Arguably, the interest 
rate is an important determinant for the microcredit borrowing decision. The interest rate is 
largely determined on the supply side in the micro-finance market, with borrowers being in a 
very weak bargaining position. Therefore, the given interest rate directly affects a household’s 
decision to borrow, but not its decision on education (other than indirectly through its effect on 
the microcredit borrowing). For the amount of microcredit received, Khandker and Faruqee 




could receive. I proxy the availability of funds by the sum of all households’ borrowing amount 
in their communes. 
For the NB model, I employ the control function approach to account for the endogeneity. In 
particular, I first obtain residuals in the first stage regression of microcredit against all 
exogenous independent variables and the two instruments. Then, adding the estimated residuals 
in the second stage, using the NB model, as an additional regressor (see Wooldridge, 2015). 
In the estimations, several tests are conducted to confirm the validity of the two instruments. 
The under-identification test and weak identification tests both verify the relevance of the 
instruments (i.e., strongly correlated with microcredit). The over-identification test checks 
whether the instruments are valid (i.e., uncorrelated with the error term). The relevance and 
validity of the instruments are confirmed if the null hypothesis in under-identification test and 
weak identification tests are rejected and fails to be rejected in the over-identification test. 
Besides, to control for inflation effects, all monetary value is converted to real term by using 
the producer price index with the base year of 2008 (General Statistics Office of Vietnam, 
2017). 
 Variable definitions and summary statistics 
As discussed earlier, this study focuses on productive microcredit loans. This chapter, 
therefore, excludes households, who use microcredit only for consumption. Furthermore, 
communes that contain only borrowers or only non-borrowing households are excluded to 
avoid any potential bias caused by communes’ characteristics. 
Only households who have children with ages from eleven to eighteen are included for the 
analysis. In Vietnam, children’s schooling can be classified into primary-school (6-10 years 
old), secondary-school (11-15 years old), and high-school (16-18 years old). I initially 
examined the three sub-samples and noted that the t-tests in the primary-school sub-sample do 
not find significant differences in children’s education between borrowers and non-borrowers. 
It is not surprising, because attending primary school is compulsory for all children in Vietnam. 




filtering, the final sample includes 7,232 observations, which spreads over 1,626 households, 
336 communes and 12 provinces, for estimations.20  
Table 7-1 reports variable definitions and summary statistics. Both dependent variables, 
𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠 and 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑔𝑎𝑝, are in a range from zero to twelve. On average, the schooling grade that 
a typical child completed is 6.7, and the school gap is around three years, indicating that rural 
households in Vietnam are facing difficulties in sending their children to school. Many poor 
households find they must forego education for their children so that the children can help in 
the family’s business. 
  
 





Variables Description Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. 
Grades Grade a child completed in school (grades) 0 12 6.70 2.49 
Schgap Difference between the expected schooling 
and the actual schooling years (years) 
0 12 3.07 1.75 
M Total microcredit borrowing (million VND) 0 3,100 10.31 54.86 
Childgender Gender of child (1-female; 0-otherwise) 0 1 0.49 0.50 
Childage Age of child (years) 11 18 14.77 2.26 
Birthorder The birth order of a child in its family (start 
from 1 for the oldest child) 
1 11 2.23 1.32 
Y Income from sources other than the family 
business (million VND) 
0 1,080 23.45 34.72 
W Household wealth (million VND) 0 1,570 27.86 63.65 
EduH The number of school years of the household 
head 
0 12 5.32 3.04 
HSize The number of household members 2 17 5.82 1.98 
AgeH The age of household head (years) 21 84 42.91 7.26 
Plot Total land holding (hectares) 0 32 1.39 1.74 
Dep The number of dependent members 0 10 2.53 1.56 
Nfarming Whether a household is involved in non-
farming business activities (1-yes; 0-
otherwise) 
0 1 0.24 0.43 
Shock Whether a household experienced any 
income shock (1-yes; 0-otherwise) 
0 1 0.62 0.49 
Poor Poverty status. Whether a household is 
classified as poor by authority (1-yes; 0-
otherwise) 
0 1 0.27 0.45 
Local Whether a household is local (1-yes; 0-
otherwise) 
0 1 0.76 0.43 
IV1 The average interest rate of loans at the 
commune level (% monthly) 
0 4.4 0.77 0.46 
IV2 Availability of funds at the commune level 
(million VND) 
0.20 7,885 313.31 528.11 
N= 7,232. VARHS 2008-2016. 
 
Total microcredit borrowing (𝑀), the variable of interest, is measured by summing up all 
current loans. On average, a rural household in the sample can borrow an amount of 500 USD. 
The average interest rate and the availability of funds are used as instruments for 𝑀. The 
interest rate is, measured by the average rate at the commune level, 0.77 per cent per month, 
which is not as high as the commercial interest rate in the credit market (greater than one per 
cent monthly). The Vietnamese government has significantly supported rural residents by 
reducing the interest rate in rural areas. For the second instrument, the average funds of around 
313 million VND (13,608 USD) are available in each commune. 




Children’s characteristics include age, gender, and birth order. The average age of children is 
14.77 years old. Forty-nine per cent of children are female. Most of the families in the sample 
have three or four children. 
On average, a household’s income, from sources other than its family business, is about 23.45 
million VND (1,019 USD). The average household wealth is 27.86 million VND (1,211 USD). 
21  The average age of the household head is nearly 43 years old. The highest schooling years 
of household’s head is 12. On average, s/he can accumulate only 5.32 schooling years. A 
household tends to have around six members and owns 1.39 hectares of land. One-fourth of 
children in the sample are involved in non-farming business activities. Sixty-two per cent of 
the children come from households that experienced at least one income shock. Twenty-seven 
per cent of children belong to poor households. The local children (non-migrant) account for 
76 per cent in the sample. 
 Results 
Table 7-2 reports the main estimation results. I employ the IV Poisson and the control function 
method in the negative binomial regression to estimate Equation (7.1). The results for school 
gap are reported in Columns (1) and (2), while the results for completed grade are presented in 
Columns (3) and (4). Overall, the sign and magnitude of the coefficient of microcredit 









(1) (2) (3) (4) 
School gap (Schgap) Completed grade (Grades) 
IV-Poisson NB IV-Poisson NB 
     
log Microcredit (M) 0.063** 0.069** -0.070* -0.068** 
 (0.030) (0.035) (0.037) (0.032) 
Child’s gender (Childgender) -0.260*** -0.263*** 0.266*** 0.267*** 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.037) 
Child’s age (Childage) 0.222*** 0.222*** 0.772*** 0.773*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) 
Birth order (Birthorder) 0.049*** 0.048** -0.061*** -0.059** 
 (0.016) (0.019) (0.020) (0.024) 
log Non-business income (Y) 0.005 0.005 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) 
log Wealth (W) -0.039*** -0.041*** 0.048*** 0.047*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) 
Education of head (EduH) -0.312*** -0.314*** 0.289*** 0.291*** 
 (0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.023) 
Household size (HSize) 0.045*** 0.047** -0.081*** -0.081*** 
 (0.017) (0.020) (0.020) (0.023) 
Age of head (AgeH) 0.010*** 0.011*** -0.010*** -0.010*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
log Land (Plot) 0.090*** 0.087*** -0.062*** -0.063*** 
 (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.015) 
Dependent members (Dep) 0.094*** 0.092*** -0.065*** -0.066*** 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.024) (0.023) 
Non-farming (Nfarming) -0.141*** -0.150*** 0.113** 0.113*** 
 (0.047) (0.055) (0.050) (0.040) 
Income-shock (Shock) -0.089** -0.094*** 0.094** 0.091** 
 (0.039) (0.033) (0.040) (0.040) 
Poor status (Poor) 0.343*** 0.345*** -0.381*** -0.385*** 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.053) (0.053) 
Local household (Local) 0.187*** 0.194*** -0.196*** -0.194*** 
 (0.058) (0.066) (0.065) (0.069) 
Estimated residuals  -0.072**  0.071** 
  (0.035)  (0.033) 
     
Observations 7,232 7,232 7,232 7,232 
Anderson canon. corr. LM 
statistic 105.359***  105.359***  
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 53.333*  53.333*  
Hansen's J statistic 0.874  0.935  
Likelihood-ratio (LR) statistic  0.000  0.000 
     
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate the statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 % levels, respectively; the coefficients 
reported are marginal effects; bootstrap standard errors presented in the parentheses.  
 




About the choice of models, the likelihood-ratio (LR) tests obtain a test statistic of zero with a 
p-value greater than 0.1, which fails to reject the null hypothesis that there is no under/over-
dispersion in both cases of school gap and completed grade. This test verifies that the Poisson 
model is appropriate for this empirical study. Therefore, the following discussions are based 
on the IV Poisson estimation results in Columns (1) and (3). 
For the two excluded instruments, I conduct several tests to verify their relevance and validity. 
The estimated value of the Anderson canonical correlation LM statistic is 105.359, with a p-
value of 0.000. It thus rejects the null hypothesis and implies the instruments are relevant and 
correlated with microcredit borrowing. In the weak identification test, the value of the Cragg-
Donald Wald F statistic is 53.333, which rejects the null hypothesis that the correlation between 
the instruments and the endogenous regressor is weak. The Hansen's J test has test statistics of 
0.874 and 0.935, respectively, and both p-values greater than 0.1. I thus fail to reject the null 
hypothesis that the instruments are valid. Hence, the tests confirm the relevance and validity of 
the two excluded instruments. 
The estimations find microcredit borrowing exerts significantly positive impacts on children’s 
school gap, but significantly negative impacts on children’s completed grades in rural areas of 
Vietnam. The finding suggests that microcredit access discourages borrowers from sending 
their children to school. Particularly, a one per cent increase in the amount of microcredit 
borrowing is expected to increase children’s school gap by 0.06 year, and decrease the 
completed grade by 0.07, ceteris paribus. The finding is consistent with those of Augsburg et 
al. (2012); Banerjee et al. (2015); Islam and Choe (2013) who report adverse impacts of 
microcredit on children’s education in Bosnia, India, and Bangladesh, respectively. 
A possible explanation for the negative effect is that productive microcredit in rural areas 
promotes the need for more labour. Borrowers tend to invest in agriculture-related projects that 
may be more labour-intensive. They have limited resources to hire workers, and so resort to 
their own school-aged children: pulling their children out of school to do housework or help 
them with some basic tasks in farming. 
The findings should draw the attention of policymakers and development practitioners on the 
unintended effects of microcredit on rural children’s education. It is expected that production 
loans would help rural borrowers increase their income, which then helps their children to 
attend schools. This investment in education, in turn, will have a long-term positive impact to 




hypothesis that in rural Vietnam, microcredit helps children to have longer schooling. On the 
contrary, I find that the child-labour effect dominates the income, risk management, gender, 
and information effects. 
The other explanatory variables also exert considerable influences on children’s education. For 
children’s characteristics, I find that a child’s birth order adversely affects its education. It 
appears that parents tend to take the younger child out of school to take care of housework. 
Interestingly, the results indicate that a girl receives 0.266 more grades than a boy. This finding 
is in contrast to the son preference in rural areas, where parents are more likely to send their 
sons rather than daughters to school if they have to pick one. This suggests that the son 
preference is perhaps weakening nowadays. The coefficients of a child’s age are found to be 
positive in both the school gap and completed grade estimations. Not surprisingly, an older 
child tends to have completed more grades, and because of age s/he has a higher likelihood to 
have a bigger school gap. 
Regarding the impacts of household characteristics, wealth, the head’s education, and non-
farming activities have significantly positive influences on children’s education. A household 
with better endowment tends to bring more opportunities for children to achieve better 
education. Educated parents tend to encourage their children to pursue high academic standing 
and have a higher expectation for education. In rural areas, non-farming activities are expected 
to reduce risk and increase income for households whose livelihood strategies mostly rely on 
the unstable nature of weather. Involving in non-farming activities helps diversify rural 
household’s income sources and minimise losses in case of negative income shocks.   
In contrast, family size, age of head, land ownership, number of dependent members, poverty 
status, and being a local household significantly reduce children’s academic achievement. 
Arguably, the bigger a family is, the less resource can be allocated for each member, especially 
for its education. The negative impact of age of household head appears to suggest that older 
household heads are more conservative in terms of evaluating the return on education 
investment. It is likely that the longer they are involved in agricultural activities, the stronger 
they believe that their children would follow them to work on their farms and do not need to 
study too much. This is also consistent with the adverse impact of land ownership. More labour 
is required when households obtain more land. Subsequently, they might pull their children out 
of school to increase family labour force. A household with more dependent members or 




In order to examine whether the impact of microcredit is heterogeneous across children’s 
genders and poverty status, the Equation (7.1) is estimated with sub-samples of boys, girls, 
poor, and non-poor, separately. In developing countries, such as Vietnam, it is generally 
believed that parents are more likely to be biased in favour of their son’s education. Therefore, 
it is necessary to investigate whether such perception is true or not. This chapter also considers 
whether microcredit really helps the ultra-poor in rural areas. This analysis, thus, aims to 
provide some in-depth insights into the impacts of microcredit for policymakers. The estimated 
results are presented in Table 7-3, where the top panel reports the regression results for boys 
and girls, the bottom panel presents the estimated results for poor and non-poor. Overall, this 
chapter analysis only finds that microcredit has statistically significant and adverse effects on 
boys’ education. For the poverty status, microcredit appears to have negative impacts on both 
poor and non-poor households on the competed grades and raise the schooling gap for the non-
poor households. 
For a child’s gender, the sub-sample estimations indicate that rural male children tend to drop 
out if their parents borrow loans for business, while it has no impact on girls’ education. 
Particularly, a one per cent increase in microcredit borrowing leads to a decrease of 0.092 year 
in completed grades and an increase of 0.089 years in school gap of boys, ceteris paribus. This 
finding contradicts the traditional view of preferring boys to girls in rural developing countries. 
In Bangladesh, Islam and Choe (2013) and Mark and Shahidur (1998) also detect adverse 
effects of microcredit on male children’s education. 
Given the estimation results, it appears that the child labour effect is a significant concern in 
rural Vietnam, which is likely to exist in other developing countries as well. Most rural 
Table 7-3 Marginal effects of microcredit in sub-samples. 
log Microcredit (M) 
 School gap (Schgap) Completed grade (Grades) 
Observation Coef. Robust S.E Coef. 
Robust 
S.E 
Boys versus girls      
     Boys 3,691 0.0896** 0.0399 -0.0922* 0.0522 
     Girls 3,541 0.0418 0.0450 -0.0653 0.0517 
Poor versus non-poor      
     Poor 4,154 0.0764 0.0501 -0.110* 0.0621 
     Non-poor 3,078 0.0825** 0.0383 -0.107** 0.0495 
Notes: ** and * indicate the statistical significance at the 5 and 10% levels, respectively; the coefficients 
reported are marginal effects; other estimated coefficients are presented in Tables C3 and C4, Appendices C; 
all estimations are IV Poisson regression model; group of poor households includes those households 





households have low income and are not able to hire external labours for farming activities. As 
a result, children are pulled out of school to support the family income. Boys are more likely 
to be held at home to work than girls, perhaps due to their greater physical strengths.   
For the poverty status, the coefficients in the bottom panel of Table 7-3 suggest that microcredit 
borrowing negatively impacts rural households regardless of their poverty status. Particularly, 
there is no significant difference in the impacts between the two groups. For example, for 
completed grades, the size of microcredit impacts is 0.11 and 0.107 for poor and non-poor 
groups, respectively. For the school gap, the corresponding coefficients of poor and non-poor 
households are 0.07 and 0.08, respectively, although the impact on the poor group is not 
statically significant. It is expected that the microcredit borrowing would be a burden for poor 
parents due to their limited resources and lack of labour to work on their business. As such, 
poor children would be taken out of school to support their family’s business. Nevertheless, 
this negative impact can be alleviated by the tuition fee exemption policy in Vietnam. The 
tuition fee exemption for the poor makes it less expensive for poor households to keep their 
children at school. 
 Concluding remarks 
This chapter examined the impact of microcredit on children’s schooling in rural areas of 
Vietnam. For this purpose, I utilise a theoretical framework set up in Chapter 4. Briefly, a 
representative household borrows microcredit to invest in its small business. Then it is involved 
in a three-stage decision-making process, namely first on its children’s education, then social 
network and finally, consumption. The investment in the small business brings in additional 
income, should it achieve success. The household maximises its life-time utility, subject to a 
budget constraint, which yields an optimal education as a function of microcredit borrowing 
and a set of control variables. Guided by the theoretical framework, the impact of microcredit 
on children’s education in rural Vietnam is empirically estimated. 
The results indicate that productive rural microcredit has negative effects on children’s 
education, especially for boys. Given the negative impact on children’s education, local 
authorities and development practitioners need to pay more attention to the effectiveness of 
rural production loans. Although microcredit can serve the poor as a key effective tool for 
poverty alleviation and promote local economy in the short term, the microcredit programs 
might also have an undesired side effect on rural children’s education, which, in the longer 




child’s genders and a household’s poverty status. Access to microcredit could reduce the 
effectiveness of government policies which aim to eliminate gender imbalance in education. 
From the findings, three key implications can be drawn for policymakers and microcredit 
providers. First, policymakers and financial institutions should pay more attention to the 
possible child labour effect due to utilizing microcredit. Using microcredit for household’s 
business often requires extra labour to work. For instance, rural borrowers might use the loans 
to purchase livestock or new farms. Consequently, children might be asked to take care of the 
animals or household, while their parents are not able to allocate time for such work. In the 
end, children’s schooling is scarified. To avoid such a situation, a term of no using child labour 
can be added to the loan contract, particularly for the labour-intensive projects.  
Second, one of possible causes for the negative effect on children schooling is that the parents 
are not able to hire external labour for their projects due to limited resources. Subsequently, 
their children serve as a cheap available resource, which they tap in if needed. This problem 
can be overcome if the size of loans is increased, and more low-interest-rate loans are 
distributed to the poor. Particularly, microcredit for the poor households is more likely to be 
small and associated with high-interest rates and shorter repayment conditions. As a result, the 
poor are more likely to reduce cost by using their children as labour in the business, thereby 
limiting the children’s schooling. A larger size of loans allows the borrowers to invest in more 
profitable projects and, hence, higher return and more resources enable the borrowers to hire 
external labour, instead of using their children as an input in the family business. 
Third, in order to minimise the child labour effect in the society, especially in rural areas, the 
government can introduce preferred loans that target only education, such as credit for school-
related fees (i.e., textbook and tuition fee). Along with the loan, lenders can provide training 
courses to increase borrowers’ awareness of the value of education for their children. Through 
these ways, it is hoped that more opportunities will be made available for the poor, schooling 
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In this final chapter of the thesis, key findings and conclusions derived from the research are 
first summarised in Section 8.1. Section 8.2 highlights the thesis’s contributions. Policy 
implications of this research are elaborated in Section 8.3. Finally, addressed in Section 8.4 are 
likely limitations of the study and areas to which future research attention is warranted. 
 Findings and conclusions 
This thesis stands on the viewpoint of microcredit suppliers, such as donors, policymakers, and 
MFIs, to examine whether the financial service is an effective instrument in fighting against 
poverty. In light of the need for a comprehensive study, this thesis investigated the influences 
of microcredit on food consumption, social network, and children’s education. The main 
findings are summarised as follows: 
• Impacts of microcredit on food consumption.  
Chapter 5 analyses the impacts of microcredit on rural households’ food consumption in 
Vietnam. This analysis focuses on the optimal household decision in stage three of the multi-
stage decision-making process. The study employs the System GMM estimators with a panel 
dataset, VARHS, from 2008 to 2016. The estimations suggest that the microcredit programs in 
rural areas of Vietnam appear to be effective in terms of improving household food 
consumption in both the short and long terms. However, it is worth noting that previous 
borrowings can negatively affect the current-period consumption of borrowers. This burden is 
caused by repayment of earlier microcredit borrowings. This means although rural Vietnamese 
households can benefit from microcredit loans, they also face the risk of falling into a “credit 
trap”. Hence, it is important to improve the microcredit policy to facilitate positive impacts and 
mitigate adverse impacts. 
• Impacts of microcredit on social network 
The effect of microcredit borrowings on the rural households’ social network is examined in 
Chapter 6. This empirical study focuses on stage two, where a representative household makes 
an optimal decision for its social network. The household’s social network is summarised into 
two dimensions, namely the social network size and social network quality indexes, which are 
constructed by using the PCA. The findings suggest that the impacts of microcredit on both the 
size and quality of a household’s social network are statistically significant. As microcredit 




With financial supports, households become more active and gain more confidence to enhance 
their roles in the social group’s decision-making process. Through such activities, rural 
households can strengthen their reputation and extend their circle by making more close friends 
or participating in more social events. 
This finding highlights a significant benefit for the poor. In particular, a wider and better social 
network can enable the poor to access external supports when facing adverse income shocks. 
The support network also helps the households acquire new skills from peers within its social 
network to build a route out of poverty. Moreover, the research findings suggest a solution to 
address one microcredit market failure, namely the poor are not able to get loans because of 
physical collateral requirement. Traditionally, microcredit providers usually ask for physical 
collaterals before they approve any loan application. Therefore, the poor’s loan applications 
tend to be rejected due to a lack of valuable assets as collaterals.  This problem could be solved 
if microcredit providers accept the “social collaterals”, instead of only “physical collaterals” 
which poor households do not always have. 
• Impacts of microcredit on children’s education 
Unlike the other two impacts, accessing microcredit loans appears to harm borrower’s 
children’s education. The finding indicates that children are pulled out of school if their parents 
borrow productive microcredit. This adverse effect is even more profound for boys. In other 
words, this research suggests that rural microcredit promotes the need for child labour and 
reduces the intention of sending children to school. Possibly this is because most of the 
livelihood strategies in rural areas are related to the agriculture sector. As such, rural parents 
tend to invest micro borrowings into agriculture-related projects, which are more likely to be 
labour-intensive, such as purchasing new lands or equipment for its self-enterprise. With 
limited resources, the parents might not be able to hire external labour for the projects. 
Consequently, the parents prefer pulling their children out of school to help them, such as doing 
basic tasks of farming, doing housework, taking care of younger siblings, or feeding livestock. 
In addition, boys are more likely held at home to work than girls, perhaps due to their greater 
physical strengths. The negative effect requires attention from policymakers and practitioners: 
microcredit programs have a negative effect on rural children’s education, which, in the long 
term, can exacerbate poverty.  
Overall, microcredit positively contributes to the rural household’s welfare in terms of 




findings suggest that microcredit appears to be a useful tool for poverty alleviation in rural 
Vietnam. However, Vietnamese authorities, policymakers, and MFIs should pay more attention 
to its adverse effect on children’s education.  
 Significance and contributions 
This thesis makes several significant contributions in terms of microcredit literature, research 
methodology, and policy debate. 
8.2.1 Contribution to microcredit literature 
The study significantly contributes to the microcredit literature with a comprehensive 
investigation of the causal relationship between productive microcredit and rural household 
wellbeing. As stated in Chapter 3, there is no standard framework for evaluating the impacts 
of microcredit at the household level. In particular, previous approaches offer different 
methodologies and draw conflicting and even inconclusive conclusions, suggesting that the 
roles of microcredit in development depend on the level the financial interventions. Rather than 
simply following an existing approach, this research proposed a mechanism which allows 
exploring three aspects that microcredit can affect rural households. Based on this mechanism, 
I identify the three aspects to capture the contribution of microcredit to household socio-
economics development, namely food consumption, social network, and children’s education. 
Chapter 5 adds to the literature on the impact on food consumption. Unlike previous studies 
which employ other proxies such as income or assets, this study utilises food consumption 
which directly affects the household utility to assess the economic impact of microcredit. 
Moreover, this study analyses the impact in a dynamic context which provides a better 
examination of the causal relationship. Chapter 6 contributes to the literature with a quantitative 
study of the impact on rural households’ social network. There is a lack of quantitative studies 
in the literature. Besides, although a few studies have addressed the social impacts of 
microcredit, they are qualitative. Chapter 7 provides evidence of the impact of microcredit on 
borrower’s children’s education. Previous studies do not distinguish between consumption and 
productive microcredit in investigating its impacts on education, which is likely to result in a 
bias. In contrast, I focus on productive microcredit loans. 
This thesis, therefore, contributes to the advancement of knowledge on how to better identify 
the impacts of microcredit interventions on rural households. In fact, to the best of my 




empirically examine the roles of the microcredit services in the fight against poverty in 
Vietnam, especially in rural areas. 
8.2.2 Contributions to research methodology 
One of the significant contributions of this thesis is a theoretical framework which allows 
researchers to empirically examine the impacts of microcredit in anti-poverty programs. The 
theoretical approach offers a method to assess the effects of financial interventions on three 
aspects at the household level. These effects can be included in the impact assessment studies, 
which are crucial management tasks for any interested agencies, such as donors, policymakers, 
and practitioners.  
In particular, this framework incorporates the three aspects into a multi-stage decision-making 
process in which a representative household makes the optimal decisions on its children’s 
education, social network, and food consumption sequentially. This framework can be applied 
to investigate the impacts of microcredit in other countries. 
Besides, this thesis addresses the selection bias issue, a common problem in microcredit impact 
assessment studies. Instrumental variables that are employed in this research are relevant and 
valid and can be implemented in other microcredit-related studies. 
Furthermore, unlike most previous studies of microcredit in Vietnam which utilised cross-
section data or panel data of a short time frame, this research comprehensively assesses the 
impacts of microcredit on rural households using a high-quality panel dataset from the 
VARHS. Hence, the impact evaluation could account for the dynamic aspect of the household’s 
welfare to explore the long-term impacts on consumption, social network and education of 
households. 
8.2.3 Contributions to the policy debate 
Global demand for microcredit continues to increase, but the impacts of microcredit are subject 
to ongoing debate. According to Microfinance Barometer (2019), around 139.9 million 
borrowers had accessed microcredit globally in 2018. MFIs have lent hundreds of billions of 
dollars with an average annual growth rate of 11.5 per cent over the past five years. South Asia 
continues to dominate the global microcredit market, with the top three markets in terms of the 
number of borrowers being India, Bangladesh, and Vietnam. This trend is expected to continue 
but has raised concerns from the sceptics. The sceptics are worried that the microcredit 




strong evidence resulting from robust empirical studies on the role of microcredit in poverty 
alleviation, donors and policymakers might withdraw their supports for microcredit programs. 
This might lead to a possible policy blunder. 
Findings based on comprehensive analyses in this empirical study strongly endorse that there 
is a role for microcredit in development, especially poverty alleviation. The findings of this 
study also call for attention from government policymakers and microcredit providers to lessen 
any negative impacts of microcredit on the wellbeing of the borrowing households, especially 
on their children’s education, which is crucial to any society’s goal to curtail poverty in the 
long run.  
 Policy implications 
Based on the findings from this in-depth analysis, microcredit appears to be an effective tool 
for the poor to smooth consumption and improve other welfares. However, to lift the poor out 
of poverty in a sustainable way, the Vietnamese government should implement a number of 
policies to boost up microcredit provision and its effectiveness. 
First, the loan size needs to be increased. Small loans limit the scope of investment options for 
households. Due to the limit, borrowers might only invest in less profitable projects and 
generate an income that is insufficient to cover all costs of borrowing, such as repayment, and 
at the same time maintain a reasonable living standard. Consequently, the repayment for 
previous borrowings become a burden for household’s food consumption. 
Second, additional skill training workshops/short courses should be provided along with 
microcredit provision. The additional non-financial services, such as business skills training 
and information on investment options, are to improve the effectiveness of using microcredit 
loans. The non-financial services help, in a sustainable way, the less-fortune class gain 
sufficient knowledge of doing business or investment. As such, the poor microcredit clients 
might gain more confidence and is expected to increase the probability of being successful in 
using microcredit. 
Third, the requirement of physical collateral to secure a loan should be made flexible or waived. 
Given the significant positive role of microcredit, it is welfare-improving to increase the 
microcredit access to poor households. To do so, microcredit providers need to overcome the 
lack of “physical collateral” by accepting “social collateral”. Microcredit providers can adopt 




the poor households will have a better chance to access finance. Successful use of microcredit 
loans helps them further improve the size and quality of their social network. Eventually, it is 
likely for those poor rural households to break the poverty trap. 
Fourth, policymakers and microcredit providers should regularly examine the impacts of their 
services at the household level. The impacts might change over time and depend on the 
objectives of different microcredit programs. Therefore, frequently assessing the programs’ 
impacts allows the microcredit stakeholders to revise and improve their policies to achieve 
their development goals, especially poverty reduction. More importantly, MFIs should strictly 
monitor loan use to make sure their financial assistance to the poor is used for the right 
purposes. 
Fifth, microcredit providers should also organise regular meetings (e.g., monthly, quarterly) 
for its clients. Their attendance at such meetings should be made as part of the requirements of 
obtaining a microcredit loan. These meetings can be used by microcredit officers to (1) provide 
training to help the clients to improve their business skills, (2) ask their clients to update their 
business progress and performance, and (3) provide their clients with any changes in credit-
related regulatory requirements.  
Sixth, MFIs should offer preferred loans that target only education such as credit for school-
related fees (i.e., textbook, tuition fee) as an additional option to minimise the adverse impact 
of microcredit on children’s education. Along with lending, lenders should provide training 
courses to increase borrowers’ awareness of the value of education for their children. This can 
help the poor to keep their children longer in school, most beneficial to curtail poverty for those 
households and the broad community in the long run. 
Seventh, policymakers and financial institutions should pay more attention to the child labour 
effect. Using microcredit for household’s business often requires extra labour to work. For 
instance, borrowers might use the loans to purchase livestock, such as cows or chickens. 
Subsequently, children might be asked to take care of the animals, and thereby it affects 
negatively the children's school time. To overcome such a barrier, a term of non-using child 
labour should be added to the loan contract, particularly for the projects that are labour 




 Limitations and future research 
There are some limitations in this research, which also helps to pinpoint directions for future 
research. First, one of the main limitations of this research is that the data were obtained from 
general-purpose surveys and cover only 12 provinces in Vietnam. It is possible for future 
studies to shed more light on the role of microcredit by using quasi-experimental data or 
randomised experiments with a more nationally representative dataset that covers all 64 
provinces in Vietnam. 
This study has only focussed on rural areas in Vietnam, where the residents’ livelihood is 
mostly related to agriculture. Future research can be extended to urban areas and compare the 
difference between rural and urban areas regarding the impacts of microcredit. In addition, 
future research can explore the difference between the poor and non-poor households regarding 
the impacts of microcredit, which should provide better insight regarding the differential role 
of microcredit. 
In this study, a household’s food consumption is measured by summing up expenditure on 
several food items in the last four weeks at the time of the survey. It is possible that not all food 
expenditure is captured in the surveys. Moreover, the four-week food expenditure might not be 
representative of monthly average food spending. Similarly, the social network size and quality 
indexes are used to proxy a household’s social capital. These two dimensions might not be 
sufficient to capture the whole picture of the household’s network. Improvements in the 
measurements of food consumption and social networks are beneficial and are called for.  
This thesis has focused on three outcomes of interest, namely food consumption, social 
network, and children’s education. They are three important dimensions of the multi-faceted 
poverty issue. Still, they cannot provide a full picture of how microcredit helps combat poverty 
issue. To provide more comprehensive assessments, future studies need to extend their 
examination of the impacts of microcredit on more aspects of poor households, such as 
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Appendix A: Difference Generalised Method of Moments estimation. 
Household food 
consumption 
Difference GMM Difference GMM with external 
IVs 
Coefficients Robust SE Coefficients Robust SE 
log Ct-1 0.619 1.106 -0.230 0.231 
log Kt -0.270 0.593 0.159 0.148 
log Kt-1 0.683 0.496 0.859** 0.369 
Et -0.832 0.608 -0.443 0.300 
Et-1 2.403 1.637 2.153 1.500 
SISt -1.679* 0.983 -1.568* 0.912 
SISt-1 -0.050 0.112 -0.099 0.087 
log Yt 0.061 0.086 0.030 0.067 
log Yt-1 -0.022 0.127 -0.094 0.081 
EduHt 0.049 0.089 0.035 0.071 
EduHt-1 -0.481 0.360 -0.374 0.260 
HSizet 0.648 0.808 0.025 0.237 
HSizet-1 0.040 0.037 0.029 0.034 
AgeHt -0.003 0.034 -0.015 0.031 
AgeHt-1 -0.394 0.440 -0.474 0.402 
log Plott 0.612* 0.335 0.416* 0.225 
log Plott-1 -0.064 0.296 0.111 0.192 
Dept -0.798 1.227 0.148 0.340 
Dept-1 -1.514 1.204 -1.890* 0.999 
Nfarmingt 0.931* 0.555 0.810* 0.477 
Nfarmingt-1 -0.447 0.456 -0.434 0.403 
Shockt 0.956** 0.421 0.765** 0.326 
Shockt-1 0.978* 0.551 0.838 0.524 
Localt 0.833 0.774 1.029 0.712 
Localt-1 -0.627 0.762 -0.327 0.586 
Poort 0.286 0.427 0.085 0.306 
Poort-1 0.253 0.319 0.118 0.250 
     
Year YES YES 
AR(1) -1.86** -2.54** 
AR(2) 0.39 0.02 
Hansen test 4.24 4.85 
Number of instruments 33 36 
Observations 6,827 6,827 
Number of households 2,687 2,687 
   
Note: ***, **, and * indicate the statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  




Appendix B: Collinearity diagnostics. 
 
  
Table B1. Collinearity diagnostics 
Variables VIF SQRT VIF Tolerance R-Squared 
     
log Microcredit (M) 1.06 1.03 0.9456 0.0544 
School gap (E) 1.31 1.14 0.7644 0.2356 
log non-business income (Y) 1.08 1.04 0.9240 0.0760 
log Wealth (W) 1.24 1.11 0.8072 0.1928 
Education of head (EduH) 1.33 1.15 0.7514 0.2486 
Household size (HSize) 2.33 1.53 0.4288 0.5712 
Age of head (AgeH) 1.19 1.09 0.8416 0.1584 
log Land size(Plot) 1.37 1.17 0.7283 0.2717 
Dependent members (Dep) 1.90 1.38 0.5261 0.4739 
Non-farming (Nfarming) 1.11 1.05 0.8999 0.1001 
Income shock (Shock) 1.11 1.06 0.8983 0.1017 
Poor status (Poor) 1.20 1.10 0.8300 0.1700 
Local resident (Local) 1.08 1.04 0.9218 0.0782 
   





Appendix C: Impacts of microcredit on children’s education. 
 Completed grade  Frequency  Per cent  Cumulative 
0 14 0.19 0.19 
1 92 1.27 1.47 
2 185 2.56 4.02 
3 465 6.43 10.45 
4 762 10.54 20.99 
5 971 13.43 34.42 
6 955 13.21 47.62 
7 916 12.67 60.29 
8 847 11.71 72.00 
9 1,011 13.98 85.98 
10 560 7.74 93.72 
11 396 5.48 99.20 
12 58 0.8 100 




 Table C1: Summary of school gap for children aged from 12 to 18 
 School gap  Frequency  Per cent  Cumulative 
0 30 0.41 0.41 
1 536 7.41 7.83 
2 3,094 42.78 50.61 
3 1,514 20.93 71.54 
4 911 12.6 84.14 
5 455 6.29 90.43 
6 258 3.57 94 
7 187 2.59 96.58 
8 129 1.78 98.37 
9 62 0.86 99.23 
10 35 0.48 99.71 
11 10 0.14 99.85 
12 11 0.15 100 
Total 7,232 100.00 100.00 
 
 






Table C3: Marginal effects of microcredit, boys versus girls. 
VARIABLES 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
School gap (Schgap) Completed grade (Grades) 
Girls Boys Girls Boys 
     
log Microcredit (M) 0.0418 0.0896** -0.0653 -0.0922* 
 (0.0450) (0.0399) (0.0517) (0.0522) 
Child’s gender (Childgender)     
     
Child’s age (Childage) 0.191*** 0.249*** 0.804*** 0.741*** 
 (0.0129) (0.0130) (0.0141) (0.0136) 
Birth order (Birthorder) 0.0471** 0.0501** -0.0607** -0.0620** 
 (0.0220) (0.0230) (0.0275) (0.0287) 
log Non-business income (Y) 0.00565 0.00150 -0.00484 -0.000103 
 (0.0106) (0.0111) (0.00917) (0.00946) 
log Wealth (W) -0.0189 -0.0633*** 0.0235* 0.0761*** 
 (0.0118) (0.0116) (0.0142) (0.0149) 
Education of head (EduH) -0.320*** -0.308*** 0.310*** 0.275*** 
 (0.0379) (0.0365) (0.0383) (0.0357) 
Household size (HSize) 0.0261 0.0610** -0.0585** -0.0997*** 
 (0.0237) (0.0244) (0.0280) (0.0289) 
Age of head (AgeH) 0.0179*** 0.00307 -0.0192*** -0.00217 
 (0.00486) (0.00452) (0.00586) (0.00480) 
log Land (Plot) 0.128*** 0.0353 -0.0898*** -0.0149 
 (0.0259) (0.0282) (0.0251) (0.0284) 
Dependent members (Dep) 0.0816*** 0.106*** -0.0515 -0.0820** 
 (0.0298) (0.0302) (0.0335) (0.0341) 
Non-farming (Nfarming) -0.141** -0.171** 0.118* 0.148* 
 (0.0609) (0.0729) (0.0631) (0.0798) 
Income-shock (Shock) -0.116** -0.0664 0.125** 0.0699 
 (0.0530) (0.0569) (0.0552) (0.0575) 
Poor status (Poor) 0.423*** 0.245*** -0.474*** -0.271*** 
 (0.0661) (0.0694) (0.0743) (0.0769) 
Local household (Local) 0.255*** 0.105 -0.281*** -0.116 
 (0.0810) (0.0831) (0.0890) (0.0921) 
     
Observations 3,541 3,691 3,541 3,691 
Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic 44.008*** 64.507*** 44.008*** 64.507*** 
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 22.180* 32.685* 22.180* 32.685* 
Hansen's J statistic 0.412 2.189 0.332 2.196 
     
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate the statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 % level, respectively; the coefficients 
reported are marginal effects; bootstrap standard errors presented in the parentheses; the variable Childgender is 






Table C4: Marginal effects of microcredit, poor versus non-poor children. 
VARIABLES 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
School gap (Schgap) Completed grade (Grades) 
Poor Non-poor Poor Non-poor 
     
log Microcredit (M) 0.0764 0.0825** -0.110* -0.107** 
 (0.0501) (0.0383) (0.0621) (0.0495) 
Child’s gender (Childgender) -0.274*** -0.262*** 0.284*** 0.272*** 
 (0.0564) (0.0482) (0.0584) (0.0521) 
Child’s age (Childage) 0.268*** 0.160*** 0.715*** 0.857*** 
 (0.0132) (0.0122) (0.0138) (0.0135) 
Birth order (Birthorder) 0.0550*** 0.0388 -0.0640** -0.0460 
 (0.0210) (0.0258) (0.0252) (0.0297) 
log Non-business income (Y) -0.0165 0.00594 0.0122 -0.00683 
 (0.0172) (0.00778) (0.0151) (0.00789) 
log Wealth (W) -0.0389*** -0.0358** 0.0429*** 0.0378** 
 (0.0105) (0.0148) (0.0122) (0.0159) 
Education of head (EduH) -0.271*** -0.301*** 0.254*** 0.306*** 
 (0.0405) (0.0306) (0.0386) (0.0329) 
Household size (HSize) 0.0367 0.0545** -0.0627** -0.0967*** 
 (0.0241) (0.0241) (0.0267) (0.0294) 
Age of head (AgeH) 0.0119*** 0.00861 -0.0120*** -0.00946 
 (0.00433) (0.00575) (0.00460) (0.00648) 
log Land (Plot) 0.213*** -0.0150 -0.170*** 0.0387 
 (0.0305) (0.0271) (0.0258) (0.0311) 
Dependent members (Dep) 0.111*** 0.0510* -0.0792** -0.00713 
 (0.0298) (0.0304) (0.0328) (0.0328) 
Non-farming (Nfarming) -0.134* -0.199*** 0.130* 0.217*** 
 (0.0690) (0.0686) (0.0739) (0.0745) 
Income-shock (Shock) -0.122** -0.0652 0.119** 0.0768 
 (0.0591) (0.0519) (0.0598) (0.0565) 
Poor status (Poor)     
     
Local household (Local) 0.134 0.158** -0.174 -0.189*** 
 (0.0962) (0.0646) (0.113) (0.0725) 
     
Observations 4,154 3,078 4,154 3,078 
Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic 60.418*** 38.701*** 60.418*** 38.701*** 
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 30.537* 19.495* 30.537* 19.495* 
Hansen's J statistic 2.547 0.551 2.724 0.551 
     
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate the statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 % levels, respectively; the coefficients 
reported are marginal effects; bootstrap standard errors presented in the parentheses; the variable Poor is omitted 
to avoid the multicollinearity problem; all estimations are IV Poisson regression model; group of poor households 
which includes those households identified as poor at least once in any survey round. 
